

A N
E S S A Y
O N

VIRTUE and HARMONY,
WHEREIN

A Reconciliation of the various Accounts of
moral Obligation is attempted.

By WILLIAM JAMESON, *A.M.*
Minister of *Kerick.*

*Nec vero quisquam potest de bonis & malis verè judicare, nisi
omni cognita ratione natura, & vita etiam Deorum; & u-
trum conveniat, necne, natura hominis cum universa.*
CICERO.

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THE RIGHT HONORABLE
ESSAYS

JOHN

OF GLASGOW

WHERIN

A RESEARCH INTO THE VARIOUS
MORAL QUALITIES IS CONTAINED
IS INTENDED

BY WILLIAM JAMESON, M.A.
MINIST. 43

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EDWARD VII
Presented by T. J. Jameson
to the University of Glasgow
WILLIAM JAMESON

TO
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
JOHN
Earl of GLASGOW,

The following ESSAY
Is Inscribed,

BY

His Lordship's

Most humble Servant,

WILLIAM JAMESON.

TO
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

J O H N

EARL OF GLASGOW

THE FOLLOWING ESSAY

IS FORWARDED

BY

WILLIAM JAMIESON

ESQ. OF THE BARR

WILLIAM JAMIESON

AN
ESSAY
ON

Virtue and Harmony.

INTRODUCTION.

VARIOUS are the Methods
used by the Learned, to
illustrate the Difference between
Virtue and *Vice*, and to prove the
moral Obligations. Many and
warm have been the Debates, long
and earnest the Contentions, while
the Interest of *Virtue*, we can well
believe, has been equally at heart
with the several Parties engaged in
them. And as they may be re-
garded

garded as all agreeing in this, so it may be presumed that few, if any, of their Schemes ought to be entirely rejected, how difficult or impracticable soever it may be, to defend them in every Particular. They generally build on some Part of the moral Ground-work or Plan; but in this, very possibly, lies the Error or Defect, that they take not in the whole of the complex Foundation. One is apt to persuade one's self, that no Realist in Morality, who believes Virtue to be founded in *the Nature of Things*, will deny that any Scheme which differs from *Nature* in any Particular, or takes in for its Ground-plan a larger or less Extent, than the true Foundation of Virtue, must be in so far wrong: And that Scheme which doth most exactly, and in every Part of it, agree unto Nature, and most fully and compleatly build the Super-structure upon the whole and every

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ry part of the moral Foundation, is, of all others the truest and the best.

THIS has given Occasion to the following Essay, in which a short and easy Scheme is endeavoured; and though the Plan should appear unusual, the Attempt, at worst, may be deemed excusable; since it may possibly throw some farther Light upon a Subject of infinite Consequence to Mankind, or, perhaps, by some lucky Hints, moderate the Heat of contending *Friends*, or, at least, adapt the Argument to some Classes of Readers.

IN order to the forming any such Essay, System, or Scheme, 'tis necessary to take Things pretty deep, and to trace Virtue through all its various Turnings up to its Origin; and to enquire into its Harmony, Agreement and Coincidence with

the Nature of *Man* in particular, of the *Universe* in general, and of the original Model and Cause of the whole, the *Divinity*.

WE may indeed, and for any thing I know we must, take our Being upon Trust. We may likewise take it for granted, that we are conscious and intelligent Beings, without waiting for Argument, or seeking rigid Demonstration. And that we are not intelligent Machines, has an equal Claim to our fullest Persuasion: If Proof here be difficult, this is some Comfort, 'tis needless. Our Consciousness that we act voluntarily, and with Choice, and not by Compulsion, is sufficient for our Satisfaction; and our own Experience is as persuasive as any Demonstration: And were it possible really to doubt, whether we are, or are not, mere passive Instruments of Action; one might

Introduction.

might satisfy himself as to this, by his own conscious Feelings and Experience, to better Purpose than the greatest Philosopher could do by his Arguments, and more expeditiously than the readiest of them all could bring his Proofs together.

If the Powers of human Nature are considered, and final Causes admitted, that Man was designed for Action, cannot be refused; this at least cannot be denied, that Action is needful, in order to Life, Subsistence, and Happiness.

CONCERNING the Actings of our Mind, of which outward Actions are only the visible Effects and external Representations, the following Things may be remarked: No Motion of the Will or Affections arises, but in Consequence of some Perception of the Under-

standing. Bare Perceptions, that appear absolutely indifferent, do not put the Mind into Motion at all. Those Perceptions only excite to inward Action or Motion, that are attended with Pleasure or Pain. When there is a pleasant Perception, or an Apprehension of something desirable or good in any Object, Action, or Event, the Soul doth embrace, or desire to enjoy it; and on the other Hand, when there is a painful Perception, or an Apprehension of something undesirable or evil, in any Object, Action, or Event; the Soul doth shun it, or desire to get rid of it. Now since the escaping of Evil is to be reckoned under the Notion of Good, and to be accounted a Happiness; and since the Soul can only act in Prospect of Evil to be shunned, or Pleasure to be enjoyed, it follows, that the Soul is put into Motion, or excited

ted to Action, only by the Prospect and Desire of Good.

It is not asserted, that every Desire of Good doth excite to Action; for where the Means of Attainment, or the Consequences of Enjoyment, are looked upon with Aversion, as Evil; and the attractive and repulsive Forces are equally balanced, no Action will follow; it is only in general affirmed, that the Prospect and Desire of Good is that which puts the Soul in Motion.

FURTHER, it is not said, that the Good, the Prospect whereof excites to Action, must be a private Good, which only one can enjoy; for let Good be never so diffusive, and common to others, one on the Prospect of it, may no less desire it, and therefore be thereby no less put into Motion.

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THE several Senses external or internal, give Rise to those affecting Ideas of Pleasure or Pain, that do excite to Action. Thus, do Hunger and Thirst, and other Sensations from without — Thus, do the pleasant or painful Sensations, arising from the Senses of Harmony, Novelty, Benevolence, &c. set the Mind in Motion. Such affecting Ideas of Pleasure or Pain, in whatever way they are raised in the Mind, have a Tendency to excite to Motion, and none but affecting Ideas, no Ideas merely indifferent, do at all excite to Action.

If it be a true and just Account of the Matter, (which is only to be known by attending to what passes within) that no Ideas but affecting Ideas of Pleasure and Pain, or pleasant or painful Sensations

tions do excite to Action: Then these are the Springs of Action:— Or, this Instinct toward Good negative or positive—this Disposition to act *sub ratione boni*—this Determination to act, when affecting Ideas of Pleasure or Pain do arise, is the *Source*, the only *Source* and *Spring* of every voluntary Action.

To comply with this Determination, cannot be called a *Duty* properly, or a *moral Virtue*, even taking the Obligations of Virtue for granted, any more than Gravitation can be so called. A Duty, or a Virtue, supposes a Liberty of acting, whereas this is a natural Principle, and the Exertion of the motive Powers only in Prospect of Good, is a *necessary* Consequence of the very Frame of our Nature. Men obey these Powers, they must do so, nor can they do otherwise. This is as inseparable from our Nature,

Nature; as Gravitation is from heavy Bodies: And it is in that Point of View so like Gravitation or Attraction, that though the Term be unusual, and perhaps not altogether proper, yet as a better does not occur, it may be at least metaphorically called *mental Gravitation* or *Attraction*.

It is this Determination of the Mind to act in Prospect of Good, or on the Presence of pleasantly or painfully affecting Ideas; a Determination it is never conscious of, when no Good is in Prospect, or when the Ideas are barely indifferent; it is this, I say, which Philosophers mean, when they assert, that "Self-love, or the Desire of Happiness, is the Spring of all our Actions." At least, this is a safe way of explaining these Words, and very probably it is all they understand by them. But whether

whether the Term *Self-love* be a proper one, or may occasion a Confusion of Ideas, if at other Times it be used to signify private Self-affection, and whether the equivocal Use of this Term may not be apt to perplex a *moral Enquiry*, may fall under our further Examination afterwards.

MEAN WHILE we may advert, that this *Determination*, whose Operation we have observed to depend upon the Presence of affecting Ideas of Good, is variously named by different Theorists on this Subject. It is this, it would seem, that some intend by the Term *Self-love*, which they hold to be the sole Motive of human Actions: The same Principle is denoted by *Uneasiness*, which others maintain to be the secret Spring that urges us to pursue Good, as well as to avoid Ill, and
of

of Consequence to be the sole Source of all our Motions.

Now whether it be said, that
“ Uneasiness is the Spring of all
“ our Actions;” Or, that “ Self-
“ love, the sole Spring of Moti-
“ on, actuates the Soul;” Or, that
“ the only *Source* of Action, is
“ the natural and necessary Dis-
“ position of the Mind, determi-
“ mining and putting it into Mo-
“ tion, on being affected with
“ pleasing or painful Sensations;”
it is of chief Consequence to re-
member, that each of these
Forms of Expression are equally
significant of the same Thing;
and also that amidst the vast Va-
riety of *particular* Motives to
Action, hard to be delineated,
and of difficult Investigation, there
is one great and *general* Source
into which all these do resolve
themselves, and from which all of
them

they arise, *viz.* the Disposition of the Mind to move or act in Prospect of Good, which because of its Resemblance to that *Phenomenon*, I have presumed to call *mental Gravitation* or *Attraction*.

By the Way it may be remarked, that they who build a moral Scheme on *Self-love*, build on a Principle which is really in our Nature: And one need scarcely enter into a War with them for asserting, that Self-love is the Origin of virtuous Actions, if it is owned to be likewise the Origin of vicious Actions, and the Spring of Action in general, however directed. It may also be observed, that those who refer the Spring of Action to *Uneasiness*, may with equal Justness build a moral Scheme upon that Principle. Nor can it well be refused after what has been said, that *mental Attraction*,

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or

or the natural and necessary Determination of the Mind to act only in prospect of Good, may with equal Propriety be established as the Foundation to the moral Scheme. But it is perhaps more strictly proper to call this the *great Out-line* than the Foundation itself. In general it may be asserted, that were there no motive Powers in our Nature, nor any known general Spring of our Motion and Action, into which particular Motives did resolve themselves, it would be difficult to establish any Principles, which might serve to influence and conduct our voluntary Motions: For if Man had no natural Determination to act in prospect of Good, how could general Rules of Conduct be fix'd; or what sort of Rules could be laid down?

To

To proceed: Though the *Motive-faculty* is put in Motion only by the Presence of affecting Ideas, and excited to Action only by the Prospect of Good; yet the Mind having several Images of Good presented to it, and these being supposed to exhibit various Degrees of Good, the human Soul has, in most Cases at least, a Power to suspend its Motion, or the Exertion and Execution of its Desires towards any particular Species, till once it has carefully examined which of them contains the greatest Quantity of Good. Thus the several Sorts of Good, present or future, may be compared, and an Estimate made of their various Degrees. That such a Comparison and Estimate ought to be made, is evident from hence, that all the several Sorts and Degrees of Good which may present

B 2

them-

themselves to our View, may not have an equal Fitness to promote our Happiness, or gratify our Desire of Good. A greater Good has a greater Degree of Fitness to do so than a lesser. That which is ultimate Evil to any Man has no Degree of Fitness to answer this original Bent, and necessary Determination of his Mind towards Good. And it is evident that what is relatively Good may be ultimately Evil; so, three Degrees of Good by occasioning nine Degrees of Evil, after making all Deductions, produce six Degrees of ultimate Evil to the *private System*.

THIS, one would think, is sufficient to shew how much this natural Principle and necessary Determination of the Soul, to act in prospect of Good, stands in need of Direction and Conduct, in order

der to the Attainment of Happiness or ultimate Good, which alone, properly speaking, can be called *Good*. What renders the Distinction between relative and ultimate Good still more important, and the right Direction of this natural and necessary Principle infinitely more momentous, is the reasonable Ground we have to conclude that Matter, however variegated and modified, is incapable of Thought; and therefore that the Mind is a simple, uncompounded and spiritual Substance, and consequently naturally immortal; and hence it may be inferred, that it is capable of Happiness or Misery through an endless Duration.

IF the Inference of the natural Immortality of the Soul from its Spirituality, should appear to any not quite clear and satisfactory;

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thus

thus far however it may be allowed to be strictly conclusive, to say, that since the Soul is spiritual, it may be immortal, notwithstanding any Influence that Matter, or the Laws of Matter, can have to the contrary: Whence it may be concluded, that it depends entirely on the Will of that Being who created it, for the Continuation of its Existence; and if we can assign no Reason why he will annihilate it, we may rest persuaded of its Immortality, as being at least, highly probable. The universal Consent of all Nations, which *Cicero* thinks may be appeal'd to as a Law of Nature, might likewise be insisted on, as an Argument of the Soul's Immortality. And from the Goodness of the Deity, brought in by way of Postulate, the same Doctrine might be farther confirmed. And from all these taken together in

in one collective View, the Conclusion, so highly agreeable to our earnest Desires, might be drawn at large.

BUT to proceed: This Instinct or Appetite of Good, which the *Author of Nature* has inlaid in our Frame, does not create, or furnish itself with the Ideas or Images of Good, but receives their Impressions from the several Senses, external or internal: Neither can it judge with Care and Caution, and give the Preference where it is due. It is a Desire that is altogether indeterminate, and destitute of the least Power of distinguishing whether the particular Objects of Good that affect it, be relative or ultimate, real or apparent. It is an urgent but blind Propensity toward Good that never examines the Kind or Degree or Consequence: And if we chuse
to

to express this Principle by the Term *Self-love*, the following Thought will appear to be as just as it is poetical,

*So drives Self-love, thro' just and
thro' unjust,
To one Man's Power, Ambition,
Lucre, Lust.*

The ingenious Poet observes with great Justice, that Reason must direct and guide this Principle, else Man will be active to no End. This instinctive Principle, on the Perception of affecting Ideas, awakes the Mind, and as the Pebble stirs the peaceful Lake, rouses it from Inactivity; but because it is a blind indiscriminating Principle, it stands in absolute Need of the Conduct and Guidance of the Understanding.

HENCE

HENCE we are led to an Enquiry of all others the most important,
“ How shall we direct this natural and necessary Principle by which we are excited to Action in prospect of Good, or on the Presence of pleasing or painful Ideas, and which, whether it be called the Desire of Good, Self-love, Uneasiness, or mental Attraction, is the original Source and general Spring of all our voluntary Motions or Actions?”
And it is the main Point in question in this Enquiry, “ Are there in the Course and Constitution of Things any certain Measures and Rules, in a Conformity to which, the way of acquiring the ultimate Good is to be ascertained; or may it be as effectually secured by a Neglect of these Measures, and a loose and random Manner of Conduct, and an
“ in-

“ inconsiderate Pursuit of every
 “ Species and first Appearance of
 “ Good, without any Distinction
 “ or Exception?” The Resolution
 of which may serve to illustrate
 and establish the Obligations of
 Virtue.

PART I

PART I.

IF there be such a Thing as Virtue or Morality, it must be of universal Concern, and relate to every intelligent Agent with whom we have any Connexion; it may therefore be fit to enquire, at least, in a more general Manner, "Who, or what we are? And where? And with whom more immediately connected?" For how otherwise shall we be able to know what is Virtue; in other Words, what is our ultimate Good, or how it can be obtained?

THE slightest Attention fully satisfies us, that besides these conscious Intelligencies, our Minds, we are possessed of Bodies, of material Systems, consisting of several Members or Parts. Our Place
of

of Abode, is a World various in its Parts, stupenduous in Bulk, and curious in its Fabrick and Contrivance; and amidst all the numberless Variety of Beings in this Universe, there appears to be a joint Relation unto, and Union in one great Whole. The more we survey this vast System, with all its several Parts animate and inanimate, we find still greater Reason to conclude, that it could not have been the casual Product of Chance, nor the blind Effect of undirected Force; and therefore that it must have been the Contrivance and Work of an intelligent and most powerful Agent. Nor can any one miss to draw this Inference, that the Creator of the Universe, and First Cause of Existence, is Eternal, Independent, and Self-existent? Besides, from the Relation that every Thing in the Universe within our Observation, seems

Part I. *Virtue, &c.* 25

seems to bear to one System or whole, it is highly credible that there is but *One* supreme Creator.

NONE of the Philosophers, if we except those who meant to deny the Being of a GOD, have refused a Divine Providence. It would seem indeed to be probable, that the omnipotent Power and unerring Skill which made the World, is alone sufficient for all the Purposes of its Administration. However, an impartial Searcher after Truth cannot fail to observe, that innumerable Appearances do conspire to demonstrate the Certainty of Providence. The Disposition and Appointment of so great a Variety of Occurrences, according to certain stated, regular and wise Laws, is a Matter of Fact that cannot be denied: The Diurnal and annual Revolutions, with numberless other *Phænomena*, appear

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to

to be natural and fixed; and put the Reality of Divine Providence beyond all reasonable Doubt.

THE following general Observation concerning the Spirit and Extent of *Providence*, merits to be remarked, at the same time that it falls in with our Purpose; that “as
“ a certain Kind of Weather may
“ be expected in certain Seasons,
“ so a certain Kind of Effects do,
“ in general, follow certain Actions. As in the material World,
“ Men do not gather Grapes of
“ Thorns, and Figs of Thistles, but
“ the Fruit is correspondent to the
“ Stock, and the Grain reaped is
“ of the very same Sort with the
“ Seed that was sown; so in the
“ moral World, (as is sufficiently
“ known from Experience) Men
“ generally do, in the Fruits and
“ Effects of their Actions, reap agreeably to what they sowed;
“ such

“ Such is the Result of that Order
“ and Disposition which God ori-
“ ginally established in the Crea-
“ tion.” This is what is called the
natural Course and Consequence of
Things.

It being impossible for us se-
riously to call this in question, it
follows that (if we are truly con-
cern'd about Happiness) it must
appear to be of the utmost Mo-
ment to us what our Actions are,
seeing the Divine Government in-
terests itself in them so particularly.
For the good Effects of Actions
may be deemed to be their natural
Reward, and the bad Effects of o-
thers their natural Punishment, ap-
pointed to take place by an esta-
blished Connexion of Consequen-
ces in the Progress of the moral
State of the World; and designed
to caution us, and to direct us in
our Elections, and to enlighten

our Way in the whole of our Conduct.

It seems highly reasonable to suppose that Nature, or (to speak more properly) the Author of Nature does nothing in vain, and that every Being in the Universe has a *Part* allotted to it, and is endued with a Nature and Constitution suited to that Part. Our Ignorance of the Use of some Things does not infer that they are useless; nay, further, our Knowledge of the actual Accomplishment of the Ends and Purposes of innumerable Beings, seems sufficient to persuade us, that our not perceiving the Use and Design of some other Things is only owing to the Narrowness of our Knowledge; and gives not any just Ground to imagine that the Deity did constitute Parts in the Whole, which are of no manner of account to the Whole.

THIS

THIS Argument is equally good, whether we speak of the Parts of the great Whole, the Universe, or of any particular System or Individual. For since the Author of Nature does nothing in vain, it will equally hold that the several Members have been fitted by him, each to its particular Design, and adapted for the Part allotted to it, as well as suited to the Whole itself. The Constitution, for Instance, of any kind of Animal, and its particular Structure are suited to its Design and End: Whatever be its Use, its Manner of Life, or the Element where its Province lies, its Constitution and Make is suited to these. The Birds are furnished with Wings for the Air, and the Fishes with Fins for the Water; the like may be observed of the other animal Tribes.

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THERE

EXPERIENCE warrants this further Observation, that every living Creature is in its best State, when acting its Part according to its Nature and Make: Or, "That which is natural to it, "is likewise its Happiness or "Good." If any Animal is hinder'd to proceed in his natural Way, and to follow his constitutional Bent, he is thereby render'd in so far unhappy. Take the Horse from the verdant Meadow, where healthful and at Freedom he enjoys all the Good he is capable of, lift him up into the airy Regions, he suddenly tumbles headlong, frightened and bruised, or killed with the Fall. The Fish which delights itself in the Water with the Variety and Sprightliness of its Motions, when fetch'd to dry Land, lies gasping and panting, and with painful Efforts,

forts struggles for Life in vain. And if any of the wilder Animals be caught, and confined to an unusual and unnatural Way of Life, how evident and numerous are the Signs they discover of Uneasiness and Pain? Nor less manifest are the Tokens of their Pleasure and Joy, when permitted to return to their native Element, to Freedom and the Bent of their Nature.

Now seeing it is so very obvious and certain that, with respect to the brutal Animals, that which is natural to each, is likewise its Happiness; may it not be presumed that with *Man*, the *Master-animal* on Earth, the Case is the same? Even in the View of abstract Reasoning, it appears highly absurd to maintain, that the Happiness of *any* Being lies cross to its original Structure and Make:
And

And as in all the Observations we have Access to make, we meet with no one Individual constituted in so strange and untoward a Manner; can we with any Face of Probability suppose that the Happiness of *Man* consists in Opposition to his Nature? By no means. The Harmony, Analogy and Resemblance, observable among the Works of the Almighty Creator, are sufficient to make us conclude the reverse.

Such as require more particular Evidence of this Matter, may easily satisfy themselves, that if a Man be left in the Regions of the Air, he precipitantly falls; or in the Water, he quickly sinks; or if any Bone be forced out of its natural Articulation or Place, or if the natural Motion of the Blood be obstructed, the certain Consequence is Uneasiness and Pain.

Hence

Hence whatever is most natural, is most conducive to Happiness or Good; and whatever is unnatural must cause Unhappiness, so far as the Body is concerned in the Conveyance either of Pleasure or Pain. The same Thing must also hold of the *Mind*, unless it be framed in a Manner no way parallel'd by any other Thing in the universal Creation; and quite the reverse of the Body with which it is joined in so close and intimate an Union: And as we can see no Reason to favour a Supposition so very awkward and apparently absurd, we have sufficient Ground to conclude, that the original Structure of the Soul of Man is not unfriendly to his Happiness or Good; but that similarly to what happens to all the other Parts of the Universe, to every living Being within our Ken, whatever is most *natural* is most conducive to our Happiness, whatever

ever *unnatural*, to our Misery; even where the Pleasure or Pain does arise from the Thoughts and Reflexions about which the Mind is immediately employed, as well as from Impressions of Objects that are external to the Mind.

AND thus by saying, that “for
“ Man to follow his Nature, and
“ act agreeably to his Constitution,
“ and primitive original Frame, is
“ the best Way to attain ultimate
“ Good, or real Happiness,” the
Question proposed is answered in
a more general, and perhaps superficial Manner.

’Tis indeed requisite that somewhat more be taken in, and that certain particular Considerations be added, by way of farther Explication of *Human Nature*; for in order to the following our Nature, it is needful to know it, and

and the more fully and distinctly we know it, the Measures of Conduct will still more easily and clearly discover themselves.

PART II.

PART II.

IN an Enquiry like this there is the less Need of Argument, that Certainty may be obtained by our giving due Attention to the State and Progress of Things in the Mind. I may be therefore allowed the Liberty of proceeding with some Observations obvious to every one's Attention, and with such Definitions as appear to be necessary for better understanding them.

It has been already observed, that the Ideas which excite to Action are either pleasant or painful; and that whatever Ideas are attended with neither of these Feelings, leave a Man absolutely indifferent, without any way affecting him, or exciting any Motion at all.

all. The affecting Ideas raised in the Mind by the Impression of external Objects, are called *Sensations*: Or, affecting Ideas thus raised and exciting to Action, are either pleasant or painful *Sensations*.

IDEAS of Pleasure or Pain do likewise more immediately arise from the Mind, without the Aid of external Impressions: These may be called *pleasant* or *painful Perceptions*; or if the Term may be allowed, *internal Sensations*.

WE find that while the Body is in a Condition fit to be acted upon by external Objects, the Mind is *passive* in the Reception of the corresponding Ideas. In like manner, while we are thinking of the Affections, Sentiments, or Actions, of ourselves, or others, the agreeable or disagreeable Perceptions,

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or

or *internal Sensations* thereby excited, are what we can as little alter or prevent, (the Apprehension and Opinion of the Affection, Sentiment or Action continuing the same) as we can arbitrarily change, or prevent an external Sensation, while the Body remains in the same Condition.

THESE Powers of receiving Sensations, or affecting Ideas, may in general be called *Senses*; and when the Ideas are entirely different, and agree in nothing but the general Idea of Sensation, they may be called *different Sensations*; and this does suppose and imply that there are different Senses: And indeed there seems to be a different Sense suited to every different Sort of Objects that can raise in us affecting Ideas. If we call the Powers of receiving pleasant or painful Perceptions, or internal Sen-
Sensa-

Sensations that arise without the Instrumentality of the Body, *internal Senses* : If we call every Power or Determination of the Mind, to receive different Species of pleasant or painful Ideas independently on the Will, a Sense, it will be found that we have several besides those usually named. They are usually restricted to *five* : I need not however insist, that there are some Sensations which proceed from external Impressions, that one cannot easily ascertain to which of the five they ought to be ascribed, or whether indeed they can be said to belong with Propriety to any of them all, which would incline one to think that this Division is more common than perfect ; though the Ground for maintaining the old Division is abundantly obvious, since there does not appear to be any other Organs besides these

five, that seem capable of furnishing a Variety of Sensations under a *Species*. But if (as *Tully* observes) the Nature of *Law* is to be gather'd from the Nature of *Man* *, his *inward Frame* would need to be accurately consulted for this Purpose. What precise Number of *internal Senses*, or Faculties of perceiving Pleasure, there may be in our Nature, I shall not pretend to determine. Upon a careful Self-inspection the following principal ones may perhaps appear discernible.

I. WE have a Determination of Mind to receive Pleasure from Discoveries new and unknown, and a Propensity to extend them farther. To this is owing our Desire of Knowledge, and Love of Truth. This is the Source of Admiration or Wonder, and of Amazement

* *De legibus, lib. I. cap. 5.*

mazement or Astonishment, which is the highest Degree and Excess of Wonder. Whether there be such a Sense or Determination of Mind in Man, every one may easily satisfy himself; but whether it has with Propriety enough been called a *Sense of Novelty*, is not a material Question; for if the Thing be understood, it is of less Consequence what the Terms are.

II. AGAIN, we have a Determination to be pleased with the Perceptions of Beauty, Harmony, Order, Proportion and Regularity. The Harmony of Sounds, the Beauty, Order and Proportion of Figures, Motions, Numbers and Colours, are highly relishing and agreeable. Though the musical Organs of some may be very weak and imperfect, and those, in particular, who have no Ear, may perhaps be found, for the most

part, to have a duller Taste for Painting, Architecture, and all Kinds of Symmetry and Order; (*an Ear* being, in general, no bad Indication of the Strength or Weakness of the Taste for Musick or Harmony of whatever Kind) yet it may possibly be affirmed, that none are utterly incapable of receiving Pleasure from the Perception of what is beautiful, harmonious and orderly. This Determination may justly enough be called the *Sense of Harmony*.

III. BESIDES, we have a Determination to love, to desire, and rejoice in the Happiness of other Beings, and to grieve at their Misery; or, a *social* or *publick Sense*. The earlielt Excursion, and Evidence of Benevolence or social Love is towards our nearest Relations and Kindred.

UNDER

UNDER this Article, *Friendship* is proper to be mentioned, and to be regarded with particular Attention, seeing, in respect of Energy and Force, and the solicitous Desire and Concern for the Welfare of those with whom we cultivate it, it is inferior to few of the natural Relations. One may presume to give a rough Draught or Description of this celebrated Relation, and delightful Charm of human Life, in the following Terms; as, “A voluntary, but intimate, Relation, and
“ perfect Union of two virtuous
“ Souls, who always think, as it
“ were, aloud, in each others Presence, being free from the least
“ Tincture of Suspicion or Distrust,
“ of Shyness or Reserve; and who
“ act upon every Occasion to the
“ utmost of their Power for one
“ another’s Good.”

HERE

HERE, likewise, it is proper to mention *Patriotism*, or the Love one bears to his Country, on account of civil Ties, and of a sort of *National Relation*.

BUT what deserves to be principally taken notice of is, that
“ A Mind not fettered by Edu-
“ cation, nor warped by Preju-
“ dices, feels this Benevolence
“ still more extensive, reaching
“ even to the whole of Mankind,
“ and enlarging wider still in its
“ Compass, in kind and affection-
“ ate Dispositions toward every
“ intelligent Being within the
“ Circle of Existence; provided
“ there be nothing in the Object
“ to raise Aversion and Hatred,
“ as *Malevolence*, *Villany*, or the
“ like.”

As

As the Degrees of this benevolent Disposition, or as the Nature or Circumstances of the Object of it vary, different Terms are used to distinguish it, as *Pity*, *Sympathy*, *Compassion*, *Sorrow*, *Regard*, *Esteem*, *Love*, *Complacency*, *Gratitude*, *Adoration* or *supreme Esteem*, and *Devotion* or *divine Love*: But after all, Words are wanting, and varying Ideas must often be expressed by the same Terms.

Too great Regard for ourselves, accompanied with a Neglect of, or undue Regard to the Happiness of others, is termed *Selfishness*. A Disposition toward their Hurt is *Malevolence*. A sudden Resentment of Injury, supposed to be received or intended, occasions *Anger*; *Fury* is the Extremity of the same Passion: And
Malice

Malice is slower and more deliberate Anger, though not less hurtful and mischievous. These occasion the Pain which the social Sense is liable to.

IV. FURTHER, along with this Disposition to love others, we have also a Determination of Mind to be pleased with, and to approve of such Benevolence; to like kind Affections and suitable Actions, wherever we observe them, whether in ourselves or others; and to dislike and disapprove or condemn their Opposites. For the Proof of this, we may trust to an Appeal to the Sentiments and Experience of Mankind; for all feel, in some Degree, this Determination of Mind in themselves, and the greatest Number will readily own themselves sensible to the Impulses of Conscience, and acknowledge

ledge the internal Feelings of the *moral Sense*. The Pain the Mind is conscious of, on seeing the Want of kind Affection in others, or their ungenerous Actions, (according as the Characters vary) is term'd *moral Aversion, Indignation* or *Contempt*, and the Pain it feels consequent upon its own unfriendly Behaviour or unkind Affection, is *Self-condemnation* and *Remorse*.

V. To add no more: That we have likewise a Sense of *Honour*, or a Determination of Mind to be pleased with the Esteem, and Love, and Gratitude, and Approbation of others, is what none can be ignorant of, who is not a perfect Stranger to himself, and what none will refuse, who fairly owns what he feels in his Mind. The Pain this Sense is liable to, is called *Shame*.

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THE Ideas of Modesty, Decency and Magnanimity do perhaps refer to this *Sense*. It is more material however to remark, that as our publick and moral Senses are not confined in their Exertions to our own Species alone, but extend their Attention to the Happiness of every Nature capable of enjoying it, and find Satisfaction in the Persuasion of their actual Possession of Good; and more especially as these generous Propensions extend to the great Author of Nature; as we feel Pleasure in loving, and in conforming our Actions to the Will and Intentions of the gracious Benefactor and indulgent Father of human Kind; so, our Desire of Honour is not stinted so far, as that it can be satisfied with the Esteem only of a particular Class or Party of our own Species, or of the whole human

man Race now existing, but we wish to secure the Love and Applause even of unborn Posterity, and in general of every intelligent Nature with whom we may have Access to join and converse in any future Period of our Being; more particularly we desire to be honour'd with the Favour and Approbation of the Deity, the Guardian and Fountain of all true Honour and Happiness. In a Word, we aspire to *Honour* nothing short of what is universal in Extent, as well as eternal in Duration.

With respect to these Determinations of our Mind, or internal Senses, let it be observed that they no more prove *innate Ideas*, than a natural good Ear can prove an innate Gamut; that Doctrine being indeed no way affected by any thing here advanced.

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BESIDES these original Desires, which incline us to seek the agreeable Sensations corresponding to every one of our Senses; our Memory, Observation and Reasoning about the Tendencies of Objects and Actions, enable us to perceive that some Things which do not immediately, and of themselves, gratify any one Sense, yet are some way useful in order to the obtaining such Gratifications; and hence arise the *secondary Desires*, (as they have been called) of what is reckon'd needful or conducive to promote the Gratification of our primary Desires. This is the Cause or Occasion (though, perhaps, not the only one) of our Desires of Power and Wealth, of Finery and Dress, rich Furniture and Equipage. This may enable us to account, in some measure, for the Keanness and Eagerness with
which

which the most arrant Trifles and Bawbles are pursued by many Men.

CICERO asserts, that this Propensity to Benevolence, (which has been above represented) is really seated in our Natures, and that it is the Foundation of the Law of Love, or Virtue *: But, in Support of this Principle, one may appeal to a greater Authority than this great Philosopher, —to the general Voice and Sentiments of Mankind. Let a plain Country Man, unacquainted with metaphysical Distinctions and the Subtilty of Disputes, be questioned on this Head, and he will readily answer, that in feeling the generous Principle, he is unconscious of the least mercenary Design; and, for Instance, that with Candour

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* *De Nat. Deor. lib. I. cap. 44. De Fin. lib. V. cap. 23. De amicitia, cap. 14. Acad. Quest. lib. I. cap. 5. &c.*

dour and Sincerity he uses the common neighbourly Salutations, as, "I'm glad to see you well—" "I'm sorry to see you ill," without being induced to this by previous Reasoning, or excited to it by the selfish Consideration, that the Happiness of his Neighbour tends to his own private Good. Any honest Heart that will but attentively try how the Matter stands, even after the severest Scrutiny, will find that it often desires the Happiness of others without any such interested Intention.

THAT *Philosophy* which maintains all our Desires to be selfish, and that in every kind Action we ultimately design our own private Advantage, appears contrary to conscious Feelings and the plainest Experience. And to insist upon the Charge of contracted selfish Design,

Design, even after strong Pro-
testations, made in consequence
of the most careful Self-inspe-
ction, to say the least of it, is
a way of proceeding not over-
modest or polite. Those who re-
present human Nature in this
Point of View, if they do not
paint exactly to the Life, have
themselves to blame, if they do
not Justice even to themselves in
the Picture. It cannot be reason-
ably doubted but that many a
plain open-hearted Peasant or Me-
chanick does a Number of kind
and charitable Actions, without
ever staying to reflect, whether
they any way contribute to his
private Good, or not. Nor is it
any thing to the Purpose, that a
learned Sage, by a subtile Argu-
ment, can prove that these chari-
table Actions do in Fact contri-
bute to his own Benefit. It is no
matter whether they do or not,

if this private Good be not his End ; if the Good of his distressed Neighbours be all he has at heart, and terminate his View in those Instances ; if beyond that his Intention do not reach. Concern for the Good of others may affect the Heart of such a Person even in his dying Moments. The Distress of one in extreme Uneasiness may alarm him at first Sight, and before he has Time to reflect, powerfully move and earnestly incline him to give Relief.

It will not be refused, that to comply with the Dictates of our social Sense, for Instance, by relieving the Needy ; as also, that when we indulge our Sense of Harmony, or in general, any other Sense, whether external or internal, we gratify *ourselves*. But it will by no means follow, that

that our Benevolence, our Pity and Compassion to the Distressed, are derived from *Selfishness*, and a Concern entirely limited to private Good. We can as little by a mere Act of our Will raise Sympathy, and an affecting Concern for one in Trouble, as we can create in our Minds a Relish for Musick or Painting, or raise at our Pleasure the Sensations of Hunger or Thirst. Every one knows that Hunger and Thirst, and a musical Ear, are not raised by Volition; as little can Compassion, or the Desire of the Happiness of others, be excited after this Manner.

WHATEVER particular Desire is once set a stirring, the natural and necessary Determination of our Nature to move or act in prospect of Good, is thereby excited to Motion. The Uneasiness of Hunger

ger being felt; the Desire of Musick being raised, the Consequence is, that this natural Disposition to act on the Presence of pleasing or painful Ideas, exerts itself to get rid of the painful Sensations, and to obtain the Good desired.

IN like manner, the uneasy Sensation of Compassion to one in evident Distress being once raised, the same natural Determination may set us at work to get rid of the uneasy Sensation, by affording Relief: But this necessary Determination of our Nature to move only on the Presence of pleasant or painful affecting Ideas, whether it be called Self-love, Uneasiness, the Desire of Happiness, the Motive-instinct, or mental Gravitation, or any other Name a fertile Imagination can invent, does not, nay, cannot furnish out to itself particular affecting Ideas,
any

any more than the Desire of Riches can procure Wealth. Self-love, or mental Attraction, cannot raise Ideas pleasantly or painfully affecting, or Sensations of one Kind or other; but our Nature having several Senses external and internal, implanted in it, different Sensations and affecting Ideas arise in Consequence of that Constitution of our Nature, altogether independently of our Will; and these Sensations and affecting Ideas being once raised, this mental Gratification puts us in Motion to obtain, or get rid of them.

If we had not such particular affecting Ideas, how could this great Principle exert itself, or find any Enjoyment? And if there were not such Faculties of Pleasure, such Powers of Sensation, in our Nature, how could there be any particular Sensations? Had we

we no natural, no original Determinations, to be pleased with the Ideas of Colours, Sounds, Sweetness, Regularity, Harmony, and with the Happiness of other Agents, this general Determination of our Nature to act then, and only then when affecting Ideas are presented to the Mind, would ever remain in a State of Impotence or Inactivity, as it would want the Means of Excitement to Motion, and every Organ and Instrument of Gratification. Should it be alleged notwithstanding, that this Self-love or Desire of Good has a kind of creative Faculty, and can procure those Determinations at pleasure, or that they depend entirely upon the Will: It is answered, That this will not be found to agree to what we find from unquestionable Experience; for who will say, that he can thus cause, or prevent, or remove any
Sen-

Sensation whatever? Particularly, can he, by an Act of his Will, cause, or prevent, or remove Hunger or Thirst? Can the Desire of Order, Beauty or Harmony; or can Compassion, or the Desire to procure Relief to our distressed Neighbour; or can the Desire of Esteem and Honour be thus procured, stopped, removed or altered optionally? By no means. And as a farther Confirmation, that these Determinations far from being only so many diversified Forms of Self-love, really operate independently of the Will, without any selfish Instigation, it may be added, that sometimes they do in fact operate and exert themselves in Instances that are so far from serving to gratify Self-love, or the Desire of private Good, that on the other hand, they occasion great Inconvenience and Uneasiness; nay, not only so,

so, but they continue thus to operate at the Expence of producing sensible Uneasiness and Pain, notwithstanding one's earnest Desire to get free of the Pain they occasion; which is Matter of clear Experience in the Case of Hunger, or Thirst, or Weariness, or Sickne's; nor is it less certain that Shame and Remorse, from Reflexions on atrocious and bloody Crimes, do, in spite of him, vex and disturb the Transgressor.

ANY Child can tell that a Wheel will move round, if the Handle be turned about; in the same Way it is also obvious, that the great general Movement of the Soul, whether called Self-love, Uneasiness, or the Motive-instinct of Attraction, will be set in Motion by any particular Feeling whatever, if it be sufficiently sensible

sible and affecting. And as a Child can see, that unless some Force be applied to turn about the Wheel, it must stand still, so with equal Evidence any one may perceive, that this Motive-instinct must remain unactive, and be incapable of exerting itself on the Absence of particular affecting Sensations.

It would be superfluous to insist at this length upon what seems so obvious, were it not that it may serve as a Guard against the Reasonings of some who take much ingenious Pains to distinguish us out of the most amiable Qualities of our Nature. These Philosophers seem to pride themselves in representing the human Heart in Features so deformed, and in Colours so gloomy and disagreeable, that one might blush or cry to find the Likeness genuine, and cannot but congratu-

late himself with some Degree of inward Exultation to find it false.

MIGHT not a subtile Philosopher, with equal Modesty, presume to argue us out of our Senses, as out of our Consciousness; and equally pretend to prove, as did *Anaxagoras*, that Snow is black, or that an Egg is an Elephant, as to assure me that the Relief I give a Stranger in Distress proceeds from Selfishness, when I am conscious I have no such Intention in View. Do we not find, that by a natural Determination we are carried, and, as it were, push'd beyond ourselves *, to the Exercises of social Love and Benevolence; and that this Disposition is not acquired but natural? What Nation, or what Clan is there on Earth so barbarous as to

* *Natura impellit*, as *Tully* expresses it, *De officiis*, lib. I. cap. 4.

be devoid of social Affection, or to be incapable of approving kind and friendly Actions, of condemning Ingratitude and Cruelty?

FROM what has been said, it appears that they who raise a Scheme of Morality upon the *publick* and *moral Senses*, found it upon what has a real Place in our Nature; these being no less natural to us than other Determinations. And though there are some who may affect to shew their Genius and Shrewdness, by subtly warping and perplexing a plain and open Argument, yet so remarkable are the generous and social Propensions of Mankind in a great Variety of Instances, that they must be readily acknowledged by every ingenuous and unprejudiced Mind. There is certainly no Man of Candour who will declare, that he never felt in him-

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self,

self, nor observed in others the least sincere Indication of what is usually called natural Affection, Friendship, Gratitude, Patriotism, or generous Desires for the Good of their Fellow-men; nor any Determination to like or approve these, wherever the Appearances of them might occur.

POSSIBLY it may be objected, that even admitting the above short Account of human Nature to be just and true, it amounts to little or nothing: That from this Representation of so many Principles, Instincts and Senses, so many Appetites and Propensions in our Nature, many of them passionate and vehement, nothing can be argued further, than that it is natural to gratify any of them which for the Time may be most urgent and importunate. In this View, is not any one particular
Indul-

Indulgence, a real Gratification of Self-love, as well as another? And at this rate, what Measure or Standard of Virtue can be determined, other than *Self-love*?

THAT we may obviate this Objection, let it be adverted, that Self-love is so far from being the only Standard of virtuous Actions, that it can be no direct and proper Rule of Virtue at all, and (as has been already observed) is a blind Guide, and stands in great need of good Conduct; being so apt as it is ever to fly out in pursuit of the first apparent Good, and to engage us in the Chase of inferior Pleasures, which terminates at last in ultimate Pain or Misery.

As for what is presumed in the Objection, "That it is natural to gratify every Instinct, Appetite,"

“ Affection or Passion which for
“ the Time may be most ur-
“ gent ;” there is neither the least
Ground for deducing it from any
thing above asserted, nor has it
any solid Foundation in itself.
Were this indeed “ to follow Na-
“ ture,” I should readily confess
that Virtue could not consist in fol-
lowing such a Course. But serious-
ly to imagine this to be the true
Sense of following Nature, is an
Effect of gross Underthinking,
as it plainly proceeds from very
raw and indigested Notions of
Things. The best Way however
to rectify the Mistake, and to as-
certain the Truth precisely, will
be by taking a more accurate Sur-
vey of our Nature ; in the Result
of which we hope it may be
found, that in like manner as the
Body is not a Parcel of loose in-
coherent Members without Con-
nexion or Dependence, but a Sy-
stem

stem of various Parts, mutually related and subservient to each other; so the inward Nature of Man no less consists of divers Parts or Powers, which by mutual Relations and proper Subordinations are or ought to be formed into a regular Constitution.

It indeed there was no Power or Principle in our Nature, which, compared with the rest, did bear the Signatures of Authority, and claim the Right of Direction over the rest; in that Case, perhaps; Man might be said to follow his Nature in gratifying every Appetite and Passion in its Turn, or indulging every Desire which happened for the Time to be uppermost. Though brute Animals indeed may be justly thought to follow their Nature, when they obey every Instinct and indulge every Appetite, as the Constitution

tion of their Bodies for the Time, or the Objects around happen to prompt and invite them; since there does not appear the least Ground to imagine that they have any thing else in their Nature, which requires a different Measure of Conduct: Yet this is not the Case with Man; there is really something in his Nature which calls for another, and very different Behaviour. However reasonable it may therefore be to maintain, that Brutes act up to their Nature, in complying with every Instigation of their Appetites; yet for Man to set up this as a Rule to himself, would not be *natural*, would not be proportionable, to the Respects, and Subordination of one Part of his Frame to another, and the Beauty and Order of his *whole Constitution*. Therefore,

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FOR a more compleat Account of our Nature, which appears so needful in order to discover our proper Measures of Action, we are to recollect (as was formerly observed) that we are endued with a *moral Sense* or *Conscience*. This is a Principle which (for any thing we know to the contrary) Brutes are not possessed of; and which has a Claim of Authority to superintend and govern all the rest. One who is disposed to be metaphysical, might possibly take Pains to distinguish between *moral Sense* and *Conscience*; but as the too great Nicety of refining upon Points, frequently enfeebles the Conclusions that depend upon them; besides, as the common Acceptation of Terms among the Masters of Reason and Language who employ them, is generally allowed to be Authority sufficient; and

and as Singularity in such Cases, without apparent Necessity, looks too like Affectation, it seems more adviseable to take these Terms, after the Example of several learned Writers, for synonymous; and as signifying that Principle planted in us by Nature, which, by a sort of natural Prevention, antecedently to all Reasoning about them, determines us to approve of Reverence and Love to God, of Benevolence and kind Affection to our Fellow-men, whether exemplified in Compassion for the unfortunate, in Gratitude to the generous, in faithful Friendship to the worthy, or in the publick-spirited Prosecution of a Country's Interests; and at the same Time to disapprove of Ingratitude, Treachery, Cruelty, and the like: Which also determines us to survey our own Heart and Actions in a reflex View, and

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pass Decisions on our own Behaviour; which seasons with a most exquisite Relish of Pleasure every Disposition of Love, every Instance of Regard we show to the Will of the supreme Father of the moral World, or to the Good of human Society; which no less determines us to extend our View beyond ourselves, to take Cognizance of the Conduct of other Men, to approve or condemn their Actions as well as our own; and naturally carries us to anticipate a future and a higher Sentence of Approbation or Disapprobation. This Principle manifestly distinguishes itself above every Appetite, or mere Propensity, these being all blind and indiscriminating; and therefore has a just Prerogative and Claim of Authority over them. The Aptitude of the Eye to see, is not a stronger Proof that it was design'd

sign'd by the Author of Nature for guiding our Steps, than the Fitness of the moral Conscience to govern our Instincts, Affections and Passions, is a convincing Evidence, or (if the Term may be allowed) a *natural Promulgation* of its Right of Pre-eminence and authoritative Direction: And therefore when it is said, that a Man truly follows his Nature, it must be understood that he does not act unreasonably, nor that after the Manner of the Brutes, he indulges any Part of his Nature, any Instinct or Propensity, only because it may happen at a Time to be most clamorous or craving; but that agreeably to the Direction of Conscience, he takes care steadily to rein them in, and maintain them ever in Subjection to its Authority.

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I PROCEED to make some Observations that may further illustrate and confirm what has, in part, been already established, namely, that "to follow Nature," which now is shewed to signify "to follow *our* Nature," is the best Way to ultimate Good or Happiness.

THAT alone can, properly, be called Happiness or Good, which remaineth so, after all Deductions are made. And that is to be accounted the greatest Good, which is the most intense in Degree, and at the same time the most lasting in Duration. *Mental Enjoyments* are more solid, durable and entertaining than *bodily Pleasures*: This will be allow'd by all who have studied human Nature with any Exactness, or by fair Experiments of both, have made the Comparison; nay, will scarcely be denied

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by any, but those who being lost to all true Relish or Taste, have made the Estimate falsely, by laying the lower mental Enjoyments (which alone of that Kind, People in their Condition are capable of reaching) against the highest sensual ones.

STRONGER Proof of this, methinks, will be insisted for by no Man who is fair enough to allow, that if the supreme Principle of Intelligence and Order has honour'd us with Powers superior to the Brutes, we must therefore be capable of Joys superior to any accessible by them, or even by ourselves, thro' the Intervention of any of the Powers or Organs that are common to both. We may however confirm this further, by an Appeal to Experience. The Consciousness of Joy that attends the Possession of mental Good, we find an effectual Encouragement to bear

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up under Hardship and Trouble with Chearfulness and Courage; whereas mental Pain damps the Relish, and embitters the Enjoyment of the most favourite Pleasures of Sense. The Virtuous, who are the most capable Judges, (as they alone can have Experience of both) with one Voice yield the Preference to mental Enjoyments; and pronounce that State to be the most miserable of all which is destitute of every Satisfaction of this Kind. Besides, no sensual Pleasures are needful to recommend, or set off to Advantage the Pleasures of the *publick Sense*, the *moral Sense*, or the *Sense of Honour*; whereas some Species or Tincture of mental Pleasure is necessary to season and enliven the Relish of sensual Gratifications; without this, the continued Repetition of them would become altogether insufferable and disgustful.

NAY, perhaps there is hardly any Man to be found, so utterly depraved, or so far intoxicated with Pleasure, whom the finer Instincts of his Nature have lost all Power to waken out of his sensual Dream; or, who in those important and interesting Conjunctions which tend to alarm the nobler Feelings of Humanity, will remain insensible; who in effect, even with some Degree of Contempt and Aversion at the Delights he prizes most, will not quit them for a Time, that he may rescue a Friend from immediate Danger, or his Country from impending Ruin; or, at least, to vindicate *his own Honour* when deeply affected: If however there be indeed any so deplorably perverted, would they not, in the Judgment of Spectators, be regarded as Objects of Pity, if not of Contempt;

as being to appearance irrecoverably lost, not only to all true Relish of Pleasure, but to every generous Sentiment of Reputation.

HAVING shewed the mental Enjoyments, in general, to be superior to those of Sense, it is needless to enter into a Comparison of such as arise from the different Sources of the former Kind; those namely of the *publick Sense*, of the *moral Sense*, and of the *Sense of Honour*; for they are no way opposite, except when by *wrong Opinion*, mistaken Views, an erroneous Conscience, or false Impressions of Honour, have been admitted and become habitual: And in case of a depraved Sense, it is hard to make any certain Estimate, and discover exactly the Degree of Depravation. In the Case of *right Opinion*, and of a Mind not prepossessed with false Apprehensions

ensions of Things, these Senses and Determinations do concur to excite the same Kind of Conduct; and the Pleasures of all of them being derived from the same Actions, do run into one, and greatly enhance the Sum of Enjoyment.

IN comparing bodily Pleasures with those of the publick Sense, the moral Sense, and the Sense of Honour, in respect of *Duration*; we find these latter to be the most *lasting*; and to be most *lastingly intense* at the same time. Bodily Pleasures pall upon the Sense, fade in the very Enjoyment, and when long continued, never fail to breed Satiety and Disgust; but the regular Operation of the social and moral Powers yields a Pleasure that never surfeits nor proves tiresome; and every Recollection renews the Entertainment.

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It is further to be added in favour of the Pleasures of the moral Kind; that sensual Pleasures are so far from being connected, that they are ever at Variance; not only do previous Gratifications of one Kind tend to diminish the Pleasure of succeeding ones of the same Kind, but the Indulgence of any one Kind is naturally an Enemy to that of another; Whereas the mental Pleasures not only are improved by Repetition, but are perfectly consistent, and those of one Kind are friendly Procurers of others. Thus the Pleasures of Temperance lead to those of Beneficence, &c. On the other Hand, the Sum of the whole Pleasures of Vice is to be regarded, not as the Aggregate of all the distinct Pleasures taken together, but as the positive Residue

due of Pleasure, after a Subduction of what is lost, either from Indulgence equally to them all, or to some in preference of the rest; of what is further lost in respect of the Forfeiture that is made of the Pleasures of Virtue by such Conduct; as likewise after a further Subduction to be made in consideration of the Pains and Calamities which the Pursuit of vicious Pleasures brings along with it; Evils which, like the Pleasures of Virtue, are in close League, and always follow one another in a Train: Whereas the Sum of the virtuous Pleasures is in general more nearly estimated by the Aggregate of all the distinct Pleasures, without any Balance to be laid against them. To which it is to be added, as a separate Consideration in favour of Virtue, that so far from incapacitating a Man for other natural Pleasures, it
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not only indulgently warrants the moderate Use of them, but gives him the truest Relish in their Enjoyment.

NOR is it more true, that Virtue has a sensible Efficacy in heightening Pleasure, than in relieving Uneasiness; particularly in mitigating those Troubles and Agonies, which it may at any Time put Men on undergoing, on its own Account. For it must be allowed, agreeably to the Declarations of the Virtuous themselves, with respect to those few Cases, where their Duty requires them to forego almost every Convenience and Pleasure of Life, or even to encounter Dangers the most alarming, and suffer Calamities the most formidable to Nature, that notwithstanding so apparently heavy a Discount from their Happiness, there still remains

mains with them a rich Reversion, which they would not in the very Height of the Trial exchange against the choicest Satisfaction of prosperous Vice. A Thing that could not be conceived, without supposing what is certainly true, that the Delights of Virtue are improved and enhanced ever in proportion to the Painfulness of its Conflicts, and the Greatness of its Victories. So that considering the ample Compensation which is made, partly by alleviating the Sense of Pain and Misfortunes, and partly by increasing Self enjoyment and inward Complacency, there is no Man who would not without Hesitation acknowledge Virtue, even under all her Disadvantages, most worthy to be chosen in Preference to her Rival, though recommended by the most flattering Appearances; provided he is not a Slave to the Appetites
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and Aversions of the inferior Part of his Nature.

AND thus, from the whole, it may appear, that the following our Nature in what is the only true Sense of doing so, by allowing or forbidding the Gratification of our external Senses, and by the Regulation of our Appetites and other Propensities, always according to the *Dictates of Conscience*, is the Way to the most satisfying and most durable Pleasures; or, an indispensable Condition of attaining to the Possession of the greatest Good.

THE Answer given at the Conclusion of the foregoing *Part*, we hope is now farther confirmed and illustrated, as it may fully appear from the above, that there are fixed and certain Measures and Rules, in conforming to which the

the ultimate Good is only attainable; and that the first and leading Rule to this End, is "to follow Nature—i.e. to follow our Nature." And that to follow our Nature, is "to act in a Manner proportionable to our whole Nature, and its several Parts, in the View of their mutual Relations, and more especially of their Subordination to the Authority of Conscience, and its Prerogative of Government and Superintendence."

THE ANSWER GIVEN AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FOREGOING PART, WAS
 PART III
 AND ILLUSTRATED, AS IT MAY FULLY
 APPEAR FROM THE ABOVE, THAT THERE
 ARE FIXED AND CERTAIN MEASURES
 AND RULES, IN CONFORMITY TO WHICH
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PART III.

THE most considerable Difficulties of our main Enquiry, one might imagine to be now well over, and the Solution clearly made out; were it not that some wary Philosopher may be supposed to raise fresh Hesitation, by proposing such a Question as this, — Are we certain, after all, that we may always safely look on those Actions as truly virtuous and morally right, which our own Conscience approves? Can it never happen that the Conscience shall approve of such particular Determinations of kind Affection towards some Persons, as imply unkind Affection, or at least Unconcern or Neglect of the Interest of others, who may in Truth have an equal Claim to

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our Regard? Or, in general, is it impossible to suppose, that the *moral Conscience* can never pass wrong Decisions, or approve any thing but what is laudable and right?

IF it be alledged, that the Supposition is imaginary and impossible, our Philosopher may be ready to insist for a Reason, and ask, — Whether it is, because the same thing ought to be maintain'd with respect to Virtue, which one is said to have held concerning the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, “ Believe you have “ the corporal Presence, and you “ have it ?” Or, because every Man's Conscience is infallible, in its Prescriptions and Determinations about moral Conduct?

AGAINST the former of these Alternatives, our philosophical Questioner

Questioner may argue, that at this rate there would be a Necessity of affirming *Virtue* to vary and shift about with our fluctuating Opinions: To maintain which, would indeed be a Piece of Infatuation somewhat resembling that of *Harpaste**, who imagin'd the House to have been darken'd, when the Truth of the Matter was, that she had lost her Sight. And should it be replied, in Defence of the Supposition, That every one calls that Temper, or those Actions virtuous, which are approved by his own moral Sense: It will be answered, What then?

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* *Harpasten, uxoris meæ fatuam, scis hereditarium onus in domo mea remansisse. Ipse enim averfissimus ab istis prodigiis sum. Si quando fatuo delectari volo, non est mihi longè querendus; me video. Hæc fatua subito desit videre. Incredibilem tibi narro rem, sed veram. Nescit se esse cæcam; subinde pædagogum suum rogat ut migret: ait domum tenebrosam esse. Senecæ Epist. 50.*

Is an Action really virtuous, merely because one Man's particular Sense approves it? If there be a *Right* and a *Wrong* in Things, then what is right, and what is wrong, is really so, let a Person's Opinion about it be what it will. The Fitness of Things is as independent of our Conceptions, as speculative Truth is upon our Understanding. Hence *Tully* says, as Truth and Falshood, as Consequences and their Contraries, are so in themselves, whatever be a Person's Sentiments about them, so is Virtue really such by Nature; and to place Virtue in Fancy and Opinion, and not to found it in Nature, is to play the Fool.

As to the latter Supposition,
“ of every Man's being infallible,
“ at least, with respect to his
“ Sense of virtuous Behaviour;”
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every one may easily perceive how very untenable it is, it being too plain to be denied, that the Sense of particular Persons often comes to suffer a very sensible Depravation through the Influence of ill Custom, false Opinions, perverse Habits, the Prejudices imbibed from Education or Company, or the blended Influence of any of these together. Hence they learn to bestow their Approbation on mere Shadows and Phantoms of Good; and what is worse, to determine that to be laudable and excellent, which is in itself most horrid and detestable.

THERE is indeed a common Notion prevails, that when a Man acts according to his Opinions of what is morally right, he acts commendably and virtuously, &c. *è contra.* And without question this is to be admitted, in general;

but perhaps it would not be quite safe to understand it absolutely, and without some proper Limitations. As this is a Point of some Consequence to be well settled in any moral Scheme, and the more that it is a frequent Subject of vague Debate, we may stop a little to attend to the following Illustrations upon it; which tend to show, not only that Mens Conscience, and the Standard-opinion of moral Right, may in some Cases be perverted and corrupt, but that the Actions so determined and advised are in some Sense immoral, and the Agents accountable for them at least in some Degree.

THERE is a Distinction to be made, and carefully to be adverted to, between two Sorts of wrong Opinions that have a Tendency to affect moral Practice. One Sort
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of them operates more directly on Mens Volitions and Actions; the other more immediately on their Conscience, or their Sense of Right and Wrong, so as to pervert it.

As to the first: When a Man allows a Notion or Impression to grow habitual in his Mind, that Pleasure, for Instance, or Wealth, above all other Things, will yield him the greatest Happiness on Possession, this cannot fail to render his Conduct vitious. In general, what we commonly call *Vices*, as distinct from *Weaknesses*, take their Rise from wrong Impressions or Opinions of the Value of the Ends to be pursued in Life. These Opinions were by the old Philosophers supposed to be derived from some intemperate Bias in the inferior Part of Man's Nature, where they seated the

the Senses, Appetites and Passions. The *Power* of forming Opinions or Phantasies concerning the Value of external Things, (which answers chiefly to what we call *Imagination*) was, according to them, under the peculiar and more immediate Influence of this inferior Part of the Nature of Man. Hence they ever warmly insisted to correct the *Imagination*, to redress *Fancy*, and rectify *Opinion*, as the Thing of first Consequence, in order to preserve the superior Part of our Nature intire, and to form the Mind to Virtue. For wrong Opinions lead to Affections and Desires that terminate on wrong Ends of Life, wrong Affections in their Turn to bad Actions; bad Actions produce Unhappiness, and when long repeated, totally pervert the Habit and Constitution of the Mind: So that Unhappiness

ness and Vice are to be charged upon the wrong Opinions as their first Source. Such Opinions (to use the Expression of an *Antient*) vitiate the Mind, as the Redundancy of the Bile, or the Corruption of the Blood spoil the Habit of the Body.

Now with respect to this Species of corrupt Opinions, there is no Question to be made, that though they may over-rule the Conduct and render it immoral, they may still leave the Conscience pretty intirely in Possession of its Power of remonstrating and protesting; . at least, till by long Continuance and frequent Repetitions, the Character has become inveterately wicked.

THE other Sort of Opinions answers better to what passes by the Word *Opinion*, in the most received

ved and current Sense of it. These more immediately operate upon and influence the Determinations of *Conscience* itself. As those of the former Sort take their Origin from the *inferior Senses* and Biases of our Nature, and the Desires which depend on them, and which refer to their more effectual Gratification, these, on the other Hand, arise from some particular State or Modification of the *higher Senses* that belong to our mental Nature, as of the social Sense, of that of Honour, or of the very highest Sense, namely, that which qualifies us for Religion and Piety.. This may happen in Consequence of partial and narrow Notions, (early imbibed and habitually imposed from *Education, Example, Situation in the World*, or otherwise) being so constantly represented and made so familiar Objects to any of those Senses,

Senses, as to intercept and exclude from the Conscience every fairer and juster Prospect of Things that might serve to rectify the Error, and determine it to right Exertions.—Of this a Variety of undeniable Instances might be adduced. Thus it is with respect to the *publick Sense*, in the Case of a Man who has been train'd to an Impression, that how much soever he may be bound to observe Justice, and Beneficence to others, though at the Expence of disappointing his own private Desires on many Occasions, he is bound at the same time to comply with every Dictate of his publick Sense, requiring him to promote the Interest of his Country, even though in this, he may do a very sensible Injury, and produce lasting Calamity to other Countries, and their Inhabitants. The Error here is a great deal more plausible

sible than any of the former Kind, and may well interest any single Man's Conscience in its Behalf, so far as to cause it yield its Sanction of Approbation to the most unjust and cruel Actions, especially if the whole People of his Country be tinctured with the same Prepossession.—In like manner, with regard to the *Sense of Honour*; Does it not seem to have arisen from an ill informed Sense of Honour that *Jonah* justified to himself his wayward and peevish Behaviour *? And may it not be reasonably supposed, as a thing too agreeable to Experience, that a Man may, on a slight or merely imaginary Affront, think himself bound in Honour to seek the Death of his Companion; and yet feel little or no Relenting or Remorse on succeeding in so unjustifiable an Attempt?

* *I do well to be angry, Jonah iv. 9.*

tempt? — Again, this Perversion of Conscience is yet perhaps more evident, in Cases where that Branch of the social Sense which refers to superior Beings, or the Sense of Religion, has been depraved. In Confirmation of this, we may appeal to that ingenuous Confession of *Paul* the Apostle, *I verily thought with my self, that I ought to do many Things contrary to the Name of Jesus* *. We may further call to Witness those Places, where, if there be any Faith in History, Religion taught the deluded Inhabitants to look on Cats and Crocodiles as proper Objects of Worship, and that to save a Cat preferably to a Parent was meritorious; witness the zealous Followers of *Mahomet*, who reckon it their Duty to despise and treat as Enemies all *Pagans, Jews* and *Christians*.

* *Acts* xxvi. 9.

Christians, without Exception. Or, to come nearer home, witness those Christians that bear the Name of *Catholicks*, (if such deserve to be called by the Name of *Christianity*, while they show a Temper so opposite to its humane and gentle Spirit) who think themselves bound in Conscience to make Use of Force and Persecution, and all the *Extremities* of Fire and Blood, to compel whom they call *Hereticks*, to a Submission to their Church, and to deter every one from the Thoughts of deserting it. And it were to be wished that some of those who bear the Name of *Protestants*, were less swayed by a like fierce Spirit of Zeal, and had their Consciences less under the Influence of a like narrow and ungenerous Principle. There is indeed, perhaps, little Doubt to be made, that the original Broach-

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ers of such Bigotry, were determined by political Views more than by any serious Impressions of Conscience, to spread it in the World; nay, that many of their Followers, who by better Understanding or otherwise, have Access to enter into the Springs of Affairs, give Encouragement and Countenance to that Bigotry, for the same Reasons. But certainly it is a Fact, that the greater Part are so poison'd from their earliest Education, and so grossly deluded, that they come to approve heartily in their Conscience of all the sanguinary and cruel Proceedings against those they are trained to look upon with Abhorrence as *Hereticks*.—We are assured by an Author of Credit *, (who resided long in *Spain* and *Portugal*) that at the Execution of an

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* *Geddes's View of the Portuguese Inquisition. Tracts, Vol. 1. p. 412.*

Auto de Fé at *Lisbon*, the Populace never fail, by their Acclamations, to discover the highest Applause and Triumph; though these very People will shed Tears at the Execution of an ordinary Criminal, who may have been guilty of the most barbarous Murder.

Now, who is the Man will say, that such Approbations are virtuous or just? Perhaps indeed it may be urged, that the Epithet *virtuous* cannot properly be applied to *Approbations*, but rather to such Conduct and Actions as are agreeable to Approbations, and that those People being honest to the best of their Knowledge, and acting sincerely according to their Approbations, act in so far virtuously. But on the other Hand, can it be denied that any Mind which has got a
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Habit (in which Conscience authorizes it) of acting Things the most contrary to the natural Determinations of generous and humane Affection, will not on that Account fall into a wrong moral Habit, that the Order of its Constitution will not be in so far disfigured and depraved, and of consequence that its Tranquillity and Happiness (which always is found in Experience to wait upon the former as an inseparable Concomitant) will not in proportion be broken and disturbed? And if this be true; if wrong Opinions producing a Depravity in the Determinations of Conscience, uniformly tend in the long-run to bring any Degree of Unhappiness on the Mind, must it not be concluded that this Unhappiness is the Effect of a penal Sanction of the Law of Nature against such Opinions? Nor would it avail

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against a Fact so undeniable, to say that this cannot be supposed, because the Ignorance of such People is *invincible*: For whatever Influence such a Consideration may have in inducing us to form charitable Conjectures of the future State of such People, or how far a Plea of this Nature may serve to indemnify them from the positive Punishments threatened to be put in Execution hereafter against unrepented Faults, still, methinks, it is indisputable that in Fact they are subject in some measure to certain *natural Penalties*, or natural ill Effects of their Errors.

VIRTUE is properly a regular Habit seated in the Mind, which in every Operation and Determination must be uniform and of a piece with itself; as far as it fails of this, it falls short of the Character of true Virtue; and the
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Happiness depending on it, must be imperfect in a like Proportion. Now it is undeniable that *Conscience* may be depraved to such a Degree, as to produce very melancholy Effects on the moral Order and Virtue of the Mind. When the leading Principle is not in Condition to act its Part well, and for its proper Purposes, the whole moral Oeconomy must be in a State of Confusion, and the mutual Agreement and friendly Operation of the Parts must suffer sensible Disturbance. In proportion as this prevails, the inward Tranquillity and Satisfaction of the Mind must be diminished, and at last real Unhappiness succeed in its Place. Nor can this well be otherwise, while in such a Character, through the partial Indulgence of Conscience to some Affections, they are suffer'd to exceed all just Bounds, and others

thers are as unjustly controul'd, through its Prejudice against the Objects of them: Which happens manifestly in the Case of those Slaves of Superstition, who anxiously restrain every Motion of their Compassion and Humanity towards the unfortunate Persons who are the Victims of their Inquisitors Cruelty. All this must happen: These natural Penalties must take place, even though the Causes of such Depravation of Conscience may have been ever so impossible to be foreseen or declined, or though their Influence may continue ever so insuperable. And if so, it must follow, that in the Eye of the Great Legislator who ordain'd these natural Penalties, Errors affecting Conscience, and perverting moral Conduct, are regarded not only as not virtuous, but as positively vitious; otherwise how could Men be accountable

countable and punishable for them
in any Degree?

WHAT may serve to confirm
the Fact, that a misguided Con-
science, by inducing some Degree
of moral Depravity on the Mind,
renders it obnoxious to propor-
tionable Unhappiness, is the Con-
sideration, that if it were not so,
there would be hardly any Ground
left to go upon, for settling a right
Conscience, as truly distinct from
and preferable to a wrong one.
If the Consequences on the Mind
were the same in either Case,
where would be the sensible Dif-
ference?

To determine further, that we
are in a State of Discipline as to
our Opinions, as well as our A-
ctions, it may be adverted, that
some Things are prescribed as
Points of highest Duty, which
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presuppose certain Opinions to be first formed, in order to render us capable of performing them. Thus none will deny it to be our Duty *to love God*; and does not this imply, that in order to love God sincerely, we must have form'd right Opinions of him, of the Excellency and real Amiability of his Character; consequently that it is our Duty to form such Opinions, and that we are accountable for the Want of them, or for entertaining any that are contrary.

MIGHT it not be also urged to the same Purpose, from the frequent Case of those Men who live under the Influence of Opinions of the first Kind, that when such Characters have come to be pretty far advanced in Vice, and thorough paced in carrying on Intrigues against their own true

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Interest by the Practices of Self-deceit, the Authority of Conscience is not so properly suspended altogether, as that it is transferr'd to the opposite Side, and drawn in to be a Party or Accomplice with their wrong Opinions and Passions, and to hold Intelligence with them so far, as not only to pass from its Privilege of remonstrating against them, but also to give them positive Countenance and Encouragement? For how else should it be, that bad Men so often preserve a Face of Tranquillity in doing the worst Things, by varnishing their Actions to themselves with Pretences that have the Semblance of Lawfulness, if not sometimes of Virtue itself? Which cannot be understood to be spoken, as if such Men could hereby elude the natural Punishment of their Vices; a Character like this being certainly

tainly the most immoral, the most shameless and infamous of all others. For though they may feel no immediate Checks of Conscience in the mean while, yet they must be supposed most unhappy from the Disorder thereby privileged to reign in their Minds without Controul, from many natural ill Consequences in which their Vices involve them; from Conscience itself, when at Intervals it finds Opportunity to reascend its native Throne and inflict its vindictive Terrors; or from the greater Vengeance which must overtake them in the End. But passing this, I dare aver, no Man will say, that the Consent or Approbation of Conscience is so bad a Character, may at a Time be supposed to bestow on his wicked Designs and Actions, is sufficient to vindicate him, or even to extenuate his Guilt; on the

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contrary, he passes on that very Account as the more scandalously wicked, and is the more heartily condemn'd by the moral Sense of every good Mind. But I insist the less on this Case, because of its Difference from the former, where it was not supposed that a Man has taken voluntary Pains to pervert his Sense of Right and Wrong.

THE Aversion of some Persons at the Zeal and Bigotry of others in behalf of insignificant and trifling Opinions, may possibly mislead them to a Disregard of Opinions in general; for one Extreme is apt to beget another, and Persons may fall into one Extreme of Superstition or Prejudice to avoid its Opposite. But for one in earnest to assert, that we may be in a State of Trial as to our Actions, yet not as to our Opinions, may well ap-
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pear, after the former Explications, to be a most glaring Evidence of Underthinking: It would perhaps be matter of no great Surprise, if such an one should maintain that our Opinions do not depend on any conscious Determination of our Minds, or (which comes to much the same thing) should resolve in the Affirmative the Question put to *Seneca* *, whether *Justice, Prudence, Fortitude,* and the rest of the Virtues, were *Animals*.

BAD Opinions lead to Affections and Desires of wrong Ends in Life, wrong Affections in their Turn to bad Actions, and these again to Unhappiness and Misery; and therefore bad Opinions do in the Train of Consequences lead to unhappy and miserable Effects. Hence appears the Expediency of fre-

* *Seneca Epist.* 113.

frequently inculcating upon others, and often recollecting within ourselves, that important Doctrine which the Author of the *Characteristicks* proves at large, viz. that *corrupt Opinion is the Cause of Wrong**; for since wrong Opinions naturally lead to wrong Determinations, it plainly appears that the forming and regulating our Opinions in a proper Manner, is so far from being a Matter of Indifference, that it is of the utmost Consequence to the real Merit of our Characters, and the lasting Happiness of our Lives.

ON the whole, though it may perhaps be improper, according to the received Use of Words, to call the wrong Actions that flow from a misguided Conscience *vicious* or *immoral*; yet, from what has

* *Characteristicks*, Vol. II. p. 24, 25, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 100, 101, 102.

has been said, they appear to fall under that Character, in so far as they arise from an original Source of moral Wrong; namely, the Influence of *false Opinions*, first perverting the higher Senses of our Nature, and then misguiding the Sense of moral Rectitude or Conscience. And thus we may venture to conclude, that we are accountable and in a State of Trial, as to our *Opinions concerning moral Right*, as well and for the same Reason as to our *Actions*. Whence, on the whole, it follows, that it is of the greatest Importance to settle some Method by which Errors so fatal may be guarded against, or corrected if possible, in case they be already incurred.

It is impossible for us to exceed in taking Pains, not only to be well informed about e-
very

very particular Branch of Conduct, where Right or Wrong can possibly take place, but also to settle accurately in our Minds such true Opinions and Notions of our Situation in the World, of the various Relations we stand in, and of the great Ends we ought to have in View, as may prove unerring Guides to us, in every Step and Measure of our Conduct. He, therefore, who is careless and negligent as to his Acquisition of just Conceptions and right Opinions, must also be supposed of course to be negligent as to a right and proper Conduct of Life: And he who is truly in Love with Virtue, and earnestly intent upon a right Behaviour, must be supposed to be likewise careful and diligent in acquiring and forming such right Notions and Sentiments.

HENCE may we see the great Advantage of the Sense of *Novelty*; for this Determination of the Mind, to search after Things unknown, and to feel a Pleasure on the first Appearance of a newly discovered Truth, when rightly employed, contributes not a little to the Instruction and mental Improvement of every impartial Searcher himself, as well as to the Progress of Knowledge and Advancement of Learning in the World. This earnest Desire of Knowledge rouses the Soul, causes it shake off its Indolence and Supineness, and with Keeness and Assiduity dig in the Mine, in Search of the precious Treasure: It is in a good measure by the Influence of this Determination, that the Friends of Virtue are excited to exert their utmost Diligence to form right Sentiments, and to enable

enable themselves to discern distinctly between Good and Evil, and to approve only that which is right.

“How shall we inform our Conscience aright?” is the Question now before us; in prosecuting which, the main *Enquiry* will be, Whether, supposing the Sense is depraved, the Case is without Remedy; or, whether, on the other Hand, there be any thing in Nature throughout, which Man, by consulting, may instruct his moral Conscience, and enable himself to pass just Decisions and right Approbations?

In order to this Discovery, it may not perhaps be amiss to extend our Views beyond human Nature; and consider the *World* around us. We have (as has been already

already observed) a Sense of *Harmony*, or a Determination of Mind to be pleased with the Perceptions of Beauty, Symmetry, Order, Proportion and Regularity. All the Proportions of Numbers, the Harmony of Sounds, the Beauty, Order and Proportion of Figures, Motions and Colours, delight this Sense. The Assemblages of living Creatures, Flocks, Herds, and Societies of Men, afford a higher Delight of this Kind. More than this, there is an acknowledged Beauty and Harmony in the Order and Regularity of the Affections, and a Decency and Comeliness in that Course of human Actions which a well informed moral Conscience approves, which affords an exquisite Pleasure. Hence common Language stiles those Actions fair and beautiful, and the contrary Actions ugly and deformed; and to call a Character

character fair or beautiful, is nothing unusual.

SOME of the ancient Philosophers have considered the Order and Harmony of the Universe as a Declaration of God's Love of Order and Harmony; and as exhibited in the Plan of Nature, with a View to prompt and instruct us to copy after it, and after the original Exemplar of Beauty and Perfection in the Divine Mind from which it is derived. They compared the just Order of the human Affections to a well tuned Harp; agreeably to this, they called Virtue, *Harmony*, and * *virtutis quasi carmen*; and maintain'd, that Men cannot judge aright of Virtue, but in as far as they understand, where-

* Cicero, *De finibus*, lib. v. cap. 15.

wherein their particular Nature agrees with the universal. They asserted, that Man is appointed to behold, and obliged to imitate the beautiful Constitution of the Universe. They taught that Nature in forming this Universe, after the Divine Measure and Proportion, made it in all Things conformable and like to itself, so as to preserve a consistent Analogy and Proportion amidst all its Differences; and of all the different Species diffused throughout the whole, made as it were an Image of the Divine Beauty, imparting variously to the Copy, the Perfections of the Original: And that it becomes Man to know that the Nature of this Universe is, in all Respects alike, that is to say, that the whole corporeal Substance, from the highest to the lowest, is honoured with an analogical Likeness

ness of God *. Man alone, said one of them, perceives the Beauty and Comeliness, the Agreement and Proportion of the Parts of Things, and by rising from sensible to intellectual Objects, is qualified to judge, that much more he should observe Beauty and Order in his Determinations, his Affections and Actions; and beware not only of all indecent Actions, but every unbecoming Thought and false Opinion: And from this, says our Author, he comes to discover the Nature of moral Beauty and Virtue †.

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* Πρὸς τὴν θείαν εὐμετείαν ἢ Φυσὶς τῷ ἐμὲν κόσμῳ ἀποτυπυμένη, δι' ἀναλογίας τοῦ αὐτοῦ πανταχῶ διαφόρως ὁμοίωσεν, καὶ τὸ θεῖον κάλλος ἐνεκονίσασθαι δι' ὅλων τῶν ἐξκοσμίων ὡς ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως, &c. Hierocles in aug. Pyth. carm. ad vers. 52. viz. γνώση δ' ἢ θεμὶς φύσιν περὶ παντὶ ὁμοίον.

† Cicero de officiis, lib. i. cap. 4.

THE Amount of their Observations and Reflexions on this Argument, seems to resolve in this, That as several Parts or Strains of Musick, and different musical Instruments, do compose a Concert, so the various Sorts of Beauty, Order, Proportion and Harmony, in mere inanimate Matter, in the vegetable Kingdom, in the animal World, and in the intellectual System, constitute one universal Harmony or Concert; and that in this grand Concert every Man is bound to perform his Part, in a proper Key as it were, or in just Consonance with the whole, which can only be done, by the Order and Harmony of his Affections, and the Beauty and Regularity of his Actions. Hence it was, it would seem, that they called Virtue *Harmony*.

Harmony, and said, that it is known by Analogy.

FROM this Account of the Matter, it is easy to observe, that this not unusual Manner of speaking, "to follow Nature, or to act according to Nature," did not only signify, "to act up to the Dignity of human Nature, under the Limitations above explained;" but that it had a much more extensive Sense, and implied "our acting according to our Powers and Capacities, in proper Harmony and just Concert with the Order of the Universe, of which we are Parts."

THIS Matter, perhaps, may be rendered clearer by a farther Explication. The Evidences of Beauty and Order observable in all the lesser Systems, very naturally lead an impartial Inquirer to

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conclude, that in like Manner, admirable Proportion, Order and Harmony reign in the universal System, or Whole. Now if *Harmony* (as is generally admitted) consists in “Uniformity amidst Variety;” this gives a Thread to our Research, or an Intimation that we ought to prosecute it, by inquiring, “What is that, towards which this Harmony has “a general Tendency;” or in other Terms to the same Purpose, “What is the Unity of Design “which is uniformly preserved “amidst all the Variety of Phænomena in the Universe.” For it is properly *Unity of Design*, or the uniform Prosecution of one End or Point of View, by the Means of a Multiplicity of different Parts and Operations all harmonizing and conspiring together, which constitutes that *Uniformity amidst Variety*,

riety, which is equivalent to Harmony or Beauty. The Solution of this Question is of great Use in instructing the *moral Conscience*, and directing it to right Determinations and Decisions.

'Tis an established Maxim, that whatever Things have Order, the same have Unity of Design, and concur in one; are Parts constituent of one whole, or are in themselves an intire System. Such is a Tree with all its Branches; an Animal with all its Members. Now it may be easily observed by every one, that there is an Order, Agreeableness and Sympathy of Parts in all the different Systems that come under our View. Thus the Root, and Branches, and Leaves of a Tree, do all concur in one, and make up a whole; and all agree in one common End, the Preservation

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of

of its particular System, and the Propagation of others like to it, that when itself is at a Period, the Race may remain. Thus also there is Order and Sympathy among the several Members of every Animal, and a Concurrence in one common End. Thus, the Feet, the Eyes, the Ears, the Teeth, and other Parts of any Animal, tend to the Good of that Animal, or whole. What Insect, or Reptile, what Fish, or Fowl, what four-footed Beast of any Kind, but is thus framed? And as to *Man*, it is beyond all reasonable Doubt, that there is Order and Sympathy among his Members and Parts, and an Unity of Design in which they all concur; which is his Preservation and Good: This is carried on by his Hands and Feet, and other outward Members and Organs; by his Brain, and Heart, and

and Blood, and other inward Parts of curious Texture; nor is the same End less promoted by the several Powers, Faculties and Determinations of the Mind.

FURTHER, it is observed that no Animal of any Kind, nor any smaller Whole, that we know of in the Universe, though ever so compleat a System of Parts, as to all within itself, or, however each internal Part may mutually answer all one another's Relations, can be said to be in like manner compleat, as to all without; but must be considered to have certain outward Dependencies, and to bear Relation to Things abroad. Thus, the Male bears Relation to the Female; and both these a Joint-relation to others of the Kind. Besides, whole Species of Animals contribute to

the Well-being of some other Species: Nor is Man so independent, that the brutal Kingdom contributes no way to his Well-being. And as animal Bodies are compounded of Parts subservient one to another; and as in Plants, the Branches are united to the Trees, and the Leaves, or Blades to the Stalks, as really too is the animal System united with the vegetable. Again, the living System, consisting of the animal and vegetable ones, is not a detach'd independent Whole, without Coherence, or without farther Relation abroad, but one System runs into another, so as to compose larger Confederacies. Thus the living System is so united with and dependent on the Earth, Air and Water, that it cannot subsist without them; all which together make up one terraqueous System,

System, in which there is a Sympathy of Parts, and a Concurrency to one common End, the Good of the Whole. Again, it is no less evident, that this terraqueous System has a real Dependence upon something also beyond itself; and is in a State of Union with the Sun and Moon, and other heavenly Bodies, and so is, in reality, no more than a Part of another, and larger System; and this larger, or solar System, is reasonably thought to depend upon, and make a Part of the great System of the World, or the Universe. Thus a mutual Subordination, Dependency and conspiring of Parts and Operations, in one coherent Scheme, is abundantly manifest; or, an *universal System*, containing as it were *all in one*, and making every thing to hold of one common Stock

Stock *. The Order, Sympathy and Subserviency of the Parts of all lesser Systems, and their Concurrence to the Good of these Systems; and the no less visible Order and Concurrence of the Earth, Sun and Moon, and other heavenly Bodies, to one common End, the Good of the Whole; and the Congruity and Similitude observable throughout the Works of Nature; when taken all together, leave scarcely any Room to doubt, that in the universal System the great End towards which all the Parts concur, is the Good

* *Nihil est in omni mundo, quod non pars universi sit.* Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 2.

Sic undique omni ratione concluditur, mente, consilioque divino omnia in hoc mundo ad salutem omnium, conservationemque admirabiliter administrari. Ibid.

Ipse homo ortus est, ad mundum contemplandum & imitandum, nullo modo perfectus, sed quaedam particula perfecti. Ibid.

Good of the Whole. Such then is the *Unity* of Design carried on by that Order which prevails in the Whole: For, since wherever Order, Coherence and Union is observable, this Sympathy of Parts is no less so, as well as a common End in which they all concur, namely, the Good of the System; and since there is also a like Union, Consent and Sympathy in all that we see of Things, and since the common End towards which every Thing we see co-operate, is the Good of the Whole, one should think it must seem unreasonable to stop here, and not to allow the same throughout; for the Analogy of what we see and know, determines us to presume boldly, that there is an Union of all, in one all-comprehending System; and that in like manner, with respect to this, the common End designed by the
Parts,

Parts, is, in general, the *Good of the Whole.*

THIS being once established, it follows that the Good of the Whole is the Aim and Design of the *sovereign Mind*, who thus appears to be not only the Source of Being, but the Fountain and Guardian of Happiness to the whole Creation; as those Things in Nature, which operate for the Good of the universal System, do so by the Constitution and Providence of God. Thus we see with what Justice one of the Ancients enjoins us to follow Nature, and imitate the Deity; since, by following the general Tendency of Nature throughout, we conspire with the Design and Drift of Nature's Author; and since by seeking the Good of the Whole, in correspondence with the Tendency of universal Nature,

ture, we imitate and endeavour to copy down into the Frame of our own Minds, and the Tenor of our own Actions, the perfect Characters of the Divinity.

THAT such Beings as we, who are not independent Wholes, but Parts of this great Universe, should beware of jarring, by a wilful Discord, with the universal Harmony; but, on the contrary, that as Parts, we should act in Concert with the other Parts, and all together seek the Good of the whole System, appears as unquestionably certain (admitting the Doctrine of final Causes) as that in any lesser System, in Man, for Instance, the Hand, as well as the Foot, or the Eye as well as the Ear, should operate for the Good of the Body. The Will of the Creator seems to be no less plainly discovered,

vered, and openly declared by the one, than by the other.

Thus it appears to be the Will of the Author of Nature, and the supreme Law of our Conduct, that we should maintain *universal Love*, and excite and cherish a generous Desire of the Good of the Whole.

Thus likewise we perceive, how our own inward Structure and Constitution, in which is implanted publick Love and Benevolence, beautifully tallies with the Constitution of the Universe.

It is not less worthy of Remark, that our own Constitution, and that of the Universe, conspire to excite us to, and instruct us in right Measures of Conduct: At the same time that our own Constitution determines us to kind Affections,

Affections, and to approve of such Affections in ourselves or others, the universal Constitution instructs us to approve only those particular kind Affections which are consistent with universal Love.

FROM what has been advanced, the moral Conscience may be furnished with such Axioms and Rules, as, if carefully attended to, and followed out in all their several Consequences, it is likely might prevent a great many wrong Decisions in point of moral Right and Wrong. The following general ones are just mentioned.

THE universal Good ought to be the great *Point of View* to every intelligent Agent. — The Good of the whole ought to be preferred to the Good of any Part. — The Good of a greater Part of the System is to be preferred to

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the same Good of a lesser. — The greater Good of the System, or of any Part of it, is to be preferred to a lesser Good of the same. —

No particular Good ought to be designed towards any Part of the System, or Whole, that does not fairly consist with the Good of the Whole itself. — Whatever contributes to the Good of any Part, and is, by no Means, inconsistent with the Good of the Whole, is in Effect the Production of a certain real Quantity of Good, and tends to the Increase of the systematic Good, being at the same Time highly agreeable to universal Affection.

FROM these may be derived other Rules that are more particular. And first of all, we are instructed in such Measures of Conduct, as have Reference to Self-interest. But, previous to this,
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I shall take the Liberty to resume the Distinction I formerly made, between *Self-love* or *mental Attraction*, and *private Self-affection*, or a Desire of private Interest.

It was explained above, that there is in our Nature a Determination to Motion on pleasant or painful Sensations being raised in us. This Instinct or natural Determination, whether called *Self-love* or *mental Gravitation*, is the great original Spring of inward Motion; and any particular Motives, or affecting Sensations, arising from any of the Senses, external or internal, do affect this Spring of Motion, and set it at Work.

To take the Term *Self-love*, for the natural and necessary Determination of the Mind to act, or to be set in Motion, when affecting Ideas of Pleasure or Pain arise;

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and,

and, at the same time, to take it for *private Self-affection*, or a deliberate Concern for our own private Happiness, is a very equivocal Use of the Term; and the Neglect of distinguishing here, has been the Occasion of warm, but needless Disputes.

THAT there is a real Distinction between the natural Principle called *Self-love*, and that of *private Self-affection*, or a cool and deliberate Concern for our own private Happiness, will, perhaps, be made evident, and this Part of the *moral Scheme* be farther illustrated, by attending to the following Things.

INSTEAD of Self-love, or the Desire of Happiness, let this Determination of the Soul to Motion, on the Presence of pleasant or painful Ideas, be expressed by the
Term,

Term, *mental Gravitation*, or, if any choose rather these Terms already adopted by the most celebrated Writers on this Subject, let it be expressed by the Name, *Uneasiness*, according to the ingenious Author of the *Treatise on Virtue and Happiness*, who gives it the Preference, because he reckons, that Uneasiness ever accompanies the Desire of Happiness: A Sentiment, which by the way, may not appear very just and exact, since it will be very probably found, that there are some Exceptions of particular Desires, that are not attended with any Uneasiness. However, supposing this to be assumed with a Grain of Allowance, who will contend, that Uneasiness, the Spring and Source of voluntary Motion, is one and the same precisely with private Self-affection, or a cool Concern for private Happiness?

THE former, *viz.* *Self-love*, *Uneasiness*, or *mental Gravitation*, is not a moral Duty, but a natural Instinct and necessary Principle, operating like the Power of Gravitation, whether we will or not: The latter, *viz.* *private Self-affection*, is a moral Duty, admits of the Decisions of Reason, and is capable of being influenced by the Dictates of the moral Conscience; in Compliance with which Principle, it can consent to decline Actions and refuse Objects, otherwise and at first View the most agreeable to it.

SELF-LOVE, as was formerly observed, is a blind indiscriminating Principle, being ever ready, when without Direction, to fly out into the random Pursuit of those inferior Objects, that are good only to the *Self-system*, or that serve to gratify

gratify only some low Appetite; nor is it insensible to such Objects, as are morally worthy and excellent, and tend to publick Happiness; in a word, as Opportunities occur, it catches at every kind of Good, whether real or apparent; nor is it less determined to decline and recoil from every thing that is painful, which many a time it is apt to do, without Regard to moral Order, publick Happiness, or even the greatest private Good. It is the Province of Reason to advert watchfully to every Motion of a Principle so heedless and undistinguishing, and to advise the proper Measures of conducting it. And in the Course of human Life it may often happen, that Reason shall prescribe such Things, as while highly conducive to private Interest, are however extremely shocking to this gravitating Instinct, or general Desire of Good;

as

as in the Case of the Amputation of a Limb, to prevent an incurable Gangrene or spreading Mortification; nothing being more directly opposite to the Cravings of Self-love, than the present Suffering and Torment of Pain; and nothing being more necessary in order to our ultimate Good, than to repress the first Sallies of this Instinct, and quell the turbulent Agitation and Ferment which it sometimes occasions; from which it appears, that in nothing is the Exercise of Reason more beneficial, than in serving to guide and direct this indeterminate Desire, that so its Excursions towards the first apparent Good may be restrained, and a regular Prosecution of the greatest private Good may be steadily and resolutely carried through.

NOR is *Reason* only of Use to inform

inform us, that Objects of private Good which are present and limited, ought to be given up, for the Sake of such of the same kind, as are future and more extensive, but that *private Good* in general ought to be pursued in Subordination to the *publick*, and to the Regard and Obedience due to the Father of the moral World. *Reason* may see the Fitness of preferring the Imitation of the Order of Nature, of concurring with the Designs of the Deity, and conforming to his Will or Law, to the most immediate Objects, and the most craving Sollicitations of this instinctive Appetite; for it is no inconceivable Thing, that Reason may, in certain Cases, advise and determine a Man, to prefer the suffering of Persecution, and of the most exquisite and protracted Tortures that Tyranny can devise or execute, to Ease and Health,
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and worldly Grandeur; and all this, notwithstanding the violent Aversion of that Instinct to the former, and its strong Desire of the latter. Hence it may appear, that this indeterminate Instinct, or general Desire of Good, is something really distinct from that calm Regard to private Good or Self-affection, which I have called a moral Duty. This *Self-affection* is properly distinguished from *social Love*, in this Respect, that the latter comes under the Notion of *Self-love*, as above represented; for *Self-love*, or the *motive Instinct*, being a general Principle, comprehending all the original Movements of the Soul, or what are called its *Senses*, it is as really gratified by doing Good to other Persons, as to ourselves; whereas *private Self-affection* bears Regard only to our own Happiness, directly and immediately, as distinct

Part III. *on Virtue, &c.* 143
distinct from the Happiness of other
Men.

AGREEABLY to the Representation now given, it may be asserted farther, that Self-love or mental Attraction no more stands in Opposition to Piety and Religion, or to Benevolence and Patriotism, than it does to private Self-affection. If indeed there were no Determinations in our Nature to the Love of associated Forms; if we were by Nature void of a social Sense, then it would be impossible, that any Views of the Interest of others, or of the Distresses of the unfortunate, much less of Patriotism or Heroism, could sensibly affect us, so as to excite us to Motion. But this in Fact is far from being the Case. Again, were there no Determinations in our Nature independent of our Will (or which are not affected and

and raised by any particular Volitions, however they may be accompanied with what is called a *Velleity*) to love and approve Harmony and Beauty, Truth and Benevolence, Goodness and Perfection, the Idea of Divine Excellency would be indifferent to us, and so by the very Frame of our Nature could have no Power of exciting us to Action; but neither is this the Case; for Truth and Faithfulness, Wisdom and Power, Goodness and Love, in their highest Degrees of Exaltation and Glory, when closely and carefully attended to, must fill us with Sentiments, by the Constitution of our Nature, the most affecting and delightful. To ask therefore, if Self-love in that Sense be opposite to the Love of God, is much the same as to ask, if the Determination to act upon the Presence of pleasant Perceptions in general, be
opposite

opposite to acting on the Presence of any given pleasant Perception in particular: For in this large and most extensive Sense of the Word, as formerly stated, I would be understood to take it all along: One might indeed as seriously set about enquiring, if a Ship will sail before any Wind, or a Fane vary its Position, as the Gale shifts from one Point of the Compass to another; or if an Organ or Harpsicord will sound, whatever Note or Chord be set in Vibration. If therefore the Question were to be proposed, "Is Self-love to be preferred to social, and to the Love of GOD?" or inversely, "Is social Love to be preferred to selfish?" I should answer, the *Question* were just as significant, "Is *Self-love*, Uneasiness, or mental Attraction, to be preferred to the Desire of *private Self-interest*?" For this Motive-

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instinct

instinct is as really excited by pleasant affecting Ideas relating to the Deity, or to Mankind, as by those that relate to Self-interest; and, like the Organ, shews that it is affected, and touched, whatever String be struck.

IN effect, it is by thus settling the true Notion of *Self-love*, (a Term otherwise of a very doubtful Meaning) and substituting in its Place the Term *Uneasiness* or *mental Attraction*, which is equivalent to it, that we avoid all the Perplexity and Wrangling this Question has occasioned. Thus there appears to be in Truth as little Pertinence or Propriety in enquiring, Whether *Uneasiness*, *mental Attraction*, or *Self-love*, is stronger or preferable to the Love of Mankind and of the Deity, as in asking, If the general Determination to be moved by pleasant

pleasant Ideas, is preferable to those Ideas that are of all others most delightful and interesting;— as in stating a Competition between *Being* itself and its Enjoyments;— or between the Organs that perceive Pleasures, and the Pleasures that are perceived by the Organs.

SELF-LOVE is in Truth as really affected and gratified by the pleasant Impressions of Benevolence or Harmony, as by those that concern our own Preservation and Advantage.

*Self-love thus push'd to Social to
Divine,
Gives thee to make thy Neigh-
bour's Blessing thine.*

POPE.

FROM the foregoing Illustrations, it is hoped that the Distinction

tion between *Self-love* and *private Self-affection*, may appear to be well founded: The former (to speak logically) being the *Genus*, under which the original Desires that affect the Good of others, as well as those that refer to our own, are equally comprehended: Whereas the latter implies a deliberate Consultation and balancing of the Merits and proportionable Values of the several Desires that refer to private Good; in doing which, there is an indispensable Necessity of employing the Faculty of Reason.

ABSOLUTE Want of Self-affection, or total Neglect of Self-interest, is morally wrong, in regard that it implies Neglect of a Part of the System; and the more, that it is such a Part as has been particularity committed to our own Charge by Nature, Providence
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and Society.—For the same Reason, any Deficiency in the Degree of it is also blameable; for this is to be less careful of our Interest than the Good of the Whole requires.—Again, we are bound to employ all our Powers in occupying the Station, and cultivating the Sphere of Action, which the Head of the System has destined for us in Society, during so long a Time as he pleases to continue our Abode in it; nor are we left at Liberty to lay Hands on that Life which God has bestowed on us for those Purposes, or withdraw from it, thro' Peevishness on account of Disappointments that are past, or thro' a pusillanimous Despondency at the Prospect of Hazards and Difficulties that are to come, or in a Word to dismiss our selves, on any Pretence, at our own Pleasure.

FURTHER, as the Deity has implanted in our Nature a general Desire of Pleasure and Happiness; and, in order to its Gratification, has furnished us with several Senses or Determinations to be pleased with certain Objects; and as he has not only furnished us with particular Organs and Instruments of Pleasure, and with various Appetites and Affections, but has likewise made very liberal Provision for their Gratification; so the gratifying them with agreeable Perceptions, or Sensations, cannot be wrong, if it be done in such a Way, as may reasonably appear to be fairly consistent with the Good of the universal System, and the Will of its sovereign Benefactor; for the Enjoyment of any Degree of Pleasure by our selves, when it consists with the Good of other Parts
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of the Universe, not only adds to our own Happiness, but inhan-ces the Sum of Happiness in that Whole, of which every Man is a Part. — But, *Selfishness*, which is the Excess of Self-affection, as it implies Deficiency of the due Measure of publick Affection and Concern for the Interest of the Whole, is justly blameable: As are also Idleness, Indolence, Waste of Time and Wealth, Officiousness, or the interesting our selves in the Concerns of others, beyond certain Rules and Limits; laborious Application to Trifles and useless Amusements; yet more, Intemperance, Luxury, or whatever while it overloads or weakens the Body, at the same time enervates and debases the Mind; and in general, whatever indisposes us for pursuing, or tends to make us neglect our
greatest

greatest Good, and the Good of the System at the same time.

As *Self-affection*, or due Care of Self-interest, tends to the Good of the Whole, though not so directly as Benevolence; so *Benevolence* tends to the Good of the private System, and conspires towards the Gratification of Self-love, as effectually, though not so immediately, as Self-affection. This publick Affection extends itself to the whole Circle of sensible and intelligent Beings. But our Intercourse being confined at present to those co-existing with us upon Earth, our publick Affection is chiefly determined to manifest itself, in a Care to advance the Good of the human Species; who, for ought we know, are the only moral Inhabitants on this Globe.

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THERE appears to be good Foundation for asserting, that no View of gratifying a wanton and frolicksome Humour, nor any Thing less, than the necessary Service of human Life, can furnish a just Warrant for depriving the Brute-animals of Life, or any of their sensitive Enjoyments; Providence having subjected them to Man's Use, and not to his Tyranny. And besides that the indulging such mischievous Humours, is in itself unnatural, and hurtful to Man himself, it is cruelly injurious to that sensitive Interest of Brute-creatures, which Nature has given them a Right to enjoy; and which, however inconsiderable, in respect of what moral Beings can attain, is still their only Good; and, at the same Time, ought to be regarded, as bearing some Proportion in the Sum or total Aggregate of
Good

Good in the Universe: Therefore, it cannot be justly taken away, or impaired, but in case this shall contribute to a greater Quantity of Good upon the whole.

AFTER taking Notice of the general Measures of Benevolence, and Duty to be observed by Man, towards inferior Species of Creatures, we are led to mention those that relate to his own. Now it is certain, that tho' the first Determinations of social Love are confined by, and interested in the nearer Attachments of Kindred and Relation; yet, if no wrong Association of Ideas supervene, to confound its Feelings, and divert its natural Course, it will gradually open and expand itself, till it embrace all Mankind with its generous Regards. Various Circumstances concur to excite mutual kind Regards amongst Man-kind,

kind, and to set them in an affectionate Relation to one another. Such are ; Their Similitude of Nature : Their partaking in common of the Powers of Reason and Speech : Their common Superiority in consequence of these to the bestial Tribes, and their greater Capacity of Happiness and Misery : Their common Subjection to the same Needs ; their having Recourse to similar Means for relieving them ; their Capacity of assisting one another ; the Power which, by the Combination of their distinct Forces, corporeal and mental in social Life, they jointly acquire of disincumbering themselves of almost every Inconvenience arising from natural Necessities, and of rendering Life chearful, commodious and elegant. Their equal Derivation from one Stock, or their common Participation of the same Blood, descend-

descending to them, all alike, from the same original Parents: The more interesting Affinity (were they duly sensible of it) that arises from their partaking in common of the same intellectual Nature; and of some remaining Traces of the Divine Image: Their common Subjection to the same Laws of Virtue, and the same Discipline of Providence: Add to all these, the Influence of the social Instinct itself, which is ever found to strengthen and become more enlarged and active, in proportion to the Force of the Habit with which the Considerations now mentioned are attended to and regarded. A just Impression of these will not fail to extend the Benevolence of Men beyond the narrow Limits of Oeconomical and National Attachments, and represent this immense Globe, on which they dwell as one common Country,

try, wherein every one who partakes with them of the human Nature, in whatever different Nation or distant Climate he may live, is their Compatriot and Fellow-commoner; and all the several States and Kingdoms are so many Families under the same great Community, and equally subject to the same Laws of Nature and of Nations. At the same Time that these Considerations tend to excite our Affection to our Brethren of Human Race, they represent them to us, as forming no contemptible Part of that great System or Whole, whose Good, in concert with universal Nature, we are bound to advance with our utmost Power. Under this Head the following Observations obviously reducible to the preceeding Maxims, may be properly subjoined.

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WE are bound in case of any Competition to prefer the Happiness of all Mankind to that of any Part; —to prefer the Good of a greater Number to the same Good of a lesser; and therefore, in such Cases, we should promote the Good of a greater Number rather than of a lesser, provided that the Good, thus parcell'd and diffused among many, do not dwindle into a Trifle, and lose its Nature and Use, with respect to each Particular. —We should consult the mental Enjoyments of Men, rather than their sensual ones; —and their moral Enjoyments rather than any other mental ones; because we ought to have it chiefly at Heart to do for them what is most beneficial, or contains the greatest Quantity of Good. —Such Things as we justly reckon our Fellow-men, are
by

by the Law of Benevolence, or universal Love bound to do, or forbear, for our Good, are equally to be done or forborn by us, with a View to theirs, the Case being inverted.

NATURE has invested every Man with the Property of his Life and Limbs, of his Labour, and the Product of his Labour: Also the first Occupation of any Thing, when obtained without Prejudice to any, gives a Man a fair Title to the Possession of it, a Title that none can justly challenge, and that can be forfeited no otherwise, than by Crimes against the Civil Society of which he is a Member. Nor is it less agreeable to Reason, that a Man may lawfully defend or recover what is unjustly invaded, or has been taken from him by Violence or Fraud. And as the Right to

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Wealth and Property which one has acquired, remains to him intire, unless transferred by Compact, or by the Civil Authority, which generally suppose an Equivalent or Compensation; so the Rights of all that claim under him, continue valid; and being neither forfeited, nor transferred, remain in the Family till it be extinct. It is conducive to the Good of the Whole, that a Man be careful to maintain to himself these, and such other personal and private Rights as these.

THE same Regard to universal Love, and the Good of Society, no less obliges Men to consult the just Interests and Rights of one another: And to qualify themselves for this effectually, they are above all Things bound to beware of the following Crimes and Vices: Of all Overt-acts of Injustice

justice, Violence, Oppression, and Cruelty, as Deceit, Theft, Robbery, Mutilation, or Murder; as also of Lying, Treachery, Perjury, and Defamation; and, for the same Reason, of whatever bad Dispositions and Habits of Mind have a Tendency to these, as Malice, Envy, Pride, Surliness, and Contempt of the kind Disposition of others, which, by the Name of Ingratitude, stands distinguished as one of the most odious of all the Vices.

YET more carefully ought we to consult the Interest of Society, than of single Persons. With Regard to the Oeconomical Society, Adultery is real Injustice, as it lessens and tends to extinguish natural Affection, and introduces Unhappiness and Confusion into Families, as it tends to make the Parents either hate their Chil-

dren or unattentive to their Education : as the Practice of it, at the same Time, is really hurtful to the Delinquent, to his inward Character as well as outward Reputation, it is therefore opposite to Self-interest. Vague Lust also is a Source of great Disorder to human Life, the more, that it introduces Children into the World in Circumstances of great Disadvantage and Contempt, and incapable, from the Want of regular Education, of becoming any Thing else, than dangerous Members of Society. Any Man, who hesitates, concerning the Injustice of this Practice, may quickly be satisfied by putting the Case home to himself, and making the Supposition, that it is his own Daughter, who, by being debauched, is exposed to the unhappy Circumstances of Prostitution; and he must straightway be brought

to conclude, that the Debauchee has wronged him in a most sensible Part, by blasting the Credit of his Family, and depriving him of the Joy and Comfort he might hope to have in his Children.

IF these Things be contrary to the Interests of Mankind, their Opposites must be virtuous and right; such are, the Expressions of Regard to our Neighbour's Person, Estate and Reputation; of Justice, Integrity, Candour, Humanity, Moderation, Meekness, and Chastity. But over and above mere outward Expressions, the Love of Mankind implies, more directly, Goodness of Heart, an affectionate Propension to the true Interests of Men, and a sincere Endeavour to promote their Happiness; for Love, not only, worketh no ill, and restrains every outward Appearance of Self-interest
and

and Malevolence, but, being an active-Principle of universal Benevolence, subdues the very Passions and Desires from which those arise.

It is impossible that Mankind could live happily, or even securely, in a State of Dissociation or mutual Independence; therefore *Society* is indispensibly necessary. Nor is Subordination and *Government* less requisite for the Good of Men; it being undeniable, that Society would be altogether insufficient, as it could not even subsist without it. And it is reasonable and just, because necessary in order to Government, that Men should part with, or yield up certain natural Rights and Privileges to the Care and Protection of the Laws. It is also better on the Whole, that a Plurality of Civil States prevails, and that Mankind are

are cantoned under weildy and tractable Governments, whether Kingdoms or Common wealths; this being also requisite for the Interest of Mankind, and agreeable to their various Situations, and the different Circumstances of the Countries, and Climes which they severally inhabit.

PERHAPS, no absolute Conclusion of the Law of Nature can be established in general, in Preference either of monarchical or republican Forms of Policy; this being left (as it would seem) to be determined in particular Cases by the Genius and other Circumstances of a People.

WHATEVER be the Form of the Government one lives under, he is bound to submit to it, as far as its Laws are consistent with the general Good; for particular National

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tional Laws, that are not productive of general Ill, and that tend, at the same Time, to the Advantage of the particular Government, are not only consistent with, but evidently conducive to the Good of the Whole.

WE are under a peculiar Obligation to consult the Good of that civil Society, with which we are particularly connected. And here we easily see the Foundation of Civil and Municipal Laws.

THE Obligation to civil Society strengthens the natural Ties that bind Men to take Care of their Families. For they are properly the Nurseries, out of which Society is supplied with Members; and therefore, it is of the last Moment, that they be heedfully tended. A Man ought to remember, that he is charged both by the

the greater and lesser Systems to which he belongs, with the Care of his Family, as well as of himself; and therefore his acquitting himself in this Task well, is at once an Evidence of his Love of Mankind, and of the universal Society. The Foundation of Kindred or natural Relation is in Marriage: And, what is the fundamental Relation, ought to be regarded as the nearest. The next is that of Parents and Children; since, without the constant successive Supplies of Children, Society would fail, and the Species itself become totally extinct: And since they stand so much and so long in need of their Parents Help, in order, both to their Subsistence and Education, and their future Usefulness in human Life, it must follow, that to be neglectful or indifferent about them, is highly immoral. Perhaps, the
Care

Care to propagate the Species, is never in the least Degree, and a Concern to assist Children, and to educate and train them for human Society, is too little considered as Matter of moral Obligation. The Reason of which, perhaps, may be ascribed to the passionate Inclinations and Instincts of Men: It may, however, appear to any considerate and impartial Thinker, that such Actions as are more immediately prompted by any natural inferior Propensity, or mere Sympathy, are by no Means on that Account the less virtuous, if moral Reflexion and Approbation be likewise included.

It remains that we consider one Relation more, which is the most important, and ought to be the most interesting of all others; namely, that which we bear to the Deity. This Relation is founded
on

on the following Truths; That God is our Creator and continued Benefactor; that he is the Creator and sovereign Head of the Universe, of which we are Parts; that he is the Author of that Beauty and Harmony, by which he ever regulates and adorns the universal System, and of that Happiness with which he blesses the reasonable Part of it; That we depend upon him not only for outward, but for inward Good, and for Virtue itself; that Virtue is no farther significant, than as it participates of that Beauty and Excellence of which he is the sole Original, and inexhaustible Spring: Therefore he is the highest Object of Esteem, Love, Veneration and Worship; and our moral Conscience cannot help approving those Sentiments and Affections towards him, and the proper Cultivation of them, as the noblest

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blest Exercises of the Mind, and the most honourable to human Nature.

It may be questioned, if any distinct *moral Footing* can be traced, without taking in the Consideration of a Divinity; for where there is not allowed a Precedent of universal Love in some superior Nature, nor any designing Author of Order and Harmony in the Whole, how evidently doth this tend to cool and quench the Ardour of publick Love? The Demonstrations of Regard due to Society, must be lame and defective, when no Head of the Society is supposed, and final Causes are rejected; and the Arguments from the Construction of our Nature can conclude but little, while a designing Constructor is denied. That Hypothesis which represents the Universe, as having hurled together

together by chance, or by a casual Jumble of Atoms, saps the Foundation of Virtue; the Accidents of Chance are too slippery and uncertain a Ground, upon which to establish any settled Laws and Measures of Action; the Foundations are at least so feeble, that no generous Hope of Improvement, or future Felicity, can safely rest upon them.

HOWEVER *Lucretius* may mistake in other Things, he is in the right to say, that the Attempt of *Epicurus* to free Men from the Belief of a GOD, was, at the same Time, intended to free them from the Ties of Religion. A much better Philosopher than either, says, “ If the Gods do not concern themselves with the World, what Worship is due unto them? but if they do, and are beneficent, then Piety and Devotion

"tion to them, is no more than
"Justice."

TRUE it is, that the Philosophy of *Epicurus* does not expressly disavow the Existence of Deities: But it is no less true, that any Acknowledgements it contains of their Reality, are entirely verbal, and designed only to save appearances with the Bulk of Men. The *Monogrammick Gods* of the *Epicureans* (as *Tully* significantly called them *) having never been copied from the true GOD of the World, but designed from Fancy alone, could make no Impression on Mens Minds, more than the scrawl'd Outline of a Picture could do, without any of those animating Touches and Finishings, that give an Idea of Nature and real Life. Nor were they meant in good earnest to serve any other Purpose

* *De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. 23.*

Purpose than to shuffle out, not only the Bugbear-deities of Superstition, as unreal as themselves, but the genuine God of the Universe also: Religion, with those Philosophers, being ignorantly imagined to be indistinguishable from Superstition, and the Source of the worst Calamities, that afflict the State of Man.

BUT, setting aside the imaginary Divinities of *Epicurus*, as well as those of the superstitious Extreme, what follows, proceeds on the Supposition of the true God, the sovereign Principle of Design and supreme Head of the Universe. Whoever carefully observes the innumerable striking Indications spread over the Face of Things, of the Reality of such a Principle, of his unlimited Dominion, of the Wisdom of his Government, of the Order and Harmony of his

his Operations, of his universal Goodness and Benevolence, will find himself strongly determined to acknowledge his Authority, to delight in the Contemplation of his all-perfect Character, to honour him as the greatest, and to love him as the best of Beings, to serve and obey him with becoming Reverence, and to conspire with his Plan of promoting the Good of the universal System, both by the right Improvement of his own Mind, and by consulting the true Interest of his fellow Creatures. The moral Conscience, at the same Time, approves of nothing more than Veneration and Love of the divine Perfection, Compliance with the divine Will, or Obedience to the divine Law. Our Faculties are indeed so scanty as to fall greatly short of the Height of the Object. Still however, we feel that we ought

ought to love and honour him, though not adequately to his supreme Amiability, yet in a Way proportioned to our highest Feelings and Capacities. Our natural Capacity of entertaining Sentiments of this Kind towards any Object whatever, indicates that we can bestow them no where with such Propriety, and that we ought to bestow them no where in so high a Degree, as on him, who is himself the sovereign Fountain of Honour, and the perfect Exemplar of Goodness and Love; from whom the most affecting Characters of Worthiness in any other Things we esteem and admire, are at best but so many languid Rays and partial Derivations. To honour him, is to honour our own Nature and that of the Universe; it is in effect to submit to him, who has the only Title to preside and hold Sway over the
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Creation. And to testify this supreme Regard to him by Acts of exemplary Piety, has a Tendency to lead others to do the same. On the other Hand, to disregard him, is a Piece of Injustice to the Being, of all others, most worthy of Honour, and at the same Time reflects the greatest Disgrace on a Man himself, as it shows him to be of too gross a Make to be affected with the most powerful Charm in the World, or of being sensible to Excellence and Perfection itself. It implies Disregard of universal Nature, of Harmony and Order, of publick as well as private Happiness. And to show this Disregard openly to others, tends to have a very pernicious Influence, and to mislead others, into the same most absurd and unworthy Behaviour. Hence the Reasonableness of *publick Worship*, as well

well as *private Devotion*, plainly appears.

THESE seem to be so many Deductions from this, that we should, in Imitation of Nature, and in Compliance with the Design of the God of Nature, “consult the Good of the Whole:” Many more minute and particular Rules might also be thence inferred. If therefore a *Formula* or *Canon* is to be enquired after, and ascertained, for preventing wrong Approbations, and regulating our moral Conscience, as one of the Antients proposes, * this now given seems to be the best calculated of any other.

THIS Rule or Directory, taken from the View of universal Harmony, or from beholding

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* *Formula quædam constituenda est: quam si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio nunquam recedemus.* CICERO.

*The Chain of Love**Combining all below, and all above,*

though perhaps, the best that the Light of Reason can discover, is not pretended to be intirely sufficient or compleat. The Conjecture of a great Philosopher*, that Morality may be numbered with the Sciences capable of Demonstration, is not to be admitted absolutely and without all Restriction. For granting that many of the moral Obligations may be judged demonstrable, yet to estimate in every Case, even such as fall within our Observation, the several Degrees of Good, is a Matter so extremely nice and intricate, and to presume to ascertain with Clearness the greatest Good upon the whole, is, considering the Immensity of the Views requisite for this Purpose, an Under-

* Mr. Locke.

dertaking so arduous and of such mighty Compass, that it may well be reckoned impracticable by any natural Powers of Man.—An infinite Mind alone knows all these Things with absolute Exactness: He alone perceives all possible Relations, Circumstances, Events, and Fitnesses. And Man's Abilities, how great soever they may be allowed, cannot, with any Shadow of Reason, be supposed so ample and extensive, as to comprehend the whole, and supersede all Use of supernatural Notices and Interpositions in his favour; considering that he is at best, as the Poet well describes him, *a Being darkly wise,*

*With too much Knowledge for the
Sceptick Side,*

*With too much Weakness for the
Stoicks Pride.*

POPE.

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It can only be asserted, in general, that the Conscience may be said to act its Part aright, when it rules and directs the Affections, Passions and Actions, in just Harmony with the Laws of the Universe, and conspires, as in a lovely Concert, with the Design and Tendency of universal Nature, to the Good of the whole, which, as a common Law, runs through the whole Creation.

HAVING already shewed, that our acting according to *our Nature* is the best Way in order to our obtaining the greatest Good, — that our acting up to the Dictates of a *well informed Conscience*, is the surest Way to *ultimate Happiness*; it is not needful to add a particular Proof, that *following universal Nature* tends to ultimate Good, since a Rule is only pro-

proposed for directing the Principle of Conscience in its more immediate Government of our own Nature; namely, "that in order to follow our own Nature aright, we must regard and imitate that of the Universe;" for our own Nature being no more than a Part of the universal, cannot furnish a perfect Rule independent of the Connexion. It may however be added, that if following our Nature be for our greatest Good, then in the Use of all the most proper Means, to follow Nature fully and exactly, must needs ascertain this Good with the greatest Certainty. Besides, since by universal Love, and a Desire and Endeavour after the Good of the whole, we act conformably to the Will of God, and correspond with the Designs he is carrying on throughout the Creation, we act of Con-

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sequence in a Way the most effectual to secure the Divine Friendship in this, or in a future World.

BESIDES, as the *Discovery* of the Order of the Universe, and of the Beauty of Virtue as depending on the Imitation of it, gratifies our Desire of Knowledge, our Love of Truth, and entertains our Sense of Harmony at the same time; so the *Practice of Virtue*, in many Instances, gratifies several of our Senses; and these too the most refined in their Nature, and which yield Joys the most delicate and relishing. Thus, for Instance, by the same Action we may gratify our *social Sense*, our *moral Sense*, and *Sense of Honour*; whereas Vice, on the other Hand, can entertain but few of our Senses at once, and when it does so even with greatest Advantage, it is at the heavy

heavy Expenditure of thwarting and grievously wounding those sublimer Senses, which are the most important and essential Parts of our Nature. As particular Virtues, which consist in properly gratifying the Senses of this superior Order, may be called the Springs of true *Pleasure*, Virtue itself in general may be justly called the Source of *Happiness*. Further, as this universal Love, and the kind Affections, which a well informed Conscience approves, and as particular Actions (however they may be severally distinguished by the particular Objects to which they relate) when the Conscience decides in their Favour, are Sources of genuine Satisfaction and Pleasure to the good Man himself; so, when viewed by others in a proper Light, or that is no way discoloured by Prejudice or Mistake,

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take, they gain Approbation universally; the *moral Sense* being in a greater or less Degree shared by every one, whence it may seem justly intitled to be termed the *common Sense*. And since true Virtue cannot fail to recommend us to the Approbation, Esteem and Love of any moral Society of a Make similar to our own, among such only, we may reasonably suppose, GOD will take care to place the Lovers of Virtue, in any future Period of their Existence. This Approbation and Esteem of others, is one of the choicest Ingredients in the Happiness of Virtue.

AND as the uniform and exact Practice of Virtue is thus fitted, not only to yield immediate Joy to ourselves, but to procure Honour and Esteem from every moral Creature, and the Approbation

on of the Fountain of Honour and Happiness, the great Administrator of Providence himself; so while the Affairs of the Universe are under his wise and steady Administration, universal Esteem and Honour, and an Happiness commensurate with our Existence, must be the Consequence and Reward of uniform Virtue.

It is by this Time, I flatter myself, evident that "there is a Standard of Action in Nature, a Law to be found in human Nature itself; and further illustrated and confirmed by the Nature of the Universe;" that as we have an Appetite for Happiness, which is the general Movement to Action, so there are a Set of Actions that have a Suitableness to gratify this Appetite, and produce ultimate Good; and another Set that have a real Un-

suitableness to answer this End, and tend to Misery; — That therefore the Measures of Conduct which lead to this ultimate Good, are not precarious or indifferent, such as only depend on arbitrary Will, and mere positive Appointment. On the contrary, while human Nature continues essentially the same, (*i. e.* while the same Sort of Perceptions and Sensations cause Pleasure and Pain, as now do so) our Reason cannot more fully perceive, that the Operations of Nature tend to the Good of the whole, cannot more distinctly perceive that the Desire of Good is an Appetite implanted in our Nature, that ultimate Good is preferable to relative, and that the former is more suitable to satisfy this Appetite of Happiness than the latter, which may terminate in ultimate Misery; than that these Measures of Conduct have

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an absolute Fitness in their own Nature, independent of all mere positive Law and Institution whatever, to produce our greatest Good: And that consequently these Measures are right and proper for us to prosecute, and have a natural Congruity and Suitableness to our Natures, or are morally fit for us; and on the other Hand, that the contrary Measures are the reverse, or morally unfit.

SOME who affect to speak of the moral Obligations in a very different Stile, still appear to have Sentiments much the same, and so put one in Mind of the Poet's Observation,

*Wits just like Fools, at War about a Name,
Have full as oft no Meaning, or the same.*

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THE *Treatise* that represents Virtue as what consists in "acting agreeably to Truth," seems plainly, though undesignedly, to coincide with the Scheme that places Virtue in "following Nature;" for what is *following Nature*, but treating Things as being what in Nature *they really are*, or *according to Truth*? And what is acting agreeably to Truth, but acting suitably to our own and universal Nature, or agreeably to the true Nature, to the real Constitution of Things, and the Relations, Fittestes and Respects thence arising? Nor would the *Author* ever have imagined this was *loose Talk*, had he only recollected, how the antient Philosophers understood it; — that they hold nothing to be agreeable to Nature, which is contrary to Reason; and that for
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Man to follow Nature, is not to live like Beasts, but according to the Dignity of those intellectual Faculties and moral Powers the Author of Nature has favoured him with; and further, that it implies an Imitation of the God of Nature.

AGAINST that particular Branch of our Scheme, which asserts the Tendency of universal Nature to the Good of the Whole, the following Objection may be started; that "several Animals, by their natural Make and Structure, seem to be adapted and designed for the Destruction of others;" and it may be added, that it is no sufficient Answer to say, that this appears necessary, in order to preserve a Balance, and prevent an Overgrowth in the animal Kingdom; because such Overgrowth might have been as effectually

fectually prevented by other Causes, as by arming any of the animal Tribes against another.

IN Answer to this, let the following Considerations be attended to. Whatever Instincts Brutes may have, Man, the only rational Animal we know of, has none that lead *him* to destroy his Fellow-men, nor has Nature furnished *him* with destructive Weapons. Anger, though natural to Man, is only implanted for his own Defence, and not for the Ruin of others. The irregular Conduct of this Passion may indeed produce dismal Effects, but the irregular Conduct of particular kind Affections may do so no less; and it might be easily shown, that this is one of the most fertile Causes of Wars and bloody Contentions among the human Species. Just Views of human Nature

Nature will convince us, that Malice is natural to none, and that the Misery of another, for its own sake, is by no Means grateful to any. And tho' it may be in some Cases judged needful to cut off particular Persons, for other important Reasons, tho' never to prevent an Overgrowth of the Species; yet it is evident, a lawless Liberty to kill and destroy our Fellow-men, would produce extreme Confusion and Misery in human Society. As the Order and Happiness of Society requires, that the Propagation of the Species be regulated by proper Laws and Constitutions; it likewise requires, that none be violently taken off, but by certain just Laws, and for Reasons relevant to infer capital Punishment. Nor need the fanciful Apprehensions of an Overgrowth disturb any one's Mind, who will
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please to observe the Depopulations of Pestilences and Famines, the numberless Diseases, and various Accidents which are Enemies to human Life; and the vast Tracts of Land upon Earth, that still ly uncultivated and uninhabited.

As to the Instincts and peculiar Frame of certain Brute-animals, which naturally determine them to feed upon others, however singular and unpromising the Appearance at first Sight may seem, is perhaps one of the most refined and masterly Instances of Oeconomy, to be met with in the whole Conduct of Nature, and even of the Care with which she consults the Interests of animal Life in general. For if we estimate the Quantity of inanimate Provision that is made for the bestial Families, so great a Number
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of them as exist in Fact, and each of them requiring a certain proportional Allowance of Provision, could not have been sustained, otherwise than on the present Footing. Now, since the pleasant Sensations of any given Number of sensitive Beings, however various and intense, cannot make up so large an Aggregate of Good upon the Whole, as the same Degrees of like Sensations in a *greater* Number of sensitive Creatures; it follows, that a greater Accumulation of Good must be produced upon the Whole, in Consequence of that Appointment of Nature actually taking Place; by Means of which, not only a certain Number of Brute-animals of various Sorts, proportionable to the Quantity of inanimate Provision the Earth can afford, but a great many more are brought into Existence, which find

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Room to act their Parts on the same Scene, at no higher Cost than the Lives of other Creatures that serve them for natural Food, and that otherwise would necessarily perish in a short Time. Thus it may be said, that a great Part of the Provision itself is animated, and of Consequence the Number of Beings capable of Pleasure by Sensation, vastly increased; thus their Species are more diversified, (which adds to the Variety and Beauty of the animal System) and a Sum of Pleasure and Good is produced to the Whole, greater than could have been otherwise admitted into it. This Surcrease of Happiness, is in the compound Proportion of the Number of Beings formed of the Provender, (or that are the animated Provision of others) and the Agreeableness of their Sensations. It may be added too, with regard
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to such Animals as serve for Food to others, that their Lives are naturally of a short Date, in proportion to the Lives of those that feed upon them. This is plain in the Case of the little Insects and Flies which sustain great Multitudes of Birds and Fishes: Some of them are observed by late Naturalists to be only Creatures of a Day, and come to their last Period, at the setting of the same Sun that rose upon their Birth: The like might perhaps be asserted to hold generally in other Instances. It is true, they do in Time, become Food for other Creatures: What then? Such Creatures once existing must have Food of one Sort or other; but the Question is, whether it is not better or more eligible for the Animals that serve to feed them, and a Production of an additional Quantity of Good upon the

Whole, that they be capable of enjoying a certain Quantity of sensitive Happiness for a Season; than that they should always have remained in the State of mere insensible and inanimate Provision? Which, methinks, may be as easily decided, as the Question, Whether some Degrees of Pleasure are not better than none at all? Should it be alledged, that the same Number might have Subsistence, tho', in a poor and scanty Manner, it is sufficient to answer, that in proportion to the Scantiness of Provision, and Poor-ness of feeding, their Pleasure must be proportionably diminished, and consequently, the Quantity of sensitive Happiness be so much less, than according to the present Appointment of *animated Provender*: And, if this be allowed, it must follow, that the rapacious Instincts of the Animal-feeders

feeders are no less consistent with the universal Good, than the Instincts of those that feed only upon Vegetables; and that both Sorts of Instincts in the bestial World, are as truly subservient to the Good of the Whole, as the human Mind, when cultivated by Virtue, in a more perfect Manner, and higher Degree.

Nor only are higher Degrees of *Good* admitted into the System of Things by this Constitution, but (as was hinted above) higher Degrees of *Beauty* also. It is not easy to see, how, on any other Footing, so great a Variety of different Species and Classes of Animal Beings, could have co-existed on the Earth. At the same time, amidst the prodigious *Diversity* of this great Assemblage of Creatures, the most admirable *Correspondence* reigns; in which the

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Essence of *Beauty* is allowed to consist. There is not one Species we know of, which may not be found linked with some other, and conducive to its Subsistence and Utility.

It may be worth while to advert further, on a Review of this Part of Nature's Oeconomy, that a greater Quantity of *Good* and *Beauty* seems to result from it, than could take Place, were it even possible, that the same Number of Animals could co-exist, and be as plentifully sustained by Means of inanimate Provision only. Had it not been for this Contrivance, there had been no Occasion, no Place, no Opportunity of Exercise and Employment for that wonderful Apparatus of Instincts, observable in Animals of Prey. I speak of those Instincts that are peculiar to themselves,

selves, which they possess over and above such as they have in common with the Vegetable-feeders, and which give them great Advantage over them in Spirit and Sagacity. Now it seems evident, that such Animals have, at least, as much real Enjoyment in the active Exercise and Gratification of their peculiar Instincts, as in gratifying the sensitive Appetites that are common to them with the rest. The same Thing may perhaps be said, with respect to the peculiar defensive Instincts of the Animals that are preyed upon; at least, there may be Reason to affirm, that as much Satisfaction arises to them from hence, as may compensate for the Want of that Security they would enjoy, did all the Brute-creatures live together in Peace.—At any rate this Consideration may go so far as to show, that nothing is lost, but rather

rather something gained to the Sum of *Good* and *Beauty* on the Whole, in consequence of this Diversity of Instincts and their Gratifications, which is owing to the Establishment of Animal Provision: Especially, if we take in this further Circumstance, that to Brute-creatures, a violent and sudden Death is certainly most tolerable. Thus, amidst all this apparent Negligence and Waste of Life, *Nature* preserves the greatest Care and most exact Frugality; a Frugality, from which, with inconceivable Address, she raises Works of most exquisite Beauty, and produces the most bountiful and munificent Effects.

Others perhaps may incline to regard such an Appointment, and reconcile it with the Goodness of Providence in the following View, *viz.* how little Value
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mere animal Sensation, and the the Pleasures resulting from it, pass for, in the Eye of Nature, and of her supreme Law-giver; since thus Measures are taken, which do so effectually deprive Creatures, both of the Means, and of the very Capacity of enjoying them; and at the same Time, along with this, what high Respect is paid to the Powers of perceiving mental Good; and with what remarkable Pre-eminence the Beings possessed of them are every where distinguished; as is apparent from the peculiar Security they have of attaining and possessing them, while they pursue them in an exact and uninterrupted Conformity to Nature. Our own outward Frame, and Condition in the World, appears adapted to present us with this View of the Matter. Hence it would seem, that mental Good is

is the grand Point of View, and the favourite Care of all Nature's Operations; so that one would be apt to imagine, that she has of Design, as it were, more loosely studied her other Works, in order to shew us more strongly and convincingly the Superiority of mental Good, while she has thus omitted (at least, as far as the present Scene of Things admits us to perceive) in some Degree the lower Species of Good; tho' even in these (as has been shown) a Surplus is abundantly secured.

AFTER the foregoing Explications, I hope it may appear safe to conclude, that the *Law* requiring us to consult the Good of the Whole, founded as it is in *our own Nature*, and confirmed by the Order of *universal Nature*, is so consistent, and of a Piece with

with itself, so wise and unexceptionable, that it may well be regarded, as the Dictate and Ordinance of him, who is the Author of our Being, and the sovereign Lord and Governor of the Universe.

THE necessary Existence, Independence, Eternity, Omnipotence, and other *natural Perfections* of the supreme Mind, have been already mentioned; as also his perfect Intelligence. Concerning his *moral Perfections* and Goodness, the following Observations seem to be abundantly warranted, from what has been above advanced.

THE Structure of human Nature, whereby the chief Enjoyments are made to result from a well governed social Affection, and a truly universal Love; and the Construction of the Universe, which determines the several Parts to promote
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the Good of the Whole, (both of which have been above represented, as tending, on the whole, to produce a greater Quantity of Good, than a contrary Structure of either could have done) make up between them a Proof, "that God is good." Nor can Reason discover to us any other Motive than Goodness, that could determine the Deity to communicate Being, and a Capacity of Happiness and Perfection to his Creatures, or to order the Scheme, and conduct the Operations of Nature in such a Way, as to have a beneficial Tendency, and promote the Good of the Whole.

THE Goodness of the Deity is made further evident, from the Immensity of his Knowledge and Power, of which we have striking Indications, in the Frame of the Universe; since it is natural
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to infer from his Possession of those sublime Attributes, that he is perfect and happy, and of consequence, beneficent and good; for we cannot help thinking, that Happiness (or Perfection, the only Source of genuine Happiness) necessarily implies Benevolence and Goodness; at any rate, there is, perhaps, scarcely any Thing, in which Mankind are more agreed, than in an Impression that God is good; and it can hardly be thought, that ever any one who was in his Heart persuaded of the *Being* of a sovereign Mind, could seriously persist in disbelieving, or even in doubting of his *Benignity*, or in imagining the Designs of the first Cause to be destructive in their Issues. It seems indeed highly probable, that were the strongest Proofs *a priori*, of the Existence and Benevolence of the Deity, by proper Illustrations rendered

level and obvious to the Capacity of Mankind, it would scarcely give them a more full and convictive Persuasion of these great Truths, than that which more obviously arises to them from the Evidences *a posteriori*.

THE skilful Accommodation of the Frame of our particular Nature to that of the Universe, by which the Prosecution of the Good of the latter, necessarily conduces to the greatest Good of the former; and the rendering the universal Constitution so far manifest, as to instruct us how we may promote the Good of each at the same time, jointly evince *that God is wise*; an Evidence the more persuasive, that it is taken from Experience. In effect, the Choice of noble and worthy Ends, is not a stronger Argument of the divine Goodness, than the Choice
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of proper Measures, and the Establishment of such an Order of Providence, and Tenor of Operations as are most effectual to accomplish them, is a Demonstration of the divine Wisdom. Thus harmoniously do the several Perfections of the Divinity conspire, and hold Concert together in promoting the universal Good.

SHOULD any one maintain, that Goodness would have been more manifested by communicating an unconditional Happiness to every one, or independently of any settled Constitution, such as in the present Course of Things permits no real Happiness, but what results only from the right moral Temper of particular Minds,——it may be answered, how does this appear? Before one can prove this, he must have an entire Acquaintance with all the Springs of Pleasure in eve-

ry created Intelligence, and be able to compare the Quantity of Pleasure intelligent Beings could receive without any regard to a Constitution or Plan, with the Quantity they actually can receive, on the present Footing of an established Constitution; at least, with so much Exactness, as to be able to judge and determine that, the Quantity which might arise independently of any Plan, would certainly have the Advantage on its Side. Mean while it is certainly evident, that as Things stand at present, intelligent Creatures of our Make, or one that is similar to ours, whose chief Enjoyments are of the moral Sort, and consist either immediately in the regular and harmonious Operation of the Affections, or are the Effects of such Operations, are so far from being capable of receiving greater, that they cannot possibly receive

ceive Degrees of Happiness so great and intire by neglecting the Constitution of their Nature, as by conforming to it: Nay, it may perhaps be added, that such as are truly sollicitous to follow their Nature and act the Part of virtuous Men, would be far from wishing an *equal* Degree of Happiness, at the Expence of a contrary Conduct; and further, that no virtuous Man would hesitate to give Preference to that Happiness which results from conforming to a moral Constitution, to an equal Degree that may be supposed possible to arise, were Constitutions of every Kind set aside: And with good Reason, because, if there was no established Constitution, he could have no Security, no moral Certainty, that his Happiness would remain with him one Moment, since at this Rate every Thing must appear sub-

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ject to perpetual Fluctuation and Caprice. In effect, as no sufficient Reason appears against the Thing, and as divine Goodness in general bears manifest Relation to a Plan, so we have no Ground to imagine, that in any future Period of Existence, Happiness will be conferred without Regard to the Structure of intelligent Beings, or to those Rules of Harmony and Order, which by a general Appointment are established as fundamental to Happiness.

THE Impressions of the Steadiness and Consistency of God's Administration, which we gather from every Branch of it, that falls within the Compass of our View, render it highly credible that he will never totally dissolve the fixed Connexion of Consequences, nor abrogate the general Plan which we observe at present going on; that

that he will neither depart from the Law of Harmony and Order he has so universally established, on purpose to prevent the Production of that Happiness which is founded upon it ; nor cause the Happiness of the intelligent Creation stand on any other Footing, than what may be agreeable to the moral Temper of the Agent, and the Harmony of Virtue. Thus we learn to form an Idea, and acquire a Persuasion of the *divine Immutability*.

Tho' it is asserted, that he will not arbitrarily break in upon that wise and good Constitution so as to unsettle it, it is owned that the great Sovereign and Lord of Nature may, notwithstanding, in some Instances, and for good and wise Reasons, by particular Interposition stop or suspend a particular Consequence. It is not, for Example

ample, against Reason to suppose that he has reserved to himself the Liberty and Power of interposing in some particular Cases and Circumstances between the Default of a moral Agent, and its Consequences or Punishment. It is in this Way, that (according to the Light of Nature) we may form some Idea of *divine Mercy*.

No one will imagine any Thing more to be meant here, than that he *may* interpose, for it is not pretended that it follows from any Premisses contained in the foregoing Parts of this Essay, *that he certainly will*. I readily own my Inability to prove by any sufficient Reason drawn from natural Light, that he will actually suspend the Course of Nature in the least Degree, for the sake of any intelligent Species in the Creation; or, putting the Case, that this were to be

be done for any, to ascertain, which among them would be so eminently distinguished. The *Phænomena* of Nature give no Intimation sufficient to lead us to the Discovery of those Instances, wherein the Author of Nature may have thought fit to exert the Power of interposing he has reserved to himself. Where therefore we have nothing but Nature to teach us, and have no certain and particular Reason to conclude an Interposition in any Instance, then the most natural Order and Course of Things is always most probable and likely to happen, and what we ought always to lay our Account with: And what is the most natural Order and Constitution of moral Beings may be evident from the foregoing Explications; as consisting, namely, in that Establishment of Connexions and Consequences, whereby the orderly

orderly Conduct of Affections and Actions, in concert with the Harmony of the Universe, leads to ultimate Good, and the contrary to ultimate Ill. Nor can we reasonably ascertain ourselves of an Interruption of the established Connexion of Consequences, implying Mercy or Pardon, except we have Proof and Demonstration of it by Samples and Experiments, such as may plainly manifest a Power only competent to him who at first designed and settled that Establishment.*

AFTER all the Discoveries we can attain of the Nature and Perfections of the divine Being, we must confess our Insufficiency to understand them clearly or comprehend them fully. That eternal

* *Philosoph. Enquiry concerning the Connexion between the Doctrines and Miracles of Jesus Christ.*

nal Source of Light, too dazzling for any created Eye will not allow itself to be contemplated too near. An infinite Mind is such an Object, as must unmeasurably transcend all Conceptions but its own. Certain Rays of the divine Splendor are indeed *reflected* to us from the Face of Nature, at the best an imperfect Mirror of its Glory; but the *obvious and complete* Spectacle can only be beheld and enjoyed by *him*, in whom it dwells from everlasting. So, the philosophick Rhapsodist, while in loose Numbers he attempts to rehearse the Praises of the Divinity, declares with Reverence his incomprehensible Nature. “Thy Being is boundless, unsearchable, impenetrable; in thy Immensity, all Thought is lost; Fancy gives o’er its Flight; and wearied Imagination spends itself in vain.”

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As far are we from pretending in our present State, to understand thoroughly his Works and Operations. What Man is able to penetrate the Depths of Creation, or the hidden Conduct of Providence? What Genius so acute and piercing, as with Accuracy to distribute the infinitely varied Forms of Being, each into its distinct Tribe, to distinguish their several Properties, or perceive their mutual Relations and Dependencies? much less (one should think) can any Understanding be found so sublime and comprehensive, as to take in this mighty Universe itself, tho' only as it stands at any single Period, in one commanding View; and less still, to trace from first to last the mysterious Detail of the Operations of the Government of God. Is it in the Power of Man to visit the remote Regions

gions of infinite Space, or recal the Annals of eternal Ages past? imprisoned as we are in a petty Corner of the immense Creation, what Views can we form that are in the least Degree adequate to its Extent, what Ideas entertain proportion'd to its Dignity? what can we expect from the Light of Reason itself, the Pride and Boast of our Nature, imperfect as it is at the best, and obscured by the dull Cares of this narrow Scene, but that like a feeble and sickly Taper, it give us a faint and partial Glimpse of the Surface of Things? It must not however be omitted, that in proportion as it is carefully employed this Way, the more vigorous it becomes, the drowsy Obscurity that hangs upon it gradually passes off, its Horizon opens, and from the View of this magnificent World, it ever finds new Prospects arising of

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the Glory of its majestick Original: So that it would seem, as if it could rekindle its own Lustre, from the heavenly Light displayed in the Face of Nature.

WHICH leads us to observe, that however we are obliged to confess our inadequate Conceptions of the Nature and Works of the supreme Being, the Knowledge we acquire of these, so far as it goes, may notwithstanding be held genuine, and safely depended upon. The Goodness, the Power, or any other Perfections of the Deity, which are any Way analogous or similar to respective Faculties and Characters in ourselves, are what we can certainly assure ourselves have real Place in his Nature, from the Indications we behold of them in his Works: In this we have found Footing and solid Ground to go upon, in as far

far as we can conceive the Ideas of these Perfections, by reflecting on our own Minds and their Capacities. Therefore we may fully assure ourselves of the Reality of the divine Perfections, tho' we are far from comprehending their Degrees.

IN like Manner, our Incapacity of comprehending fully the Works of God, by no Means can be thought to warrant any Inference, that our Notions of the general Laws, and common *Phenomena* of Nature are wrong or merely hypotheticalal. May we not for Instance, be allowed to know with sufficient Certainty that the Parts of the human Body contribute to the Good of its whole Composition, notwithstanding we can see but imperfectly the particular Manner of their several Operations to that End? or, that the

Motions of the Planets are settled in such a Way as to be conducive to the Good of our Solar System, tho' we know not whether Planetary Motion is produced by the Instrumentality of Æthereal Matter, or otherwise? The Tendency of every Part of the Universe to its greatest Good is what we may rest assured of, without the intire Comprehension of the Whole. We find in effect, that the Impression of this, is what we cannot possibly get clear of, if we would; the very Supposition of an opposite Plan, or of a Tendency to Evil on the Whole, is obviously fanciful; so arrant a Supposition is it, that it can hardly find any plausible Support, nor the least Countenance from the Structure of even the minutest System, or most inconsiderable Animal. On the other Hand, so far as our Observation goes, the
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Parts of every System, without Exception, are found *faithfully* to conspire to its Good. Now, if we consider the great Variety of the Specimens of this Kind we have Access to know, and the obvious Congruity and Similitude observable among all the Parts of Nature within our View, we derive Evidence (not indeed demonstrative, for that would suppose a Comprehension of the Whole but) abundantly satisfying, that the Case is the same with the great Whole or the Universe itself. As my not understanding the Office of the Spleen is rather an Evidence of my Ignorance of the Use, than any Proof of the Uselessness of that Organ, and as I have still Ground to conclude it to be some how serviceable, from observing the beneficial Tendency of the other Parts; so my Incapacity of discerning the

Conduciveness of any single *Phenomenon* in the Course of Nature to the general Good, proves no more in reality than the Narrowness of my Views, and my Ignorance in that particular; far less can it give Ground to doubt the general Conclusion of a good Design in the Whole itself.

SINCE therefore we may with a fair Warrant assure ourselves of the good Tendency of the Parts and Operations of Nature, and, of Consequence, of the beneficent and just Intentions of the sovereign Principle, of Design to whom the Worlds belong, particularly in his establishing such a moral Plan, as renders the Enjoyment of true Happiness a necessary Consequence of observing the Rules of moral Virtue, and as at the same time makes the Observance of those Rules an indispensable Condition

dition of true Happiness; it follows, that not only the Laws of Order, Harmony and Virtue, are established by the *Deity*, but that there is actually exercised at present a *divine moral Government*, bestowing, according to that natural Order, Rewards on the Good, and Punishment on the Vicious; or, in other Words, that the natural Dictates of our Conscience concerning moral Good and Ill, together with the concurring Harmony of the Universe, are to be understood as making up between them a significant Declaration of the sovereign Will and moral Law of God; and that the good or ill Effects of complying with, or disobeying these inward Dictates and that Harmony, are to be understood as the natural Sanctions of that Law; which we may evidently perceive, are ever uniformly taking Place,
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and irresistibly prevailing, without respect to any Thing else, than the real Demerit of Persons and their Actions. Besides, as the Subjects of this Kingdom are immortal in their Nature, we may conclude, that the divine Government will be eternal in Duration; and that through all the Periods of its endless Duration, it will be exercised in a Manner the most becoming the Wisdom, Goodness, Power, and Perfection that appear with such Lustre and Glory, throughout the Creation, and are essentially inherent in the supreme Mind.

PART IV.

P A R T IV.

EXCEPTIONS may perhaps be taken at the foregoing Representation of the Nature of *Moral Virtue*, as seeming to imply that it is an arbitrary Thing, depending on mere Will, and on the Construction of our own Nature, and of the Universe, so intirely, that on Supposition of a different or contrary Construction of either, it would become different, or opposite to what we find it at present. To obviate any Difficulty of this Kind, let the following Particulars be observed.

It is owned indeed, that we could not easily form a perfect Idea, nor settle a distinct Scheme of all the moral Obligations of any Species of rational Agents, without

out some Knowledge of their Nature, of their Affections, of their Appetites and Passions, if we suppose them to have any, and of the Relations the Individuals of the Species bear one to another: Without knowing any of the Constitutions, universal, or particular, our Ideas of Virtue and Obligation must be quite indeterminate: Further, were there no Appearances of Goodness, nor any Vestige of Order and Harmony in Nature, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to compleat the Idea of Virtue, or make out a Scheme of moral Obligations with Certainty, or in any tolerable Extent.

BUT it does not appear, that there ever was the smallest Hazard, that any contrary Appearances could have taken Place, or that our moral Notions could have

have differ'd from what they are on the present Footing; for seeing the Evidences of Design, Order and Harmony are obvious to all; seeing the Marks of Wisdom, Goodness, Power and Perfection that meet us every where, lead us to regard those Excellencies as *essential* and *inherent* in the universal Creator, the first and self-existent Cause, who as he is self-existent, cannot possibly be beholden either for his Being, or for any of its Excellencies, to any other; it follows, that no contrary Structure of our particular Nature, or of the universal, would have been so fairly consistent with divine Perfection, or indeed have evidenced Wisdom, Goodness or Order at all: Therefore such a contrary Constitution of particular and universal Nature can be no more properly supposed, than it can be distinctly imagined; nor could

could the Scheme of Virtue possibly have been made the Reverse of what it is at present.

As for any inconsiderable Variations from the common Course of Things, they can have little Influence in disturbing Practice, or altering the Nature and Force of Obligation. While the general Laws that have been established, continue in Force, and preserve their Authority inviolate, no Accident, no Circumstance can be imagined of sufficient Power to suspend their Energy, or supersede the Regard that is due to them. No Exception can be supposed sufficient to overturn any *particular Rule or Law*, however it may prevent its having Effect, in the particular Case where it happens; but with regard to *the general Laws of Morals and of universal Harmony*, it may perhaps be safely

ly maintain'd, that no real Exception ever happens at all. These general Laws indeed, in order to their actual and constant Operation, require that certain other Appointments and a Variety of Circumstances shall also take place; but no Change, no Exception with respect to those Appointments and Circumstances, can affect the Nature, or lessen the Authority of the general Laws themselves. For Instance, in order to the regular Operation of the Laws of Harmony in the Universe, it is requisite that there be existing on the Face of the Earth, many different Provinces and Nations, many different Species of Animals, and many Planets, that are perhaps like our own, peopled with reasonable Inhabitants; but it will not follow, that because a hard Season has extinguished a whole Species of Animals, or an

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Earthquake has sunk a whole Province with its Inhabitants, or because *Mercury* or *Saturn* has fallen to Ruin, that the Laws of Harmony are therefore in any degree weakened or counteracted: On the contrary, such Accidents may be not only consistent with these Laws, but highly conducive to their Design, or even Consequences of them. In like manner, in order to the actual Operation of the Laws of Morals in particular Men, it is requisite that there be certain Senses and Appetites, which in the present State it is the Task of Virtue to regulate; also that there be certain outward Circumstances, and Relations, as of Brothers, Husbands, &c. Now while the Capacity of perceiving the Force of these Laws, that is, while a moral Sense and Conscience remains in all Men (which is certainly true, however they may

may be uncultivated and obscured in some Characters) a Man's having one, more or fewer of these inferior Senses than commonly happens, is by no means inconsistent with the essential moral Structure of his Nature, and by no means lessens the Authority of these Laws over him. The same Thing is to be said with respect to Cases where certain Relations may be wanting. All that can be said in effect, with regard to such Cases, is, that they may supersede *particular Rules*: For Example, a blind Man has not the least Occasion (whatever other Men may have) to make a Covenant with his Eyes, lest they ensnare him; so too a Virgin cannot, like other Women, be supposed under any immediate moral Obligation, in reference to her Children.

THE present Constitution of our Nature, and the present Constitution of the Universe, or such as might be similar to them in all Points essential, alone could deserve the Approbation, and engage the Preference of a Being infinitely wise and good: No opposite or different Constitution could have corresponded with those Excellencies that are *essentially* inherent in the divine Nature. So far therefore are the virtuous Obligations from being founded in mere arbitrary Will and Pleasure, “that they are founded in the
“ Deity’s essential and inseparable
“ Perfections.” Some Philosophers represent Virtue as consisting in, or as resolving into “Agreement
“ ableness to the eternal Fitness of
“ Things; to the eternal and immutable
“ Relations of Things,
“ or to the eternal Reason of
“ Things;”

“ Things : ” A Representation unexceptionably just, in the View of Virtue’s being intirely agreeable to those Constitutions which the supreme Mind, by an inward Necessity arising from his infinitely perfect Nature, was determined to relish and approve, in preference to all others. And as the present Constitution of Things, whether appearing in the Universe itself at large, or in the Structure of particular Agents, may well be regarded as the Type or Signature of the divine Ideas; as the Type must be supposed to correspond to the Archetype, and to represent in a genuine Manner the original Idea or Ideas, which were eternally in the divine Mind; so the Rules of Virtue, according to the View we have given of their Agreement with the Constitution of Things, and to those eternal divine Ideas, may be said to agree

or coincide with the Rules of eternal Reason, or with the eternal Relations and Fitnesses of Things.

It requires Penetration and Delicacy to carry a Point just as far as it should go, and no further. The Doctrine of the Fitnesses and Relations of Things seems to be overstretched by some, and rendered obscure and perplexed; for they speak of *abstract* Fitnesses or Relations: Now, it is far from being easy to apprehend what is to be understood by *Fitnesses* and *Relations*, abstract from and antecedent to any Constitutions, or the Idea of any in the divine Mind, or abstract from and antecedent to the very Supposition of a first Principle of Design, the Original of Order and Happiness. The Appearance of disjoining the Fitnesses and Relations of Things

Things from the essential and eternal Perfections of God, clogs this Scheme with great Difficulties, and has created (perhaps very justly on this Account) strong Prejudices against it in the Minds of many. For the Fitnesses and Relations of Things cannot well be conceived in any other Shape, than as implying either some Constitution actually taking place, or the Archetype of such a Constitution in the divine Mind, his Designs in reference to it, and his original Ideas and Perfections, from which alone (as being antecedent to every thing else) these Designs could have been suggested; and therefore, to place Virtue in Fitnesses and Relations, abstract from and antecedent to all these, must appear to be a resting of it on a very obscure or unknown Foundation; perhaps on Words and Terms, rather than on any Thing
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of which we can have a clear and determinate Idea. It is plain, that as soon as any Constitutions or Systems come to exist, mutual Relations among their Parts must be supposed to arise. Neither can it be doubted, that in the Scheme of Being, great Varieties and Differences must be observed to take place; a Superiority of Perfection in some Beings above others, or a Scale of Ascent from a Stone, for Instance, to a Cockle, from thence to a Dog, from thence to a Man, and upwards to an Angel. The Deity being of absolute Excellence, and transcending all Comparison, possesses the Station of Supremacy, and stands for ever at the Head of the Whole: Whereas the Degrees of Perfection in created Minds are only in proportion to their Resemblance of him, the Original from whom they are derived, and are therefore

fore no more than *comparative* in one Mind, with regard to any other. It will likewise be owned, that Pleasure is more *fit*, that is to say, more *agreeable* to any sensible Nature than Pain, or that it is naturally *good* to such a Being: And that any Source of Pleasure to Beings of a certain Constitution, may give no manner of Pleasure to Beings of a Constitution that is different; and as a *Perfection* of any Kind may well be understood to be a Foundation of Happiness, it will follow, that any Being which has more and greater Perfections than others, is in proportion capable of greater Happiness than they. Therefore Fitnesses and Relations cannot be real Entities, eternally existing of themselves, or antecedent to the Will of God, and independent of his inseparable Excellencies, but rather consequent
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upon the original Intentions of his Goodness, and the Determinations of his most perfect Will. Thus, with regard to the Fitness of Pleasure to a sensible Being, it may indeed be said to be as eternal as the Idea of such a Being in the divine Mind, or as the Designs of the divine Will to bring it into Existence; but it is so far from being a Fitness antecedent to and independent of the divine Mind, that, in the Order of Nature, it is subsequent to the Determination of the divine Mind to give such a Being a Place in his Creation: For could it be supposed of any sensible Being, that it never actually existed any where in the Compass of Nature, or that the Idea of it was never present in the divine Mind, or that the Goodness and Perfection of the Deity had never determin'd its Existence; where in this Case had

had been the *Fitness* of sensible Pleasure to it, and for what Part of the Creation would it have been *fit*? So, that on the whole, it may appear that there can be no Ground for supposing *Fitnesses* and *Relations* abstract from, antecedent to, or independent of the perfect Nature and Will of the original and eternal Principle of Being and Design.

ON the other Hand, if such Abstractions be avoided in this *Scheme of moral Fitnesses*, it may safely be admitted as true in itself, and at the same time abundantly agreeable to the moral Views represented above. And if (as we have endeavoured to make evident) the divine Nature is the Foundation, the ultimate Foundation of the Rules of Harmony and Virtue, we may be satisfied that these Rules may justly,

ly, and with great Propriety, be called *immutable* and *eternal*; and that they are absolutely and perpetually binding upon us.

THESE Considerations serve further to ascertain the Requisites and Conditions of true Virtue, and qualify us for estimating the Value of Actions. It may have been sufficiently understood from the foregoing Passages, that Actions materially good, or such as Love of Virtue itself might prescribe, when dictated by Malevolence, (if that can be imagin'd,) or by Caprice and Whim, or by any other Motive than a regard to Virtue itself, can have no real Worth, no moral Goodness in them, nor add any Value to the Character; for Virtue ever implies *Goodness of Design*. It has also been represented, that *Goodness of Design*, or a well-meaning Intention, is not the Whole of what is requisite

requisite to true Virtue; seeing right Opinions must also be formed, and just Views of the Harmony of the Universe taken along. This leads us to subjoin farther, agreeably to the Article immediately preceeding, that Virtue cannot be perfectly genuine or compleat, when it only implies an abstract Regard to certain Relations and independent Fitnesses, or to Beauty and Harmony, *apart* from the divine Appointments and Constitutions universal and particular, whence those Fitnesses and that Harmony arise. True and genuine Virtue supposes Regards more sublime and aspiring, looking ever upwards through Nature, to Nature's God, and terminating finally on that great Object, who (like the Capital Figure in some masterly Production) stands at the Head of the Universe, communicating to each of its Parts their whole

Significance, Vigour and Worth, from whom every Thing fair and amiable derives its Beauty, every Thing powerful its Energy, from whom, in a Word, every Thing that lives derives its Being. Therefore any intelligent Being, that is not strongly conscious of Sentiments of Esteem and Love to this supreme Parent and Benefactor of the Universe, and of an habitually prevailing Regard to the Laws of Benevolence, the Rules of Beauty, Order and Harmony, and the Conditions of Happiness, which he has established, and in the View of his having established them, betrays in this (to say the least of it) the very imperfect and uncultivated State of its moral Dispositions and Habits.

OUR Love of GOD is the supreme Exercise of our moral Sense.
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We intuitively perceive the Excellency and acknowledge the Delightfulness of loving him who is supremely Fair, and sovereignly Good, all-loving, and all-lovely, the first and greatest, the wisest, and best of Beings, whose Name is Love, and whose Nature is Goodness itself. The more we attend to this great Object, the more we dwell on the Contemplation of his sublime and amiable Excellencies, in proportion must we feel a Consciousness ever growing of our Obligation to love, to revere and obey him; of an Obligation so far from being in the least Degree cumbersome, or felt with Reluctance, that it sweetly wins upon, and totally captivates our Souls; the more our Sense of it prevails, and our Compliance with it becomes habitual, the more does it release and disenthral us from the Tyranny of irregular Passions. It

is in Subjection to this, that the true Liberty of the Soul consists; it is this alone, that can fully recover the Tranquillity of the Soul, that can effectually restore the Government of Reason, and re-instate Conscience in its Place of Supremacy: For this, in effect, is to be under the Influence of the most perfect Reason in the Universe. No wonder then, that it is to be regarded as a Law of primary Obligation, and that our Conscience cannot help approving our Conformity to it, as the worthiest and most honourable Exercise of our reasonable Nature. Independent of this every moral Exercise and Office we can perform is deficient and spiritless, being, as it were, destitute of the true Spirit of Virtue.

Not only does the moral Sense perceive this Obligation, but Reason

son may be said further to acknowledge and confirm it. This Faculty, on attending to the Nature and Relations of Things, and the established Connexion of Causes and their Consequences, discovers it to be indispensably requisite to our Happiness, that we love the Deity, that we regard his Will, and conform to the Designs he appears to be carrying on in the Universe. Thus we perceive, that we are under all imaginable Obligations to love and regard him, who is the Parent of Being, and Author of Order and Happiness, who determined the Course of Nature to be upon the Side of Benevolence and virtuous Affection; and endued us with that moral Sense, which discerns the native Worth of Virtue and Generosity, and gives an high Relish of Pleasure to every Action of the Kind; and so made us capable to

feast on moral Enjoyments, which are of all others, the most exquisite and sublime ; in a Word, without whom no Obligation could take Place, nor Access could be had to Happiness or Good of any Kind.

WE do not indeed always trace Propositions to their first Principles, but often stop short at certain Resting-places, and take up with the Substitutes of Principles for Principles themselves. Thus, on due Attention, it appears, that we do stop short in this Manner, when, in undertaking to discover and assign the true Principle of Virtue, we rest in the Nature and Relations of Things, without proceeding forward, and taking into Consideration the Perfection and Goodness of that sovereign Mind, to whom *Nature* and *Relation* owe their Existence ; or when we only regard the Nature of Man,
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and resolve his moral Obligations into the Power of Conscience as their ultimate Principle, without carrying our Views forward to that kind and benevolent Being, who brought him into Life, and bestowed the Power of Conscience upon him. But, if instead of inquiring by halves, we proceed in the Research, as far as it ought to go, and look beyond the Substitutes for the Principles themselves, it will appear, that a full and comprehensive Scheme of Virtue, of its Origin, Foundation and Obligations, supposes the Consideration of the original Goodness and Perfection of God.

THUS we may be sensible, not only that the Virtue of any moral Agent is always in proportion to the Sentiments of Regard and Love he feels for the Deity, or the Spirit of Religion and Piety

ty which attends it; but also that the Obligations to the Practice of Virtue all run up and resolve themselves into the divine Authority, as their ultimate Source.* Thus there is one universal Law, proceeding from the Perfection, and establish'd by the Will of God, in which all other Laws are comprehended; and therefore to obey those inferior Laws, any otherwise than as Parts of that supreme Law, (*Parts* which of themselves could never have exerted any Authority, or even have existed at all) cannot be truly virtuous Obedience; to acknowledge no higher Authority

* *Sed & omnes gentes, & omni tempore una Lex, & sempiterna & immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister & imperator omnium, Deus ille, legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator, cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur, atque hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiamsi cætera supplicia quæ putantur effugerit. Cic. Fragm. De Rep. lib. III. ex Lactant.*

rity or Obligation to Virtue, than what arises from the Constitution of our own Nature, from Conscience and the immediate moral Feelings of our own Minds, or even from the harmonious Correspondence of the universal Constitution with our own, is to leave out the vital Principle of the whole, and to rest Virtue on a dead Foundation instead of a living one. This is to set up the copied or borrowed Excellencies of created Things, in place of the supreme and self-existent Original; which, in effect, in any moral Scheme is a Piece of Absurdity as great, as it would be in *Astronomy* to maintain, that the Moon and other Planets shine by their own native Light. Any Virtue that can be supposed to arise from such partial and narrow Views, must be cold, spiritless and unactive at the best, and unfruitful of those

those noble Improvements which it is capable of reaching by the Force of Religion.

THUS "to follow Nature," Or, "to follow our own proper Nature," Or, "to do so in concert with universal Nature," are not more equivalent among themselves, than they are to "following the GOD of Nature." And as the Perfection of Virtue, so the Perfection of Happiness, consists only in complying with his Designs, and imitating his perfect Example to the utmost of our Power.

THE Amount of the foregoing Observations comes in effect to this; that Virtue depends on the right Order and Constitution of natural Affections; and not only on the right Constitution of our own Nature, but on that of the Uni-
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verse, on due Regards to it, and to its supreme Head; that, in a Word, Virtue ascends in a gradual Manner from the Regards it feels towards the inferior limited Constitutions, to those that are due to that great Whole which involves and comprehends them all; and that it terminates at last, (as in the last Link of a Chain) in him who is the Author and Architect of universal Nature, himself infinitely perfect, without whom Nature is but a Name, Relation a Chimera, and Existence itself an Impossibility.

UPON the whole therefore it may appear, that Nature, or (to speak more properly) the Author of Nature, has liberally provided us with those Qualifications that are necessary for the Knowledge and Practice of Virtue: Not only are we furnished with strong Affections of Kindness, to serve for the
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more immediate Springs of virtuous Actions, but with a reflex Sense, determining us to approve with Pleasure every Appearance of kind Affection, Generosity, Gratitude, Integrity, and other moral Species; and all this, not in consequence of any previous Reasoning, but by a Sort of instinctive Power, acting as rapidly and instantaneously, as that which urges us to consult our personal Safety on sudden Emergencies of Danger. This Sense perceives the Excellency and feels the Force of the moral Obligations in their fullest Extent; not only as what require us to regulate in a proper Manner our own Constitution, to consult the true Happiness of our Fellow-men, and to act in every Thing suitably to the general Constitution of the Universe; but as further requiring us to cultivate in our Minds Sentiments of Piety

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to the Deity, and Habits of Compliance with his Will, and to animate our Performance of every moral Action by the most explicit References towards him in our Power to form, and by the liveliest Regards of Love of his Goodness, and Reverence of his Authority, in the View of his being the bountiful Father and sovereign Law-giver of the moral World.

BUT the Matter is not to rest here, nor Virtue to be consider'd as the Object of a *Sense* so intirely, as to exclude it from being likewise an Object of the *Understanding*. By no Means; for our Nature being once excited by Instincts, and by Images of Good acting upon us by their Intervention, Reason is of Course awaken'd, and engaged to make proper Observations upon them, on their Re-

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lations, and Subordinations, to discover that Constitution into which they ought to be reduced, the beneficial Tendency of such a Constitution, and the Correspondence it ought to bear to that of the Universe. It is the same Faculty which further argues and infers, that the Model, Archetype and original Reason of these Constitutions, and of the Relations and Fitnesses consequent upon them, is the inherent Goodness and absolute Perfection of the supreme Mind.

REASON likewise further discovers, that in consequence of the established Connexion of Things, we cannot enjoy private Happiness, unless we conform our Behaviour to those Constitutions which have a beneficial Tendency to the Good of the Whole, which correspond to the divine Idea

Idea and Plan, and are significant of his gracious Intentions. Thus, our Knowledge of Virtue and of course our Regard to it, depends upon a rational Perception of the Connexion between publick Good and private Happiness, and of the Agreement of Virtue to the Relations of Things as existing in Nature, and established in the original Plan at Creation, in a Form corresponding with the original or archetypal Ideas of the divine Mind. Hence Virtue may be considered as a *Species of Truth*, and our Assent unto it, as similar to the Assent we give to any speculative Proposition, which it is allowed on all Hands, arises from a Perception of the Agreement of Ideas. Thus, what a Sense or Instinct inclines us to chuse as *good and worthy*, the Understanding assents to, as *expedient and proper*. In which

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View, the *instinctive* and *rational* Schemes do not interfere as Opposites, but as Parts of one Scheme do sympathize and harmoniously accede to the Support and Establishment of the venerable Laws of Morality.

THE joint Relation of the rational and instinctive Schemes, and their mutual Subserviency to the Cause of Virtue, as Parts of one more perfect moral Scheme, may be further illustrated by what follows.

FROM the Suitableness of Virtue to the general Constitution, to the supreme Standard of Excellence, and to the Designs carrying on, as far as we can observe them, we learn that it is really founded in Nature. In this Point of View, Virtue is an Object of the Understanding. For since it
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is by this Faculty that we discover the Relation we stand in to the universal System, and to the supreme Principle of Order and Design; since by this we learn that Beauty, Order, Harmony and Happiness are predominant in the present System, from observing as far as our View extends, that Things are established and arranged, so as to co-operate beneficially to its Good; and since we cannot forbear thinking that the most reasonable, if not the only reasonable Account that can be given of this Establishment is the Benevolence or Goodness of the Deity; it seems natural to conclude, that the understanding Faculty must approve and acquiesce in that System of moral Offices, which it discovers regularly tending to publick Good, tallying with the Constitution of universal Nature, and

co-inciding with the Intentions of its sovereign Author, while it is at the same time most suitable to our particular Nature and Good; I say, it seems natural to conclude, that the rational Faculty must approve Virtue, or the System of moral Affections, Habits and Offices, as *fit*, as *proper* for us to observe. As the same Faculty discovers it to be the Intention of the Deity, that we concur with his Operations for the general Good, as an indispensable Condition of attaining our own truest and greatest Advantages, it hence infers our Obligation to Virtue, or to regulate our Minds into a System of virtuous Habits, fit to produce a Train of corresponding Offices: And as this Obligation arises from the Establishment of Nature, or from that Connexion of Consequences which is established by the

the fixed Laws of Nature, it may be called a *natural Obligation* *. And since he who has esta-

* In these Articles, and indeed through the whole of this Essay, the Terms *moral Sense* and *Conscience* are indiscriminately used, as being equivalent in their Signification. But was it allowed us to propose a Distinction, (which in a former Passage we had in our Eye, but which we waved at that Time, as what might seem too nice and subtle for the Occasion, and to be a needless Deviation from the received promiscuous Use of the Terms) perhaps it might serve to set this Matter in a Light somewhat clearer, and to bring the Parties in this Debate nearer an Accommodation. The Distinction meant is as follows: *Moral Sense* perceives the native Worth of Affections and Actions, and approves them as morally right and good in themselves. *Conscience* is a Principle more general and complex, and differs from *moral Sense* no otherwise than as it takes in something more. To understand this, we need only apply what is here said of the Difference between *natural* and *moral Obligation*. *Natural Obligation* is what arises from the Congruity of particular Constitutions with the universal and with the divine Will, and from the Tendency of moral Operations to general and private Good; this

this is perceived by Reason. *Moral Obligation* is what arises from the immediate Perception of the native Worth of Virtue, of the native Worth and Beauty of conforming to the Genius of the Systems universal and particular, and to the perfect Will of their Author, who is the Source of Worth and Beauty; this is perceived by the moral Sense. Now this last Faculty (it is presumed) never at any Time perceives the intrinsic Worth of any such virtuous Affection or Action, nor acknowledges its *moral Obligation*, without the Faculty of Reason at the same Time and along with it, observing with more or less Attention, the Congruity of that Affection or Action to the Genius and Good of the Systems, and of Consequence observing and acknowledging its *natural Obligation*. Now these two Obligations being found perhaps always to coincide more or less in the same Object of Approbation, may insensibly lead Men to attend to them as *one*, as making up *one Obligation* between them both. Thus the two Powers of moral Sense and Reason may be supposed to unite together and coincide in their Application, or insensibly join in one common Attention, as the Objects of that Attention are found so regularly to go together.

sequences is the only Fountain of Good, and alone can bestow Happiness

together. Now the complex Power which is produced by the Coalition, seems to answer to what we call *Conscience*. For Conscience (if we examine it narrowly) we may be sensible perhaps, at one and the same time approves an Action as worthy, as beautiful, and approves it as fit, as agreeable to the Truth of Things: So too it condemns an Action as deformed and base, and at the same time as unfit, as unnatural, and contrary to the Truth of Manners. Thus as there seems to be a Coalition of these Powers in the Mind, it may appear reasonable that there should be also a Coalition between the Parties who respectively espouse them, as being the one exclusive of the other in this Question. Allowing these Things, how much were it to be wished that the common Use of the Terms *moral Sense* and *Reason* were hereafter in this Subject intirely laid aside; and instead of saying that *moral Sense* approves, or *Reason* approves, to say that *both of them together in one united complex Form*, or, which is the same Thing, that *Conscience* is the Power by which we approve.

There is one particular Application indeed of the Term *Reason* in Morals, wherein its separate Use would be well retain'd; in respect

pineness on Man equal to his Capacity, and commensurate to his Duration,

spect that (as has been at large illustrated) where the Views of the Understanding concerning the State of the Constitutions and their Tendencies, are false, or unduly partial; this confounds and disfigures the Impression both of natural and moral Obligation, or, in one Word, perverts the Conscience, and therefore Reason is ever to be exercised in correcting and extending such Views. But this Operation of Reason, in making further Enquiries into the State of the moral World, is not to be confounded with that by which it joins Issue with the moral Sense, in making up the complex Faculty of Conscience; for by the first, it only lays up a Store of just Notions and right Knowledge, to serve to give Light afterwards, and qualify us to determine from time to time, in what particular Actions and Measures of Conduct, Virtue, Duty and Obligation ly; but by the second, it applies the Views and Knowledge so gathered by the first, for ascertaining those Actions and Measures as Occasions offer, and for determining their *natural Obligations*; in which however, as was said, it acts in such full Concert and keeps such exact Time with the *moral Sense*, that both Species of Obligation, in Consequence of the Correspondence

Duration, it follows that this Obligation is discoverable by Reason to

respondence of the Things themselves, and the Rapidity of the complex Operation of the two Faculties, are considered as one; and hence some regarding this complex Operation only on one Side, or in one Phasis, ascribe it all to *Reason*, while others viewing it as intirely on the other, place it wholly to the Account of an *Instinct*. But if these Contenders would only please to shift their Stations a little, and take the Pains to try if the Object does not seem to vary somewhat its Appearance from another Point of View, they might in the End, perchance, be convinced that the Object is in Reality equally favourable to them both, equally friendly to each of their Schemes, and that of Consequence there may seem to be an Impropriety unworthy such Philosophers, in their remaining at Variance, or in mutual Opposition in this Question.

The not distinguishing between that Operation of Reason which accompanies the Perceptions of moral Sense, making up along with it the complex Power of Conscience, and that which ought to go before, in discovering the Harmony of the Systems, has perhaps been a chief Reason of the wrangling here: Those of one Side, who espouse

to be not only natural, but absolute and indispensable.

SHOULD

espouse the Scheme of Instincts, seem not to be aware of this twofold Operation of Reason, nor to understand well what is said by the other Party of the Power of Reason to approve, as they only regard Reason to be of Use in Morals, for making Enquiry into and setting fairly before the Mind the proper Materials for Judgment; which is the Operation of Reason that is different from Conscience.

We may subjoin, that allowing the Operation of *Reason* in Morals to be twofold, as here represented, it may serve in some measure to remove an Objection that is frequently and strongly urged against the *rational Scheme* by those who embrace the *instinctive*. Say they, "The Deductions of *Reason* must be gradually made, and require a sensible Degree of Time; whereas the Approbations and Decisions of *moral Sense* or *Conscience*, are sudden and instantaneous, without the least Consciousness of a previous Deliberation or Computation." Now, though it be very true, that the Operation of Reason, which is applied for making Discoveries of the real State of the moral World, of the Connexions and Tendencies of its Parts, is gradual, and proceeds by sensibly successive Steps; it does not follow that its
other

SHOULD it be objected, that if the *Desire of Good* were out of the Question, the regular Order of Nature, the Connexions of Consequences and the Tendencies of Things could have no sensible Influence in establishing the

Z least

other Operation, which is join'd with that of the moral Sense in the complex Faculty of Conscience, is also gradual and successive. For in this last, Reason does no more than observe and acquiesce in the Agreement or Coincidence of any good Affection, Sentiment or Action, that may occur in one's own Behaviour, or in that of others, with the Views and Conclusions it is supposed to have already settled by its former Operation, concerning the moral Constitution and Tendencies of Things, and the Designs of the Deity: *This Agreement* we may easily conceive the Faculty of Reason capable of discerning and acknowledging in the twinkling of an Eye.

It is to be adverted, that no other Distinction is meant here between the Powers of *moral Sense* and *Conscience*, than somewhat of the same Kind with that above represented, between the Principle of *Self-love* and the Principle

least Obligation: It must be acknowledged in reply, that there is no Intention here to found *Obligation* of any Sort, on the Perceptions of Reason, independent of that Desire: 'Tis only suggested that Reason may apprehend what we have called a *natural Obligation* abstractly from all *moral Feelings*. By considering the Order and Constitutions of Things, and Connexion of Consequences, Reason discovers

Principle of *Self-affection*, or a rational cool Desire of personal Good; in which last, the Faculty of Reason was supposed to co-operate habitually along with the former, with Self-love, or the general Motive-instinct, so as to make up one complex Principle along with it.

I say, if the Distinction above be admitted and applied in this Way, it may possibly go some length to make Room for every Thing, that has been drawn from it here; and of Consequence the Reconciliation proposed, and so much to be wished, for the Sake of the Interest of moral Philosophy, may be in a fair Train of being brought to a happy Accomplishment.

Part IV. *Virtue, &c.*

discovers the natural Obligation to virtuous Actions to be so firmly established in Nature, that even on Supposition of the *moral Sense* relishing or approving any of those Things, which Reason has apprehended to be really contrary to that Order of Nature, or to the Plan of the Deity, to his Appointments concerning Good, particular and universal, and the inseparable Attachment he has made of the former to the latter; we behoved, in such Case, to reckon our moral Sense to be in some Degree marr'd and depraved, and of course, while it remains in a State so deluded or corrupt, to be in no fit Condition to direct the general Motive-instinct, the Desire of Good. The Case here supposed, is what often happens in Fact, *viz.* a mistaken Conscience, and a false inward Relish. In which Situation our only adviseable Con-

duct is to have recourse to the general System of Nature for a Rule, whereby to discover our Mistake and rectify our inward Relish, as has been already explained in the preceeding *Part*.

HENCE we are led to infer the Authority of Conscience to be only delegated and limited ; and that, notwithstanding its more immediate Superintendence of the inferior Instincts, and Propensities of the private System, this is by no means fairly warranted or legitimately supported, unless when its Determinations are consistent with the Order of universal Nature, and the Intentions of the Deity. Independent of him it can have no legal Sanction, no authoritative Establishment ; his Will, his Constitutions and Operations, relative to publick Happiness and private Good,

Good, are at once its Canon and Confirmation.

FROM the above Considerations, we come to learn more explicitly the friendly Correspondence of the *instinctive* and *rational* Schemes. The indispensable natural Obligation to the System of moral Offices which is perceived by Reason, and the pleasant Relish of Approbation of them that is felt and entertain'd by the moral Sense, demonstrate the Frame of our Nature to be essentially adapted to the Performance of those Offices; and this serves, by way of Deduction, to enlighten and confirm the rational Inference of their natural Obligation; for since the System of virtuous Offices is not only agreeable to universal Nature, and the general Constitution for the Production of Happiness, but is peculiarly adapted to

the Frame of our own Nature; this shews our *natural Obligation* to Virtue with fresh Lustre and additional Strength. From this way of considering our moral Nature, and these two main Ingredients in it, we learn their mutual Subserviency, and how the one supplies the other's Defects. Without the Inductions of Reason, and the Toil of laborious Researches, the moral Sense intuitively perceives the Worth and Excellency of kind Affection, and feels a Pleasure in reflecting on the Exertions of Benevolence and Friendship; and even where some Labour and deep Enquiry concerning the moral Offices has preceeded, there is a sensible Pleasure in the immediate Consciousness of moral Feelings, intirely of another Nature than what arises in the Mind, on the Discovery of any speculative Truth. When one has want-
ed

ed Food for some Days, Reason will tell him, " 'Tis necessary for " preserving Life that he should " eat;" this however would be but a languid Inducement, and but carelessly listen'd to, were it not that a Sense implanted in him by Nature, gives him a Relish and Appetite for Food, the Energy of which is quite of a different Sort from any Convictions of Reason, and at the same Time more immediately effectual. In like manner (allowing for the Superiority of the internal to the external Senses) the moral Sense feels a Pleasure in attending to and approving kind Affections, of a very different Nature from what arises on discovering any Truth by rational Deduction; and which also more effectually determines the Choice, than the cool rational View of natural Obligation could do without it. It is the Province
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of *Reason* to shew the System of virtuous Offices to be *naturally obligatory*, or necessary to our Happiness, according to the Constitution of Things in Nature; but the *moral Sense* yields a conscious feeling of native Worth and Excellence, on the View of every Affection, Office or Action that is truly virtuous, and such as affords the most sensible Pleasure; it is this Idea, or Feeling of the Worth and Sweetness of Virtue that directly and immediately corresponds to the moral Sense; and it is this which forms another Sort of Obligation to Virtue, that is truly genuine and binding, provided the Obligation, which Reason discovers, concur with it, and yield to it Strength and Confirmation. If we distinguish these two Sorts by different Terms, as the former was called *natural*, for Reasons already mentioned, the latter

latter may be called *moral Obligation*, as it more immediately arises from the Feelings of this inward or *moral Sense*.

WOULD the Philosophers who take different Sides in this Question, but carefully avoid the Censure of being Dogmatists, and reflect that perhaps their Schemes may not be at bottom so directly opposite as at first View may seem; that it is not impossible that Schemes seemingly very different, may notwithstanding be none of them without Foundation, on the Supposition that none of them are compleat and integral, and no otherwise contrary to Truth, but in being partial; and of Consequence that each of them may have a good Title to be taken (at least their most capital Parts) into one great Plan, and each may in its proper Order be fetched

fetch'd in, as to its substantial Form, so as to serve for compleating, illustrating and confirming one comprehensive moral Scheme; much unnecessary Debate, and disagreeable Wrangling might perhaps be avoided.

In reality it would seem, that neither the rational nor the instinctive Scheme are compleatly just or philosophical, if consider'd each apart by itself, and exclusive of the other. Setting aside any Consideration of a moral Sense, we may indeed discover by Reason, that a virtuous Temper and course of Action is preferable to Vice, more conducive not only to publick Happiness, but to private, and therefore more fit to direct the Motive-Instinct, the Desire of Good. All rational Minds upon due Attention must be sensible of this, and that Virtue is so far from being

being an arbitrary Thing, that by the Nature and established Course of Things it uniformly tends to publick Happiness, universal Order and the Good of Particulars at the same time; that further, the Correspondence of virtuous Affections and Actions to the Constitution and Relations of Things, that have been established in favour of the universal Good, plainly signifies the Benevolence of the supreme Author of that Constitution; and of course that a virtuous Temper and Conduct is of all Things most agreeable to the sovereign Will, and beneficent Intentions of the Deity, at the same time that it is necessary to private Good. This Preferableness of Virtue to Vice justifies and recommends it, and gives it Weight and Authority with every understanding Mind. But when we take into the Account of Man's Nature his Conscience

science and moral Feelings, another Idea of Virtue arises, an Idea which may be supposed to include all the Views represented above of the Preferability of Virtue, and its Necessity according to Nature, for our Good ; but chiefly is distinguish'd in this, that it super-adds the Sensation of moral Worth and Excellence, a high Relish of Benevolence and Goodness, a sensible Pleasure in the Exertions of virtuous Affection, and a feeling of inward, or what we have called, moral Obligation. These moral Feelings, and that Authority of Conscience which distinguishes the Merits of internal Principles as well as of external Actions, which magisterially exerts itself, in approving or condemning, and which naturally goes on to anticipate a Sentence higher than its own ; are what no one can well be supposed ignorant of, who gives the
least

least need to what passes within :
This moral Obligation is intimately
and immediately felt, and its Au-
thority acquiesced in by all, in e-
very Instance wherein Conscience
approves or condemns. And thus
it appears, that Conscience acqui-
esces in and approves as worthy
and excellent in itself that Sy-
stem of virtuous Offices and kind
Affections, which Reason discovers
to harmonize with the Nature and
Constitution of Things, with the
Will and Designs of the Deity,
and to be likewise perfectly suit-
able to our own moral Nature.
And these distinct Obligations,
or distinct Views of the Obli-
gation to Virtue, serve to illu-
strate and strengthen each other.
Our *moral Sense* feels these Things
to be *good*, which *Reason* dis-
covers to be *fit and preferable*;
whence this last appears to give
A a Light,

Light, and add its Confirmation and Sanction to the former.

SOME who are unwilling to admit of a moral Sense, do yet acknowledge, that in order to solve the principal Actions of human Life, it is necessary to use the Term hypothetically. Indeed the Supposition of a musical Ear seems not more reasonable, nor better grounded upon Fact; for we feel a Pleasure in moral Harmony as well as in musical Numbers. With regard to the Rise and Origin of the musical Sense, or what is called an Ear, it appears, that where it is naturally wanting, it cannot be caused by Art; tho' where it is natural to any one, it may by Art be greatly improved: Nor is it less presumeable, that if there was no Place in our Nature for these moral Sensations, they could not be artificially formed, nor raised

sed by any particular Act of Volition. If there be supposed such a Sense in human Nature, as that we call *moral*, or something similar, and if it be discoverable in some Degree in all Mankind, in which Case it may well be regarded as a *common Sense*; * one cannot help thinking it to have the same Original with our other Senses, or, that it is not the Product of Art, but the Impression of Nature. But there is perhaps less Occasion for Controversy here, as the Necessity of having recourse to the Supposition of a moral Sense and publick Affections is allowed; and as they who maintain that they are not implanted, but acquired, do acknowledge notwithstanding some Sort of Velleity or Tendency in our Nature towards the corresponding Objects, so soon as we are

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* See Cic. de Finib. lib. 2.

capable of observing them; and assert that, in fact, we are led insensibly, and by the Circumstances of our Being, to love and approve certain Actions which we call virtuous, and own that every Argument which is built upon the publick and moral Senses is equally conclusive, whether they be implanted or acquired. The Matter seems to be brought to a very narrow Point, when we are told,
“ It will really come to the same
“ thing with regard to the moral
“ Attributes of God and the
“ Nature of Virtue and Vice,
“ whether the Deity has implanted these Instincts and Affections in us; or has framed and disposed us in such a Manner, has given us such Powers, and placed us in such Circumstances that we must necessarily acquire them; they will be alike natural, and equally valuable
“ Parts

“ Parts of our Constitution in ei-
 “ ther Sense, as all Axioms are e-
 “ qually certain and self-evident, in
 “ Mr. *Locke’s* Scheme of *no innate*
 “ *Principles*, and the old one.”*

UPON the Whole, we may con-
 clude that if there be an immediate
 Perception of Approbation and
 Pleasure connected with these Af-
 fections and Actions, which Reason
 observes to be followed by Con-
 sequences of Advantage, and tend
 to our Happiness according to the
 Constitution of Nature, a double
 or complex Sort of Obligation to
 Virtue is established of Course.
 The former is more near and in-
 timate, since the Sensation of Ap-
 probation and Pleasure may be
 said to co-exist with every Exer-
 tion of virtuous Affection; the
 latter, which depends on the View

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* *Law’s Notes on Abp. King’s Essay on the Origin of Evil, Chap. I. §. 3.*

of the rational Advantage resulting from virtuous Actions, must appear very weighty and strong in the Apprehension of every intelligent Agent. Thus both of them with joint Energy operate in favour of Virtue. That Source of Obligation, by which we perceive the native Worth of virtuous Affection, and feel it with Pleasure, is the moral Sense or Conscience. That which perceives the rational Advantages of virtuous Conduct is Reason and Understanding; this is employed in discovering the Will of God, and the System of virtuous Offices, and by Reflection on the Tendency of Things in the general System, affords Rules for directing the moral Sense or Conscience, and holding it in an even Conformity to Truth in its Determinations; the previous obligatory Feelings of that Power being always supposed. By
the

the same Faculty we also discover that the Intention of the Deity conspires with the Bent of our inward Frame, and of Conscience itself; by this we likewise discover that the System of virtuous Affections and Offices are most advantageous to our private Interest; and consequently by this we perceive that the moral Sense, the Will and Intention of the Deity, and private or Self-affection, all concenter in one and the same Conduct.

THEY who refuse a moral Sense, or a Power of approving moral Worth, must of course resolve the Whole of *Obligation* into what has been called *natural*: But even on the Supposition of Instincts, or a moral Sense, and of a moral Obligation resulting from it, that *moral Obligation* may nevertheless in a certain Point of View be considered as a *natural Obligation*

ligation, or as reducible to it; particularly, as it is in consequence of a natural Establishment, that the *moral Sense* perceives Virtue with Approbation and feels it with Pleasure. The Obligation to Virtue may be therefore regarded as *natural*, in this larger View, as being agreeable to our moral Sense; and as being at the same time agreeable to our *Sense of Honour*, which presupposes the former, and implies the Reality of Virtue; since, without a Sentiment of Virtue and real Merit, the Desire of Honour would be mere Caprice and Whim: Also as being further highly satisfactory in consequence of the same Establishment of Nature to the *Sense of Harmony*; there being no Charm of the orderly harmonious Sort that can stand in Competition with the Beauty and Order of the Affections, with the Symmetry

Symmetry and Proportion of virtuous Behaviour. And it may be asserted in general, that Virtue has a Tendency to yield the most delightful Gratification to all our Senses, to all our Organs and Faculties of Pleasure, and most especially to those of the finer and nobler Kind; and consequently that Virtue tends to produce the most satisfying and durable Pleasures, or the most entire Gratification to our general Appetite of Good, or to that Determination to act on the Presence of affecting Sensations, which has been called *mental Attraction*.

THEY who place Virtue in the Reason and Relations of Things, and tell us at the same time, that these Relations are to be corresponded with, or conformed to, for the Sake of their own intrinsic Worth, or have a full obligatory

gatory Power, abstract from and antecedent to any View of Rewards or Punishments annexed, either by natural Consequence, or positive Appointment, may well appear to reject somewhat unwarily some of the most reasonable Inducements to Virtue, and to straiten too far the Grounds of moral Obligation. For may not even the Appointment of positive Rewards and Punishments be reasonably considered, either as giving an additional Spring and greater Energy to mental Attraction in general, or as a superadded Motive to excite us to a more heedful Attention to the natural Sanctions and Consequences of Things? As for the *natural Consequences* of Sanctions of Virtue, they seem to be inseparably connected with our Idea of Virtue; Virtue or moral Good being that which produces natural Good, and Vice or moral Evil,

Evil, being that which produces natural Evil to the Mind: Such an Idea of Virtue therefore, as does not represent the Delight it yields to our inward Sense, to mental Attraction, or our general Appetite of Good, seems to be very imperfect and inadequate.

WERE it possible to act virtuously, or to practise uniformly the whole Round of good Actions and Offices that Virtue prescribes, from narrow mercenary Views, or without any generous Meaning to promote the Happiness of others as well as our own; however this may have the Semblance or Shadow of Virtue, it is by no means Virtue itself. An Aim so illiberal and fordid, is in truth destructive of private Interest, and poisons every genuine Source of Self-enjoyment. But can we practise real Virtue without conscious Joy?
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Can we contemplate the fairest and most excellent and most perfect Object without the highest Taste of Pleasure? Can we love the Deity and imitate his Goodness without a Complacency the most delightful and sublime? Can we be truly beneficent and exert our utmost Endeavours for the Good of others, and be insensible mean while to the Charm of social Affection, the Sweetness of the kind Propensity? Is there the least Ground for supposing, that in order to practise Virtue without any Regard to its natural Consequences, we can stop the Organs of Sensation and Faculties of Pleasure in our Nature; or that while we exert the virtuous Affections, we can prevent or even abstract from our Thoughts that conscious Pleasure which naturally attends them, or those agreeable Reflexions that are naturally consequent

quent upon them, or, (which is much the same) suspend the unremitting Energy of mental Gravitation, or exert the least Activity without its Influence? Have those Relations, in which Virtue is alleged to consist, a full obligatory Power, or are they to be regarded for their own intrinsic Worth, abstract from, and antecedent to their Tendency to produce natural Good or Happiness,—their Tendency to gratify any particular Organs of Perception or Sensation in our Nature,—or to gratify *mental Attraction*, or the general Determination of our Nature to act in View of Good? Are these Relations to be regarded as abstract from, and antecedent to any Tendency to produce the Esteem and Favour of our Fellow-creatures? In fine, are they to be regarded as apart from, or as prior to the Consideration of their being co-

incident with the benevolent Views and Intentions of the Deity, and of their being agreeable to his perfect Nature, which is the supreme Original of all Relations, and of all Excellence and Happiness? This indeed may well seem to be a Straining of Philosophy into a Degree of Abstraction beyond natural Feelings, and beyond that very *Reason* itself, whose Influence in this Matter is so solicitously contended for. The Poet gives a much more just and intelligible Account of the Matter,

*Know then this Truth (enough for
Man to know)*

*Virtue alone is Happiness below;
The only Point where human Bliss
stands still*

*And tastes the Good without the
Fall to Ill;*

Where

Part IV. *Virtue, &c.* 291

*Where only Merit constant Pay
receives,*

*Is blest in what it takes, and what
it gives. ** POPE.

FROM these Things it may appear reasonable to consider Virtue as a Law guarded with proper Sanctions, given by a Superior of sufficient Power to make us happy or miserable, to whom we must at all Times be beholden for our Being, and every Enjoyment.

*VIRTUE is the Law of GOD,
promulgated by the Nature of Man,
and the Order of the Universe;*

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* Tho' the particular Method of reconciling the *instinctive* and *rational Schemes*, as proposed in the Note that runs from P. 259 to P. 266, was intended to stand as a distinct Piece of reasoning by itself, it may appear however, not only to be no Way inconsistent with the Reasoning in the Text to the same purpose, but to serve for its Illustration and Confirmation.

in other Terms to the same Purpose, it is a Law exhibited in plain and legible Characters in the Nature, Constitution and Relations of Things: It is a Law, not founded on arbitrary and mutable Will, but on the irreversible Basis of the *divine Will*, or on the essential Goodness and Perfection of the divine Nature; for the *divine Will* is nothing different from the Tendency and Determination of his *perfect Nature*. And the Tendency of Virtue to produce the greatest Good, and of Vice to produce the greatest Evil, may justly be considered, as the awful Sanction of this unchangeable Law and Will of God.

FOR, on recollecting the past Steps of this Enquiry, we flatter ourselves that it is fairly brought to the following Conclusion,
“ That the compleat Idea of Vir-
“ tue

"Virtue is not to be obtained from
 "human Nature alone, or taken
 "apart and independent; but
 "from viewing it as an Object
 "correlative with the Universe,
 "and from the mutual Agree-
 "ment and Harmony which the
 "Supreme Author and Law-giver
 "appears to have design'd should
 "take Place between them; that
 "therefore Virtue is to be regard-
 "ed and revered as a divine Law,
 "promulgated to Man by his own
 "Nature, and by the Nature of
 "the Universe; in one Word, by
 "the Nature of Things: That
 "therefore *the Obligation to Vir-*
 "*tue*, (as hinted above) taken in
 "any other View lower than this,
 "is imperfect and incomplete."

CERTAINLY the Motives to Vir-
 tue drawn from the Nature of Man,
 and the Harmony of Things, do
 not of themselves contain the full

Energy and Authority of *perfect Obligation*; and are not so steady, so lively and universal, as when taken in Subordination to the divine Will. It is by no Means denied, that the Tendency of Virtue to our own private Good, furnishes some Degree of Obligation to practise it; that this Obligation to it, is further strongly inanced and confirmed by the Impression entertained by *Conscience* of its native Worth, and by the Views obtained by *Reason* of its Agreement with the Constitution of the Universe: These last more especially are essential to the Idea of perfect moral Obligation: But still without something more, we may seem to be too much left to ourselves—too much at our own variable and giddy Discretion.

FOR we are to remember, that we are not only under the Direction
of

of that right Reason, or of that moral Good and Virtue, the Ideas of which we are capable of forming for ourselves, but more especially under the Government of the perfect Rectitude and absolute Goodness of the divine Nature and Will, which are altogether independent of us, and far exceed our highest Conceptions. From this arises the Completion of moral Obligation and its Authority over us. To understand this more distinctly, we may advert that *Obligation* supposes a Law binding; a *Law* supposes and implies a Will prescribing, or a *Legislator* to give it Promulgation and Authority; at least, such is the most received Import of the Terms; and, without Question, *perfect* Obligation and *perfect* Law imply these Things. For, where they do not, the Subjects of them are left without an intelligent Superior,

perior, and consequently remain at the Latitude of their own Discretion and Will.

BESIDES, there is somewhat in the Nature of Man, and perhaps, in the Nature of all finite rational Beings, that inclines to be attached and guided by something more than abstract Motives, more than Considerations of Rectitude and Good, abstract from the Character of some superior Mind or other, in whom they are conceiv'd to inhere, and from whose Volitions and Determinations agreeable to them, they are supposed to derive Energy and Influence. It seems indeed hardly possible to determine the Will, or exert it with Vigour, in any interesting Matter, without seeing first, that the Will of others has been so determined and exerted already. Whence else, the Appeals made
to

to antient Characters and Manners for Support of present Institutions? Whence else, the Influence and Authority of Men of superior Wisdom and Experience; or indeed of Example in general? Do we see any, who are capable of acting uniformly from cool Views of Reason, apart from any Countenance these may have from the Manners and Example of others? Are not the Sentiments, Declarations and Maxims of publick Superiors, especially if they uniformly adhere to them in their Conduct, in a Manner implicitly received, complied with, and imitated by great Numbers? Maxims, which if thrown out at random, or regarded separately from any Name or Character, would be neglected and made light of! The Abuses arising from this Principle are not dissembled. It is only meant to observe, that such a Principle

Principle is *natural*; as this may serve to heighten in our View the important Part which the supremely perfect Character and Will of God bears in compleating the Authority of moral Obligation. For let the Notion of the obligatory Force of the Conduciveness of Virtue to private Interest, of the Impressions felt by Conscience of its intrinsic Worth, of the harmonious Agreement which Reason apprehends it to bear with the Constitutions universal and particular, be carried to its utmost, and let these Perceptions be ever so constant, without something more, they could but slightly affect *the human Will*; I say, without something more, that Faculty would be little susceptible of any rational Impressions: It could not be in Condition of complying so readily with the Dictates of Reason or of Conscience, when acting by themselves,

as

as when conceived to act in Concurrence with a superior Will. In this Way we may see, of what Consequence it is to assume the Authority of the divine Will into the compleat Idea of moral Obligation. But the Reasonableness of doing so, may more obviously appear from considering, that

REASON, *moral Sense* or *Conscience* are Principles only implanted in our Nature, or derived into it: If these therefore impose any Obligation upon us, must not the Source of such Obligation ultimately ly in the Author of such Implantation or Derivation? What are the Constitution and Relations of Things, but Impressions of divine Wisdom? Can these then fix any Obligation, which does not resolve into the Wisdom and Goodness which established them? What

What is the Desire of Good itself (or mental Gravitation) or what Obligation can arise from it, without taking into View *that Good*, which is fittest for its Gratification? And what is that Good, other than God himself, the original and unfailing Source of perfect Beauty and Excellence? It therefore appears, that the moral Obligations can only receive their entire Consummation, in consequence of their being carried up to their divine Original; there alone they acquire their full Ratification and Authenticity.

WERE it not for this, all these intermediate or subordinate Obligations would lose all Certainty of Steadiness or Continuance. If conceived to arise merely from Nature, without any vital Principle of Intelligence to give them Energy or Stability, there could
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be no Assurance how long they would continue the same; how long Reason, Conscience and the Constitution of Things would preserve the present Form and Determination, without taking a different Turn, perhaps in favour of the very reverse of Virtue.

FROM these Considerations we may learn that it is not quite advisable to take part with those Philosophers, who maintain that the divine Will constitutes the only immediate Obligation to Virtue: As if *mere Will* could constitute *Goodness*, or establish any Obligation to conform to it: Or, as if Virtue was to be estimated only from Compliance given to such Will. Certainly it more becomes us, as indeed it is more agreeable to Truth, to say, that the inherent Goodness and Rectitude of God advises and directs his Will, and that his Will

is ever so advised. When taken in this View, the *divine Will* is unquestionably the most perfect, and the only ultimate Source of moral Obligation. From these also we may be satisfied on the other Hand, that as in the *natural World*, the divine Hand does not operate immediately, but by the Intervention of second Causes, so in the *moral World* the Deity chuses, in like Manner, to operate by Causes adapted to that more noble Province of his Administration. These are moral Causes — such as are consistent with the Liberty of rational Beings; — such are the Views and Discoveries of Reason, the Impressions, Approbations and Remonstrances of Conscience. So that, tho' he sits at the Head of the Universe, imparting Energy to the Whole of his moral Government, tho' his perfect Will is
a Source

a Source of Vitality and Authority to every inferior moral Obligation, it ought still to be understood, that he expects no other Compliance with his Will, than what is yielded in the View of its promulgating itself by the Intermediation of such subordinate Obligations and Laws. And thus it appears, that the Deity is no despotick or arbitrary Governor, acting tyrannically or capriciously; but that he conducts himself by the Intervention of certain Laws and Rules which his perfect Nature determines him inviolably to adhere to, in every Period, and thro' every Region of his unlimited Empire. And thus too (as was said) unless he be supposed to sway the Scepter of universal Government, to set his awful Seal to the moral Obligations, and thereby to give them Sinews and Energy, no one could

be secure of their remaining in Force thro' future Ages; or that future Dispositions of Things will not take Place, totally subversive of the present. Thus we are led to observe, that

SEEING the future World is only a succeeding Period of the same Government, under the same Governor; in which the same Security of Rewards to Virtue, and of Punishments to Vice shall continue in full Force: And seeing we of human Race, form'd as we are to be immortal, must remain the perpetual Subjects of that Government, never to withdraw ourselves from its Jurisdiction, never to transfer our Allegiance any where else; it follows, that the Laws of the moral World, and the Sanctions of Virtue, are of the most sacred Nature, and of all others the most important to
us.

us. For what can more deeply interest *our Desire of Good*, than the Prospect of eternal Happiness in the Ways of Virtue? What more strongly alarm *our Aversion at Evil*, than the Prospect of everlasting Misery in the Courses of Vice? While so awful an Alternative stands in View, no Man surely would hesitate one Moment to embrace the virtuous Part; were it not that some *leading Passion*, or inordinate Desire of other Objects, has already got the Start, and so incapacitates him for making a Choice, even where he himself knows it to be justly due. But, abstracting from these awakening Considerations, nothing is more certain, than that such Desires and Passions, whether they have arisen from some wrong natural Complexion, or have sprung up through Inadvertency, and have afterwards gain'd

Ground by habitual Indulgence, will prove a vastly stronger Overmatch, for any theoretical View of the Beauty of Virtue, or speculative Persuasion of its Excellence. Such Ideas, it would seem, are too fine and delicate, to have a steady practical Influence on the Heart of such a Creature as Man, unless they be assisted and reinforced by other Motives.

THAT the all-wise and all-powerful Principle of Perfection and Happiness, who made all Things in Number, Weight and Measure, did originally form the human Constitution, in becoming Symmetry and Order, is not more unquestionably true, than that a mournful Degeneracy has succeeded, that certain Passions have made gross Incroachments on that original Order, by holding an uncontroll'd Ascendency, and exercising

sing a lawless Sway in the human Breast; by usurping the Place and Prerogative of Reason and Conscience, whom they have guilefully supplanted, by enslaving in great measure every more generous Principle, and foully disfiguring the Beauty of the human System. Hence *Cicero* * says, that Nature seems to act, not the Part of a Mother, but of a Step-mother, in sending us into the World with wrong and foolish Propensities, the Sources of all those Deviations from Reason and Virtue that are so frequent in the World. Good Reason had *Heracitus* to weep, and others, Philosophers and Poets, to bewail the melancholy Corruption and Depravity of the Manners of Men.

WHETHER

* *Fragmenta de repub. lib. iii. Aug. lib. iv. contra Pelag.*

WHETHER the Balance once lost can be intirely regained, and the Force of a reigning Passion thoroughly conquered, — or whether mental Diseases, once prevailing, can be perfectly cured by the sole Medicine of Philosophy, or whether there be not, as *Seneca* seems to imagine, some inveterate Diseases of the Mind, that the whole Force of Philosophy cannot heal †, is not, perhaps, on account of our Ignorance of the Nature of a spiritual Substance, to be distinctly resolved from any Inquiries into the Mind of Man itself. It was probably the making an attentive Observation on the Strength of Leading-Passions, and the Force of evil Habits, rather than any Pretence to superior Degrees of Acquaintance with the intimate Nature of the Soul, that led

† *Seneca Epist. 85.*

led the Poet to express himself so
pathetically concerning the Ma-
ster-Passion,

*Nature its Mother, Habit is its
Nurse;*

*Wit, Spirit, Faculties, but make
it worse;*

*Reason itself, but gives it Edge
and Power,*

*As Heaven's blest Beam turns Vi-
negar more sour:*

*We wretched Subjects, tho' to
lawful Sway,*

*In this weak Queen some Favou-
rite still obey;*

*Ab! if she lend not Arms, as well
as Rules,*

*What can she more than tell us,
we are Fools,*

*Teach us to mourn our Nature,
not to mend,*

*A sharp Accuser, but a helpless
Friend?*

POPE.

EVEN

EVEN Reason herself, with all her Pride, may possibly upon considerate Reflexion, be drawn to confess her Incapacity of restoring a Mind once lost to Innocence. Nay, it may perhaps appear incongruous, that the Deity should ever vest in human Reason a Power so high, so plenary as this. Might not such a Power in the human Mind, of new-moulding or as it were re-creating itself, seem in a Manner to be equal or paramount to that which created it at first? Certainly that Power alone which *created*, is most effectually able to *retrieve*; that Wisdom which knew how to *form*, best knows how to *reform*. The human Structure once fallen to Decay, it is natural to think, can only be re-built to purpose by its original Architect. For, if the Traces of its original Form and Design be in any Measure erased,

(as

(as there is too much Reason to apprehend) who can so properly be consulted or recurr'd to for its Reparation, as that wise Being, who concerted the Plan of it in the Beginning?

FROM the Consideration following, it may perhaps appear impossible for the natural Powers of a Mind that has fallen from Virtue, to raise and recover it effectually. It has been represented, that true Virtue consists in the uniform Prosecution of the highest and most universal Good; of Consequence its Aim must ever terminate on the Deity as the perfect Original, from whom alone every real Good can be derived. That genuine Good in the Possession of which alone, Man can be perfect and happy, is no divisible Thing, does not ly scattered in distinct Shares or Parcels, which
any

any one may gather up separately; and by himself; but is so treasured up in the all-perfect Nature of God, that tho' its Issues are ever open, and its Communications ever liberally diffused, yet these are never broken off, nor parted from him, never attained by any without his Influence and Assistance. Moral Evil is well represented as arising from Ignorance of the divine Nature, and as consisting in a State of Distance from it: No wonder, that the Hearts of Men, while thus remote from the vital Principle of Light and Life, should remain in a great Measure cold and insensible, and like Plants in Winter, as it were bound up in Frost: Well may it therefore be thought, that in such a forlorn Situation, nothing less than his Approach, like the genial Return of a vernal Sun, can revive or recover them. This, in

is to say no more, in effect, than that the genuine Object of Mens most rational Desires, is alone sufficient to quicken and set them in Motion. Of Consequence therefore, it is not so properly Reason's Light, as the enlivening Beams of Heaven, that is able to kindle the Love of Goodness in human Breasts, or animate them to the unrelenting Pursuit of it. It is the Privilege of GOD alone, to touch the Heart with that ethereal Flame, of which himself is the everliving and inexhaustible Source.*

D. d

NOR

* The Antients did not so far over rate the Powers of the human Mind, as to dissemble Sentiments of this Sort. Thus *Plato*,

Ἀρετὴ ἂν ἢ οὔτε φύσει, οὔτε διδακτὴν ἀλλὰ θεῶν μοῖραν παραγινομένη, ἀνευ νῦν, οἷς ἂν παραγιγνῆται. *Meno.*

Εὖ γὰρ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅ, τι περ ἂν σωθῆτε καὶ γενήται διὸν δεῖ, θεῶν μοῖραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι. *De Repub. lib. 6.*

Thus

NOR is any Thing now said, that can justly be thought inconsistent with our former Views. For tho' it be argued here, that in order to form the Mind to Virtue, the divine Hand must be interposed, perhaps unseen and insensibly at the first; this however cannot be understood to supersede the Use of those Methods that have been above represented as necessary to forward the Progress, and maintain the Discipline of Virtue: Such as, to follow Nature,——to obey Conscience,——to correspond with the Order of the Universe.

CON-

Thus also *Seneca*, *Nulla sine Deo, bona mens est, Epist. 73.*

In the same way may be understood the Sentiment put in the Mouth of *Cato* by the Poet,

*Estne DEI sedes, nisi terra & pontus & aer
Et calum & VIRTUS.*

Lucan.

Various other Passages might be adduced to the same Purpose.

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 CONCLUSION.

THUS, with all the Perspicuity in our Power, have we represented what seemed to be the proper *Rule* for directing our *Motive-instinct*, or general Spring of Action, a Principle of itself indeterminate and indiscriminating; and have thus attempted in some Measure to resolve the Question proposed, *viz.* “Are there in the Nature and Constitution of Things, any fixed and certain Measures, to the Observation of which, Man is confined, in order to the Attainment of *ultimate Good*; or may it be as effectually secured by a Neglect of these Measures, and a licentious inconsiderate Pursuit of every Species, and first Appearance of Good?”

VIRTUE suffers less by being contested, than by being betrayed; yet it is to be wished, that such Contests were less vehemently agitated, and the Parties engaged in them less numerous. There are more indeed who unite in wishing well to its Interests, than are agreed as to its Foundation: yet the more they can agree as to this, the more will it be both for their own Credit, and for the Credit of Virtue itself; and the more for the Advantage of the younger and weaker Sort, who in the Perplexity and Confusion of their Ideas, are in Danger of losing the Force and Energy of virtuous Impressions.

TRUTH is one consistent, uniform and invariable Thing: Would Men of Parts and Genius remember attentively, that the most valuable Learning, and what of all other

other Kinds will do them greatest Honour, only consists in the Knowledge of Truth, and least of all, in the Art of warring against one anothers Schemes and Opinions; we might expect to see them more ready to agree and join Issue together. Would they candidly acknowledge their own Schemes to be in danger of failing thro' their Defects, and to supply these, would frankly have recourse to the Assistance of those they are so solicitous to overturn, we might expect, perhaps, to see one compleat Scheme growing out of them all. Thus it might be hoped, they would find, that to act according to *Virtue*, and to *Nature* is the same Thing, — that the latter is only a more explicative Way of expressing the former; — that to follow Nature, — to conform to human Nature.

Nature, * ——— to promote the publick Good, ——— to act agreeably to Truth, ——— to Reason, ——— to the Fitness, ——— to the eternal Reason and Fitness of Things, ——— to the unchangeably perfect Will of God, ——— and to the Laws established by his Authority; are all so many equivalent Expressions, alike significant of true Virtue: They would also perceive, that a full and compleat Obligation lies upon all to regard Virtue; in respect of

* I am aware, that one of the greatest Writers on this Subject maintains, that Virtue cannot properly be called *natural* to Man; his Words are, Διήλον ὅτι ἐσθιμία τῶν ὑδαίων ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται. *Aristot. Eth. Nic. lib. 2. cap. 1.* But he immediately adds, that Virtue is nothing preternatural; that it consists in a *right Habit* superinduced on the natural Faculties and Affections; which plainly implies, that it is *natural* for the Mind to give Admission and Reception to Virtue, and to acquire the Habit of it; and that it *follows its Nature* in doing so: Nothing of which is inconsistent with saying, that Virtue lies in *following Nature*.

of its being indispensably necessary to one's own Happiness, to procure the Esteem and Approbation of others, and more especially as it is the Law of the supreme Mind. And they would likewise see, that those who build a Scheme of Morality on any single Pillar of the human Frame, do not seem to advert how various a Creature it is they are representing; nor to recollect the great Diversity of Springs and Weights, that act upon the general Movement, or Motive-in-stinct; nor that Man is but a Part, a very inconsiderable Part of the Universe; and least of all, that the Universe itself is a Chimera, a Nothing, a mere Impossibility, without taking in that Principle of Design, whose Power is the Cause of the Existence of all Things it contains, as his Perfection and Excellence is the Foundation, the Model.

Model, and Reason of their Manner of Existence, of their Beauty, Harmony and Order.

THUS, on the Whole, I hope it may appear, that MORAL VIRTUE, far from depending in the least on Fashion or Opinion, is founded upon Nature; and not upon human Nature alone, far less upon any single detached Part of it; but that taking in a wider Compass, it fixes its Foundation in the Nature of the Universe itself: That it extends its generous Views to every Being within the Circle of Existence, and ultimately terminates on HIM, who is the Author of Nature, the Parent of Life, the Standard of Beauty, and the inexhaustible Fountain of Perfection and Happiness.

UPON this wide complex Foundation, and not on any separate
or

or single Part, the preceeding Essay attempts, with due Regard, it is hop'd, to every different Sentiment, and superior Name, to raise the *Scheme of Virtue*; about which I am inclined to think the Disputes of Philosophers are rather nice Distinctions, than real Differences, and that they do indeed more nearly agree, than many imagine, or they themselves are aware.

*Like Doctors thus, when much
Dispute is past,
We find their Tenets just the same
at last.*

POPE.

F I N I S.

or single Part, the preceding
 Essay attempts with due Regard
 it is hoped, to every different Sen-
 timent, and Superior Name, to
 tails the 2d. Part; about
 which I have so thick the
 Differences of the 2d. Part, that
 they are not to be in-
 tended, and that they do in-
 deed make a new man.



ERRATA.

PAge 94. Line 21. for *imposed* r. *impre-
 sed*. p. 141. l. 17. r. *Sollicitations*. p. 156.
 l. ult. insert Comma after *dwell*, dele Comma
 after *Globe*. p. 208. l. 10. insert Comma after
determine. dele Comma after *that*, p. 222. l. 16.
 dele Comma after *Principle*. p. 231. l. 21 r.
intercedent. p. 266. l. penult. r. *fair Way*. p. 275.
 l. 21. after *recommends it* r. *to*.

W. I. M. I. W.

